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The 2016 U.S. presidential election showcased prominent rejections of the 
existing political and economic order, as many voters channeled frustrations over rising 
inequality and instability into support for candidates like Donald Trump and Bernie 
Sanders, who acknowledged the widespread economic struggles of the market 
globalization age. This recent electoral example is one of many global rejections of free 
market expansion, a phenomenon that my dissertation examines. While rhetorical 
scholars have addressed the growing prominence of the free market and its logics, my 
project examines how people have resisted what is often called neoliberalism.  
Taking an approach to rhetoric derived from theories of articulation, in this 
project, I define neoliberalism as a hegemonic articulation that strings together four 
governing principles: freedom as primary, economics as natural, the individual as rational 
actor, and the free market as pure. The project examines three activist discourses that 
challenged neoliberalism in the 1980s and 1990s and that continue to resonate today: the 
1986 U.S. Catholic Bishops’ Economic Justice for All pastoral letter, the Kathy Lee 
Gifford sweatshop scandal of 1996, and Seattle’s 1999 World Trade Organization 
protests. With each case, I demonstrate how neoliberal discourses themselves fostered 
tensions and how people exploited these tensions to challenge neoliberal hegemony; 
following theories of articulation, I call these challenges “antagonisms.” This project 
suggests that we should understand activist moments as “antagonistic disruptions” that 
that interrupt hegemonic discourses and evoke the possibility of their demise.  
Taken together, these case studies offer three major lessons for scholars and 
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modal and frequent the antagonistic engagement, the more forceful the disruption. This 
project then, recommends that scholars study multi-modal recurrence and that activists 
strive for multi-modal consistency. 
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The Neoliberal Articulation and its Antagonisms 
The 2016 presidential race featured prominent rhetorical rejections of the political 
and economic status quo. As Salon noted of Bernie Sanders and Donald Trump, “two 
insurgent candidates, on the left and the right, are successfully appealing to anger over 
free trade.”1 From the political Left, Sanders told Democratic primary voters, “Tonight 
we serve notice to the political and economic establishment of this country that the 
American people…will not accept a rigged economy in which ordinary Americans work 
longer hours for lower wages while almost all new income and wealth goes to the top 1 
percent.”2 Sanders characterized U.S. free trade agreements as “disastrous” policies that 
“have had a horrendous impact on the lives of millions of working Americans.”3 From 
the political Right, Trump also called the North American Free Trade Agreement 
(NAFTA) “a disaster” and railed against “all of these countries that are taking so much of 
our money away from us on a daily basis.”4 Trump offered to protect U.S. workers by 
building a border wall and by punishing corporations that moved job overseas.5  
News media suggested that voters from across political spectra were channeling 
what The Seattle Times called “deep resentments over stagnant wages, rising income 
inequality and loss of economic mobility” into support for candidates who passionately 
denounced such economic insecurity.6 The New York Times characterized this election as 
a “populist revolt” and a “backlash” that “has been building gradually among American 
voters for years against ‘stagflation,’ ‘the middle-class squeeze,’ cross-border trade deals 
and Wall Street bailouts.”7 Sanders supporter Shiva Bayat explained in Slate that she and 
“The bulk of young Bernie supporters are most drawn to his tireless commitment to 
taking on the big banks and Wall Street.” 8 Bayat wrote that Sanders’ “platform on 
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economic redistribution and taking on the banks is palpably exciting for my 
generation”—a generation of people experiencing “chronic uncertainty and insecurity” in 
the job market while being “shackled with debt.” USA Today reported on Trump 
supporter Jesse Gonzales who had identified “a lack of economic opportunity” as his 
“most critical political issue.” 9 As he “blamed trade policy” for this lack, Gonzales told 
the reporter, “It’s the government’s job to ensure that our economy is functional and they 
failed to do so. They’ve made sure that other countries’ economies flourish.”10 
Such discourses enabled the Sanders and the Trump campaigns to garner 
significant momentum with their economic messages, which took aim at free trade and 
elite financial institutions. Sanders, a seventy-four-year-old democratic socialist Senator 
from Vermont, challenged Hillary Clinton in a well-publicized primary run for the 
Democratic nomination for president. Young primary voters overwhelmingly cast their 
ballots for Sanders, and forty-three percent of primary voters chose the democratic 
socialist over the Democratic nominee.11 Trump, a wealthy real estate mogul with no 
prior political experience, handily won the Republican Party’s nomination, picking off 
sixteen other contenders.12 Trump went on to defy many expectations when he narrowly 
won the U.S. presidency in what Time Magazine called “one of the most shocking U.S. 
elections in modern political history.”13 In response to Trump’s victory, Cornel West took 
to The Guardian to say “Goodbye” to “American neoliberalism.”14 Indeed, with their 
critical focus on economic inequality, free trade, and elite power, discourses making 
sense of the 2016 election disrupted the assumed inevitability of the neoliberal order.  
Neoliberalism generally refers to structural and cultural changes that have become 
deeply entrenched since the 1970s in the United States and, increasingly, around the 
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world.15 This governing logic valorizes the economic market as a pristine system that is 
best suited to protecting human dignity, freedom, and prosperity. Thus, neoliberalism 
upholds the free market as a model for all social interaction and structures all of society 
in the market’s image. It promotes individual autonomy, deregulation, and the free flow 
of global capital as heralds of human progress.16  
The discourse that promotes unfettered capitalism as the road to human 
fulfillment is a potent and ubiquitous discourse that currently structures human 
experience and public policy. Since the 1970s, people in all levels of society have exalted 
a free capitalist market as a guarantor of progress, freedom, and abundance for 
everyone.17 Neoliberal logic has also justified numerous structural changes that reinforce 
the discourse of free marketism. Proponents have removed structural and cultural barriers 
to free trade and otherwise encouraged the spread of free market capitalism into ever-
expanding social spheres.18 Further, neoliberalism presumes that the spread of unfettered 
capital is not only beneficial, but is an inevitable marker of global progress. Even amidst 
the economic populism of the 2016 election, The Economist argued that free trade deals 
were “inevitable,” and that “the projected gains of future free-trade agreements should be 
more than enough to compensate losers,” if allocated properly.19  
Despite discourses that uphold neoliberalism as “inevitable,” economics is subject 
to human agency and is not a natural system. Since Deirdre McCloskey’s The Rhetoric of 
Economics, scholars have demonstrated that economics is a profoundly rhetorical field, 
even though it rarely acknowledges its own rhetoricity.20 The subfield of rhetoric and 
economics began as a challenge to the idea that human beings are rational actors who 
engage in mutually beneficial exchanges. The subfield has evolved into examining the 
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various ways that rhetoric creates, maintains, and disrupts economic realities.21 The 
neoliberal turn has garnered increasing attention from scholars of economic rhetoric, as it 
continues to constitute a major governing logic that organizes our worlds.22 
Aside from being rhetorical, not natural, neoliberal restructuring and its 
justificatory logic have been, by many counts, disastrous for most people both 
internationally and in the United States. In practice, neoliberal globalization, 
individualization, and privatization have benefitted upper and corporate classes as a 
whole, leading Aiwa Ong to accuse neoliberal practice of “undermin[ing] the democratic 
achievements of American liberalism based on ideals of equal rights.”23 In the United 
States, the wealth gap has been steadily rising since 1978.24 Around the world, Oxfam 
reported that, between 1980 and 2012, “The richest one percent increased their share of 
income in 24 out of 26 countries” and that, by 2014, the “bottom half of the world’s 
population owns the same as the richest 85 people in the world.”25 This kind of inequality 
does not square with the neoliberal rhetoric that promotes markets as inevitable progress 
for all of humankind.  
 The contradiction between neoliberal justification and the consequences of 
neoliberal policy have prompted various forms of resistance against the spread of free 
marketism. Amidst the ubiquity of discourses upholding the free market, my project 
examines how people resist the free market’s dominance. Thus, in this project, I ask two 
interrelated research questions. First, I ask, how did the neoliberal paradigm itself create 
opportunities for people to resist it? Second, how did people take advantage of these 
opportunities to challenge neoliberalism? To answer these questions, I turn to three case 
studies that exemplify potent disruptions of free marketism. First, I analyze the 1986 
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economic treatise authored by the United States Catholic Bishops, entitled Economic 
Justice for All. Next, I analyze the 1996 revelations that celebrity Kathie Lee Gifford’s 
clothing line at Wal-Mart used sweatshop labor to produce its garments. Finally, I 
analyze Seattle’s 1999 World Trade Organization (WTO) protests.  
The rhetoric of resisting neoliberalism requires a critical approach capable of 
managing two important and familiar challenges. First, resistance to neoliberalism 
requires the critic to nuance relationships between the symbolic and the material. Second, 
this kind of project challenges the critic to refine relationships between ideology and 
agency. To answer my questions and navigate the aforementioned challenges, I turn to 
theories of articulation to analyze and assess both dominant discourses and liberatory 
rhetorics in the neoliberal milieu. Theories of articulation in communication studies help 
scholars navigate these challenges because they posit that rhetoric establishes 
relationships between elements in articulations.26 This approach assumes that there are no 
natural connections, only articulated ones.27 Further, an articulation approach takes very 
few foundations for granted. Instead, it demands that practices and judgments be 
grounded in a historical genealogy and with an eye toward contingency.28 In this 
introduction, I explain how theories of articulation help me navigate the challenges posed 
by neoliberalism to rhetorical studies. Next, I offer an articulation-based rhetorical 
history of neoliberalism, showing how it rose to dominance. Finally, I describe my case 
studies and preview the project’s findings. 
An Articulation Approach to Rhetoric 
Interrogating resistance to neoliberalism poses two familiar challenges to 
rhetorical studies: the relationships between symbolicity/materiality and ideology/agency. 
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The turn toward the logic of articulation offers mechanisms by which to manage each of 
these important challenges. In this section, I explicate each challenge and briefly explain 
how scholars have heretofore navigated them. I also demonstrate how an articulation 
approach to rhetoric deals with each tension. Ultimately, theories of articulation provide a 
contingent and genealogical approach to rhetoric that successfully nuances and 
historicizes relationships between rhetoric, materiality, ideology, and agency. This 
approach allows me to best answer the how question that drives my analyses.  
Symbolicity and Materiality 
Traditional humanist paradigms presume that the material world and rhetoric exist 
as a duality and that the humanist subject works on the material world through speech.29 
A fitting example of such a traditional approach to rhetoric is Lloyd Bitzer’s account of 
the “Rhetorical Situation.”30 Bitzer’s rhetorical situation refers to an observable, 
historical situation that exists outside of discourse, but invites a discursive response by a 
rhetor. Thus, though rhetoric mediates between world and consciousness, it is maintained 
as separate from the material world. 
Scholars have recognized that traditional paradigms do not sufficiently explain the 
distinctions between “material world” and “rhetoric” that they assert.31 For example, 
scholars developing the dramatistic approach have made important inroads to disrupting 
the strict separation of language and reality, positing that all human motivation is both 
symbolic and social.32 Ernest Bormann argued that traditional approaches assume that the 
“word is not the thing,” that “words are generated out of the social context rather than 
that the words are the social context.”33 Bormann here asserted the basic social 
constructionist assumption that language creates reality. Of course, that reality encounters 
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what Kenneth Burke called a “recalcitrance” that disciplines the symbolic actions that do 
not make sufficient sense with other encountered realities.34 In re-reading Kenneth 
Burke’s corpus, Debra Hawhee offered another important dramatistic intervention into 
the rhetoric-materiality duality. Hawhee argued that, for Burke, symbolic action 
necessarily had a physical, bodily dimension, and so all symbolic action has a material 
component.35 Thus, dramatism has offered important complications for the separations of 
materiality and rhetoric. 
Other scholars have further blurred the lines between rhetoric and world, 
suggesting that material objects are rhetorical and that rhetoric has material dimensions 
and consequences.36 For example, Danielle Endres and Samantha Senda-Cook followed 
Carole Blair’s conception of the “materiality of rhetoric,” in which any place is a 
“combination of material and symbolic qualities” that has symbolic as well as “material 
consequences.” 37 Endres and Senda-Cook illustrate their point with the example of a 
church, which depends on both its material and symbolic dimensions to constitute it as 
such.  
As the preceding paragraphs have shown, an approach that separates rhetoric from 
material world has faced many fruitful challenges.38 However, in many of these 
approaches, the material and the symbolic continue to appear as naturally separate 
realms, even as they are unknowable without each other. For instance, Nathan Stormer 
argued that dramatism asserts “the existence of a reality which is its own construction” 
without historicizing the processes that made one thing “material” and another 
“symbolic.” 39 The gap between the two realms is presumed to be stable and ahistorical. 
Further, many rhetorical approaches give too much power to language as a force separate 
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from, but contingent on, the material. This critique was advanced by Michael Calvin 
McGee when he charged materialists with not giving enough weight to symbols and 
symbolists with paying insufficient attention to materiality.40 Indeed, the assertion of a 
discrete and concrete difference between the material and symbolic abounds, with some 
scholars privileging the symbolic as the primary world-making mechanism and others 
privileging the material as such.41  
The neoliberal order further prompts scholars to interrogate the traditional 
distinctions made between the symbolic and the material. In many ways, the propagation 
of free market logic and advances in technology have complicated these distinctions. 
Ronald Walter Greene argued that neoliberal capital “increasingly relies on the social 
dimensions of communication” to accumulate wealth and social power; thus, he 
introduced Money/Speech as a concept that drew scholarly attention to the 
interpenetration of communication and economics, within the context of neoliberal 
discourses, which transform labor into “human capital.”42 In this milieu, we must ask, 
what counts as symbolic or material when we consider the credit system, labor in the 
growing “information” sector, or money that is legally considered speech?43  
Theories of articulation help critics navigate this challenge by taking a contingent 
and genealogical approach to the material and the symbolic. This approach does not 
assume that certain elements are material and others are symbolic prior to engaging in 
criticism. Instead, taking an articulation approach prompts scholars to attend to how 
particular distinctions between material and symbolic are made in practice and what the 
consequences of making those distinctions are.44 This approach historicizes how the 
differences between the two are constituted through articulation, while at the same time 
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acknowledging that rhetorical articulation draws together what it distinguishes as the 
symbolic and material in various ways.45 Thus, what Stormer calls the “mutual 
interaction” of material and meaning is what constitutes the very thing.46 Further, 
articulatory practices are “genealogical” in that, as Stormer explains, they “emerge from 
myriad past arrangements” that place “limitations on the invention of new forms of 
rhetoric.”47 Past articulations structure which rhetorical forms are possible, though they 
often do so in non-linear and unpredictable ways.  
For example, a critic taking an articulation approach to rhetorical criticism would 
map the distinctions that classical Marxism makes between base and superstructure by 
approaching them as historically articulated differences that have particular 
consequences. In the mid-nineteenth century, Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels offered 
historical materialism as a counterweight to discourses of human history and 
development that, according to Marx and Engels, were increasingly weightless. These 
dominant discourses ignored the processes of production and instead valorized exchange 
value. In an effort to decenter the capitalists, Marx and Engels re-articulated political 
economy as a material process of production, rather than one of weightless exchange. As 
I explained elsewhere, “Decentering the bourgeoisie, Marx and Engels advocated 
focusing on the material, rather than the idea of the material, and thus privileged 
production as a counterweight to exchange.”48  
For Marx and Engels in their time, ideas and material processes were different 
articulations with different political commitments. The material articulation privileged 
the laborer, and the ideational articulation privileged the capitalist. Constructing ideology 
as language—the unreal—and economic structure and production as the material—the 
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real—worked politically for Marx and Engels. In orthodox Marxist rhetoric, the 
privileged position was the real one and the denigrated position is the unreal, thus 
inauthentic one.49 As a political project, then, Marxism articulated a strict separation of 
the material and the rhetorical, as a way to decenter the bourgeoisie.50 Scholars and 
activists who have been pursuing a critique of capitalism since Marx have participated in 
a genealogical trajectory set by Marxism, such that they have had to grapple with the 
distinctions between the material and symbolic that Marx and Engels set.51  
As this example illustrates, an articulation approach is a mapping project that 
largely rejects what Greene refers to as the “logic of representation,” which posits that 
rhetoric represents something that exists in the material world outside of rhetoric. If we 
had taken an interpretive approach to classical Marxism, we would have explained how 
classical Marxism describes the world as it is, beyond Marxist articulations of world. 
Instead, displacing “interpretation” for “mapping” allows scholars to show how the 
“material” meaning becomes attached to particular elements and the “symbolic” meaning 
becomes attached to other elements through rhetorical practice.52  
Ideology, Hegemony, and Agentic Social Change 
The traditional humanist approach to rhetoric presumes that individuals hold and 
enact agency, so this approach privileges individual, human agents who use rhetoric to 
change or preserve the world around them.53 We can again point to Bitzer’s rhetorical 
situation as an example of this paradigm. For Bitzer, individual speakers possess the 
agency to fittingly respond to a situation by managing its constraints in a creative and 
appropriate manner. Bitzer’s model largely assumes that individuals are fully formed 
agents who can act to influence situations.54 
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Myriad scholars have demonstrated that this traditional approach does not 
sufficiently account for agency. It does not pay proper attention to collective agency, and 
it neglects the emergence and dissolution of particular forms of agency in specific 
situations. Barbara Biesecker, for example, argued that Bitzer’s rhetorical situation does 
not account for the rhetorical, social emergence of particular subjectivities, which make 
possible or circumscribe the enactment of agency. At a basic level, Biesecker argued that 
Bitzer’s model takes agency for granted.55 Also, as James Jasinski argued, the traditional 
approach does not sufficiently account for inventional agency as a necessarily “social 
process,” such that the rhetor is always embedded in and draws upon various social 
practices when enacting agency.56 Further, Celeste Condit argued that the traditional 
approach asserts the primacy of the intentions and effects of individual rhetors, but does 
not take account of the multiplicity of voices embedded in any enactment of agency.57  
What Phillip Wander termed the “ideological turn” in rhetorical studies ushered in 
a concerted effort to understand how rhetoric maintains and disrupts systems of social 
dominance.58 The growing importance of race, gender, and class studies alongside the 
rise of critical/cultural studies together pushed rhetoricians to seriously consider how 
social power is distributed and maintained, and how it constrains and enables rhetorical 
invention on the part of agents. The ideological turn decentered individual rhetors by 
drawing attention to wider social processes that constrain individual agency.59 McGee, 
for example, argued that rhetoric is a mechanism of social control, which is composed of 
political language.60 Raymie McKerrow proposed that rhetorical critics engage in 
“critical rhetoric” rather than “rhetorical criticism,” wherein rhetoricians would show 
how discourse legitimates certain positions and interests, enables some forms of agency 
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performed by certain agents, and forecloses upon the possibility of others.61 Further, 
Maurice Charland argued that social subjects are always already a rhetorical effect and 
that, often, their constitution is beyond the realm of free and rational choice.62 The 
ideological turn, then, prompted rhetorical critics to grapple with complex issues of 
power and agency. 
The neoliberal moment further challenges scholars to conceptualize ideology and 
agency in novel ways. For instance, neoliberal governance diminishes the ability of once-
powerful institutions, like the state, to act. How do we conceive of power when political 
and social institutions that once were loci of ideological force are being dismantled by 
increasingly powerful economic actors? Also, since neoliberalism privileges individuals 
while it disempowers many people, agency becomes a complex and contested term. For 
example, scholars have argued that the new world order dismantles organized labor’s 
ability to act as a collective force by treating workers as free-floating individuals.63 How 
do we make sense of agency when being considered primarily an individual can 
circumvent one’s power to act?  
 Again, theories of articulation help rhetorical critics navigate this challenge with 
their contingent and genealogical approaches to subject formation and power distribution. 
Theories of articulation focus the critic’s gaze on how elements are historically linked to 
form a coherent system of meaning, rather than an ideology that emanates from particular 
loci of power. Following Antonio Gramsci’s notion of hegemony, Ernesto Laclau and 
Chantal Mouffe displace “ideology” with “discourse.” “Discourse” for Laclau and 
Mouffe is a decipherable system of meaning that cobbles together linguistic and non-
linguistic elements ways that privilege some subjectivities and actions over others. There 
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is no necessary “truth” that is occluded by “ideology.” Rather, there are competing 
systems of signification that assemble meaning in competing ways.64 An articulation 
approach to rhetoric does not assume that discourse hides relations of power, but assumes 
instead that discourse itself can be a form of social control because it positions subjects in 
relation to objects and other subjects.65 Thus, an articulation approach does not assume 
that power exists beyond the text and is only represented by texts. Instead, the critic 
approaches texts as manifestations of power itself, rather than as representations of a 
power that exists primarily elsewhere.  
 In this way, an articulation approach is a postmodern approach to power, not 
unlike Judith Butler’s performativity approach to gender. As Butler explains, 
postmodernism deconstructs transcendent agents that exist outside of discourse. From a 
postmodern perspective, the agent is produced by and functions within various 
discourses.66 For Butler, “performativity” refers to the idea that the authoritative 
“anticipation [of an object] conjures its object.” 67 So, dominant discourses anticipate a 
“gendered essence” that divides women from men and, in anticipating it, they produce 
that essence. 68 Part of the power of that essence is that it naturalizes itself as already 
existing, beyond the discourse that articulated it.  
 An articulation approach suggests that a hegemonic articulation is a powerful 
discourse that universalizes itself through repetition and accumulation, which means that 
it attaches itself to an increasing variety of elements. As an articulation, rhetoric 
establishes relationships between elements, changing the elements and temporarily 
stabilizing them in those relationships.69 Articulating means communicating something, 
incarnating it, so that it is comprehensible enough to be perceived.70 Although there are 
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no natural connections, articulations solidify with use, and repeating connections can 
normalize particular articulations into hegemonic articulations. Those normalized, 
universalized articulations necessarily privilege some subjectivities and social 
configurations over others.71  
 For example, what Barbara Welter termed the “Cult of True Womanhood” can be 
considered a hegemonic articulation of western womanhood, one that universalized itself 
through repetition and accumulation. 72 Before this particular articulation, women had 
been excluded from full citizenship by discourses that posited them as naturally inferior 
beings. As urbanization and industrialization advanced, what were once considered 
“natural” distinctions between male and female became more complicated. In this milieu, 
the “Cult of True Womanhood” articulation rose to prominence, as it provided a clear 
distinction between men’s and women’s social locations. Under the temporarily 
stabilized meaning of “woman,” this nineteenth-century articulation established 
relationships between elements such as women’s sex, their naturally submissive 
character, their proper social realm, and their restricted citizenship and mobility. This 
articulation managed expectations of “womanly” behavior as pious, pure, domestic, and 
submissive, and thus it restricted women to the private home, as property of their 
husbands or fathers, away from public life. Although this articulation was a bourgeois 
norm, it circulated widely as a set of restrictive laws and social practices that together 
produced “woman.”  
 Taking an articulation approach means mapping the “Cult of True Womanhood” 
as more than a set of disembodied ideas. This articulation managed women’s bodies: their 
embodied (in)ability to move in particular places, to have custody of their children, to 
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vote for representatives of government. The “Cult of True Womanhood” articulation was 
naturalized by attaching itself to countless laws that restricted women’s political and 
social mobility, as well as to countless performances of “true” womanhood. Each law and 
each performance articulated “true womanhood” and made it stronger, more “natural” 
because the articulation that marked women as inferior beings was proven true through 
its own manifestation in the world. People could point to how women behaved—what 
they were (un)able to do in society—and say that the “true womanhood” idea simply 
represented life as it was. To incarnate “woman” at this time was to be submissive, in the 
home, and without power. To not participate in these practices was to not properly be a 
“woman.”73  
 As the preceding example demonstrates, the naturalization of prevailing power 
configurations is indeed powerful. However, because people identify with multiple and 
often conflicting subject positions, there is always room for agency. Agency, the capacity 
to act, usually arises from negotiating competing, overlapping, and often contradictory 
subject positions available under a particular configuration of power structures.74 
Articulation suggests that any subject is a “nodal point” among many, often conflicting 
discourses. At any time, the subject is what Kevin Michael DeLuca calls a “performance” 
that negotiates a confluence of conflicting subject positions.75 Agency, thus, is conceived 
of as a creative, constrained, and enacted force, instead of a capacity located primarily in 
a fully formed individual.76  
 For instance, activists for women’s social and political advances in the nineteenth 
century enacted particular forms of agency that leveraged their overlapping and 
contradictory subject positions. “Woman” was a nodal point that intersected with other 
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nodal points of subjectivity, such as “(white) citizen,” “mother,” “worker,” or “slave.”77 
Each articulated and performed subjectivity came with its own set of elements that were 
strung together to temporarily stabilize the various subject positions. As these 
subjectivities intersected in “nodal point” performances, new forms of agency emerged 
for women. For instance, Angela G. Ray has shown how hundreds of nineteenth-century 
women enacted agency by negotiating the subjectivity “citizen” with the subjectivity 
“woman.” Technically, women were citizens, though they did not have the right to vote. 
Hundreds of women registered and then attempted to vote in elections from 1868 to 
1875. These women repeatedly enacted the role of voting citizen, and thereby forced 
officials and other citizens to confront the articulation that made voting a man’s practice. 
When these women voters showed up at the polls, they articulated woman with voting. 
These women leveraged public rituals attached to the “citizen” subjectivity to appropriate 
and enact agency and authority as women.78 
 Dominant articulations, then, not only offer systems through which agency can be 
enacted, but they are unstable and face antagonisms that seek to tear them apart.79 Laclau 
and Mouffe displaced Marxist “contradiction” with “antagonism,” to point to the enacted 
and conflictual nature of articulating contradictions that have the capacity to disrupt a 
system. In Marxist thought specifically and in ideological thought more widely, 
contradictions are understood to exist within systems of power. These contradictions 
enable the critique and ultimate destruction of the system.80 In theories of articulation, 
though, these contradictions do not exist prior to articulation; they must be articulated, in 
some way, into existence as conflictual “antagonisms.” Antagonisms pull apart the 
dominant articulation by showing that it is not natural, essential, and complete. As such, 
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antagonisms point to the “limits” of the dominant articulation.81 Thus, antagonisms 
challenge the universalization of a particular articulation. However, dominant discourses 
always, at some level, structure antagonisms because to have “articulatory power,” 
rhetorics must participate in the dominant “normative frameworks” that make particular 
articulations intelligible.82 Also, all discourses, whether dominant or antagonistic, 
necessarily participate in what Condit called a “shared understanding” that is neither 
individual nor universal, but, rather, is collective.83 
 Social change, then, becomes a matter of antagonistic dis-articulation and re-
articulation, both of which occur within dominant frameworks of understanding.84 Laclau 
expanded on Claude Lévi-Strauss’s notions of the “empty signifier” and the “floating 
signifier” to account for how articulation changes ideas and commitments. To say that 
something is an empty signifier means that it does not necessarily and inherently signify 
anything in particular. It must attach to specific articulations to mean anything, and it 
matters what a signifier attaches to because those attachments change the signifier in 
substantial ways. Empty signifiers solidify when they are anchored in specific practices, 
and they harden with repeated use. At times, though, the signifiers are faced with 
antagonisms that challenge the coherence of the articulation. At that point, they become 
“floating signifiers” that attach to different articulations, so that it becomes possible that a 
signifier such as “freedom” means two very different things in two very different 
articulations.85  
 To return to our example, activists for women’s equality in the nineteenth century 
articulated antagonisms to the dominant articulation that denied women full citizenship. 
They pointed to the limits of the social order that made them second-class citizens. At the 
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time of the bourgeoning movements for women’s rights, the empty signifier “citizen” 
attached to white men in ways that were different from how it attached to white women. 
The dominant articulation of “citizen” drew together two different attachments to voting 
and property ownership; white male citizens could vote and own property, while white 
female citizens could not. Both were considered citizens, but not of the same caliber.86 
Women’s equality activists articulated various forms of antagonisms to that dominant 
articulation.87 One such example is the 1848 Declaration of Sentiments that activists 
wrote and signed in Seneca Falls. By appropriating the language of the Declaration of 
Independence, this document disarticulated voting citizenship and male restriction. It 
rearticulated citizenship as necessarily involving voice in the government. Since women 
were citizens, it reasoned, they were being denied their rightful voice in the state of 
affairs.88 Further, with the embodied action of creating the document collectively, women 
and their allies disarticulated the “Cult of True Womanhood” by gathering in public and 
conducting public affairs. Their very public co-presence and action articulated an 
embodied antagonism to the dominant logic that kept women hidden and away from 
public affairs. Of course, this one action did not disarticulate the dominant articulation, 
but it was one instance of dislodging the “citizen” signifier, making it possible for it to 
float rather than be anchored to white male bodies. It would take seventy-two subsequent 
years of antagonism to dislodge the male restriction from the voting “citizen” signifier.89   
 As the extended gender example illustrates, an articulation approach helps critics 
navigate ideology and agency in sophisticated, contingent, and historically grounded 
ways. The logic of articulation takes no distinction between ideology and agency for 
granted. Instead, it historicizes and maps the rise of powerful discourses, the ways those 
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dominant discourses enable some subjectivities and constrain others, and the ways 
antagonistic articulations tear apart dominant discourses. Further, theories of articulation 
suggest that agency and power are both enacted and collective, not held by individuals. 
The articulation approach also does not a priori assume that only people enact agency or 
power. Indeed, Stormer challenges rhetorical scholars to be open to the possibility that 
what we have designated “things” may also articulate.90 This approach prompts scholars 
to map power and agency in contingent and genealogically sensitive ways, paying 
attention to how discourses become subject to accumulation and disintegration.  
Methodological Commitments 
An articulation approach to rhetoric requires the critic to map how rhetoric 
arranges material and symbolic elements to create systems of meaning. Taking such an 
approach to my case studies leads me to several methodological commitments in 
answering my research questions. First, the articulation approach prompts me to look for 
the connections and distinctions rhetorics make between various symbolic and material 
elements. As Stormer argues, it is important for critics to attend to how particular texts 
distinguish between symbolic and material elements, as a mechanism of making 
meaning.91 I thus attend to the distinctions that each text makes between material and 
symbolic.  
Where such distinctions are unclear in my texts, I use my understandings of 
material and symbolic to guide my inquiries. Following such scholars as Phaedra 
Pezzullo and Catherine Chaput, among others, I understand rhetoric to always be both 
material and symbolic at the same time.92 The material generally refers to the tangible 
and immediate, whereas the symbolic generally refers to that which extends beyond 
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itself, as a signifier-signified relationship. Rhetorical meaning always has dimensions of 
both, though part of the meaning-making process sometimes means privileging one over 
the other. With each case study, then, I attend to how its composite texts arrange tangible 
and immediate elements with symbolic excesses that go beyond the immediate and 
tangible.93  
This commitment to the material and symbolic dimensions of rhetoric necessarily 
requires that I take an expansive view of what constitutes a rhetorical “text.” Rhetorical 
scholars have been steadily expanding what counts as a “text” for decades, gradually 
encompassing visual, embodied, as well as emplaced texts and performances.94 
Increasingly, the critic can bring a rhetorical perspective to nearly anything that plays a 
role in collective, public meaning making, be that a speech, a body, a law, or a place, 
among other things.95 With each of my case studies, I take a multimodal approach, 
interrogating each text’s significant verbal, visual, embodied, emplaced, and mediated 
dimensions.96 In each instance, I examine how the different dimensions together 
articulate a system of alternative meaning. Moreover, I draw on a variety of rhetorical 
approaches that best account for how these elements come together in particular 
moments.97  
The articulation approach also commits me to a genealogical view of agency and 
ideology, recognizing that past articulations at some level structure the possibilities for 
present and future ones. So, as a critic, I look for how various rhetorics forge new 
arrangements from existing and previous ones. I explain how articulations gain power as 
they accumulate, and I show how novel articulations attach to already prominent 
articulations. Moreover, to investigate how my texts disarticulate neoliberal hegemony, I 
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explore which “empty signifiers” these texts disrupt, and how they dislodge them, 
making them into “floating signifers.” Ultimately, I attend to how texts enact antagonistic 
agency—a form of agency that points to the limits of the existing order. I then 
demonstrate how each text re-articulates political economy and creates an alternative to 
neoliberal governance.  
Neoliberalism as Hegemonic Articulation 
To assess how particular rhetorics disrupt the neoliberal articulation, we must first 
define the neoliberal order and map its rise to hegemonic status. Neoliberalism refers to a 
general orientation that centers unfettered market relations as the basis for all social 
interaction.98 Scholars and activists have conceived of neoliberalism as an ideological 
project, a policy objective, a form of state, an economic theory, a form of 
governmentality, and a dominant discourse.99 For example, Professor of Anthropology 
and Geography David Harvey defined neoliberalism as “a theory of political economic 
practices” that treats individual property rights and entrepreneurial free trade as the 
guarantors of “human well-being.” 100 This theory, according to Harvey, is not 
disinterested; rather, it is a political project that benefits very few people who accumulate 
the wealth of the world, depriving the vast majority of people of economic security. The 
activist magazine Le Monde Diplomatique described neoliberalism as a set of disastrous 
policies that include “privatization, the de-regulation of the financial sector, increasing 
openness to foreign trade and investment, and cuts to public welfare spending.” 101 
According to Le Monde, these policies are disastrous because, in practice, they increase 
economic inequality and drive the world economy into constant crisis, a state in which 
only a small percentage of people thrive.  
 22 
Communication scholars have also approached neoliberalism in myriad ways, 
prompting some scholars to wonder whether “neoliberalism” continues to serve a useful 
analytical purpose. Many scholars concentrate on neoliberalism as a combination of 
structural conditions and dominant discourses that privilege private market relations.102 
Because the term is used so abundantly, some scholars doubt its utility; in 2015, the 
National Communication Association conference showcased a debate over whether 
neoliberalism is too diffuse a term to hold any meaning, during which John Sloop called 
on scholars to clearly describe exactly what they mean when they call a phenomenon 
“neoliberal.”103 In my view, neoliberalism is a potent term, one that continues to describe 
a particular set of economic and cultural circumstances and one that can be studied from 
various perspectives. Indeed, “neoliberalism” refers to the governing articulation of our 
times, and so we must address it in myriad ways.  
My project treats neoliberalism as a dominant articulation that strings together 
four governing principles: freedom as primary, economics as natural, the individual as 
rational actor, and the free market as pure. As the following history shows, these 
governing principles have been articulated before, though in different ways and to 
different degrees, and their familiarity strengthens their contemporary manifestations. 
These principles authorize certain economic, social, legal, and political adjustments, and 
those changes, in turn, authorize the governing principles. Neoliberalism as articulation is 
the rhetorical stringing together of governing principles and structural adjustments so that 
a common sense about how to govern emerges: a common sense that privileges the free 
market as natural, pristine space.104  
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Development and Spread of Neoliberal Articulation 
Neoliberalism’s governing articulation grew out of the 1947 inaugural meeting of 
the Mont Pelerin Society, initiated by economists Friedrich von Hayek and Milton 
Friedman, among others. Amidst the turmoil of re-assembling the world after the Second 
World War, the Society articulated a counterweight to all varieties of socialism, a force 
that they perceived as a threat to Western civilization.105  
The society’s “Statement of Aims” expressed the governing principles that would 
come to define the neoliberal project. 106 The statement constructed a crisis of 
“civilization,” wherein the “essential conditions of human dignity and freedom” were in 
“danger” of falling under the rule of “arbitrary power.” Given this crisis, the statement 
announced its commitment to protecting “the individual,” “private property,” and “the 
competitive market,” commitments that would guarantee “freedom,” “liberty,” and 
“peace.” To effectively protect these basic elements of liberty, the members of the 
Society vowed to create “an international order” that would establish “harmonious 
international economic relations,” and they sought to “redefine[e] the state” so it would 
be more amenable to their goals. The Mont Pelerin Society concluded its statement by 
asserting that their commitments were not “propaganda,” nor were they “orthodoxy,” nor 
aligned with a “particular party.” Instead, the Society enacted its commitment to free, 
individual association by claiming its project was “solely” devoted to “facilitating the 
exchange of views” that would “contribute to the preservation and improvement of the 
free society.” In sum, the “Statement of Aims” asserted its commitments to freedom, 
individual private property, and the competitive market as guarantors of free society.  
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The neoliberal commitments to laissez-fair government practices and ever-
expanding free markets found a comfortable home at the University of Chicago, where 
economists such as Friedman and Garry Becker expounded on the vitality of free trade 
capitalism as a model for all social interaction.107 Following Enlightenment theorist 
Adam Smith, Friedman argued that the market is a natural and pristine system, and 
because it focuses on competition, resource allotment, and mutual self-interest, it is the 
best mode of individual, and therefore social, development. 108 As such, market freedom, 
for Friedman guarantees individual freedom. Becker was also an early proponent of the 
rational actor model of human relations.109 He argued that human beings make rational 
choices based on cost-benefit analyses not only in economics, but in all realms of life 
including family, law, and politics.110 Together with other Chicago School economists, 
Friedman and Becker’s ideas came together as the neoliberal articulation, which sutures 
rational individuals with social freedom and free market capitalism. Until the fiscal crisis 
of the 1970s, neoliberalism lingered at the edges of economic and socio-political 
thought.111   
Economic Crisis of 1970s  
After World War II, the United States, Great Britain, and continental Europe 
turned to the constrained capitalism of Keynesianism, which took strong social welfare 
programs, redistributions efforts, and regulation of the market as markers of “developed 
societies.”112  The Keynesian system experienced growth until the 1970s, when the 
economy stagnated and inflation rose.  
The stagflation experienced in the 1970s was one of several major economic 
crises that prompted a transformation of capitalism. As early as 1848, Marx argued that 
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such economic crises transform capitalist structures.113 For instance, the economic crisis 
in the decades following the U.S. Civil War prompted a profound transformation of 
capitalism. As the country industrialized, capital consolidated its power in the form of 
corporations, prompting the growth of middle managers and finance professionals. 
Concurrently, labor groups began to craft collective power through unionization and 
strikes, attempting to push back on the consolidation of capital’s power.114 Of course, 
capitalism does not simply transform itself; instead, political and economic deliberation, 
action, and policy implementation transform capitalism. For example, during the Great 
Depression, the Franklin Delano Roosevelt Administration took sweeping and 
controversial policy actions to regulate economic markets. The Administration faced 
fierce criticism from all over the political spectrum, with the Left arguing that it had not 
done enough and the Right charging the administration with socialism.115 The economic 
crisis of the 1970s was one of these shocking moments that prompted a change in 
capitalism. Duménil and Lévy have demonstrated that this crisis began slowly in the late 
1960s and became pronounced in the 1970s and 1980s. 116 This economic shock consisted 
of a devastating combination of inflation, wage stagnation, a drop in profits, and high 
unemployment. 
In response to the stagflation, the Left, particularly in Europe, advocated more 
regulation and redistribution, while the Right advanced an unfettered market and its 
attendant neoliberal commitments.117 With calls for more redistribution and regulation 
and a failing stock market, upper classes in the United States, Britain, and Europe 
experienced a threat to their survival and neoliberalization provided what Harvey called 
“a project to achieve the restoration of class power” by dismantling the Keynesian 
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system.118 As Duménil and Lévy argued, inflation was a serious problem for everyone, 
but it perhaps affected wealthy people most, as their assets were worth considerably less. 
Unemployment and wage stagnation were the most devastating aspects of the crisis for 
those who were not wealthy. Duménil and Lévy argued that tackling inflation took 
precedence over increasing employment, and that if that had not been the case, 
unemployment could have been attended to more quickly. Indeed, in 1979, the 
unemployment and wage stagnation crisis was fueled by a sudden rise in interest rates.119 
Even if the neoliberal response was not as intentionally class-focused as Duménil and 
Lévy alleged, the response to the crisis ushered in structural adjustments that have, 
ultimately, widened the gap between the very rich and everyone else to proportions not 
seen since 1929.120  
The ideal of an unfettered market gained prominence and was secured as the 
dominant governing articulation in response to the crisis of the 1970s. This articulation 
was well funded and ubiquitously circulated throughout multiple arenas of social life.121 
For example, the free-market perspective gained respectability when Hayek won the 
Nobel Prize in Economic Sciences in 1974, and Friedman won it in 1976.  In his Nobel 
Prize lecture, Hayek blamed Keynesian economists for the crisis, condemning them for 
trying to shape the world after their “scientistic” economic models that justified state 
manipulation of the economy.122 He argued that the economy could not be predicted and 
manipulated into compliance by economists. Milton Friedman echoed these sentiments in 
his Nobel Prize Lecture two years later, but unlike Hayek, he professed a sincere faith in 
the scientism of economics. For Friedman, Keynesianism had failed because it was not 
scientifically rigorous enough. Despite empirical evidence to the contrary, the Keynesians 
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had maintained their economic hypothesis that upheld steady employment and high 
wages as necessary to a healthy economy.123 
In addition to undermining Keynesianism, each Nobel Prize lecture also denied 
that neoliberal economics had anything to do with ideological or political commitments. 
This kind of distancing from politics, while engaging in them, would become a hallmark 
of neoliberal rhetoric.124 Hayek ended his lecture with a warning against anyone trying to 
“control society,” through economics or politics. 125 Any effort to control, he said, made 
the actor “not only a tyrant over his fellows, but … may well make him the destroyer of a 
civilization which no brain has designed but which has grown from the free efforts of 
millions of individuals.” For Friedman, the empirical facts of unemployment, wage 
stagnation, and inflation were not a matter of “ideological warfare.” In his words, “brute 
experience proved far more potent than the strongest of political or ideological 
preferences.” And the “brute experience” necessitated an end to Keynesianism. 
Friedman, then, ostensibly took the political out of the economic, placing economics 
squarely in the realm of science, which for him was fact-based and apolitical.126 This kind 
of ostensibly apolitical language would continue to animate the neoliberal articulation.  
In sum, the neoliberal articulation generally assembles four main governing 
principles. First, neoliberal articulation privileges individual freedom. All forms of 
political organization are denigrated, as they inevitably limit an individual’s freedom. 
Also, since corporations come to be understood as individuals, their freedom is exalted as 
important and necessary for human development. Next, the articulation valorizes the 
individual rational actor. Structural inequality, then, does not exist because each citizen is 
considered a free-floating, rationally acting individual who pursues their own self-
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interest. Any inequality is treated as a symptom of individual incompetence and a lack of 
individual responsibility. Third, the neoliberal articulation assumes that economics in 
general, and the competitive market in particular, are natural spheres governed by natural 
rules, unlike social-political realms, which are constructed by politics. Since the market is 
natural and tends toward perfection, preferred terms associated with markets emerge and 
devil terms associated with politics emerge; entrepreneur, consumer, and balanced 
budgets are hailed, while labor unions, political action, and budget deficits are 
denigrated.127 Finally, neoliberalism posits the free, competitive market as a model for all 
social interaction. The free capitalist market comes to be equated with all individual 
freedom, and, eventually, with democracy. Thus, another cluster of god and devil terms 
emerge; efficiency, profit, market, flexibility, and choice are positioned as gleaming 
beacons of progress, which combat devil terms of bureaucracy, regulation, and 
entitlement. Further, attaching free market logic to individual actors, neoliberalism 
upholds a sense of democracy as individual choice, not collective action. Democratic 
choice is expressed when individuals choose political representatives, their jobs, and new 
consumer electronics: all choices that are assumed to be equally democratic, inherently 
liberating, and accessible to everyone.128  
Antecedent Articulations 
These main ideas have historical antecedents, which made them more prone to 
attach to one another and to other American ideals. Each idea—freedom, individual, 
economy, and market—is an “empty signifier” because that it has no inherent meaning 
outside of its articulation. Each has also at one point become a “floating signifier,” a 
contested term that attaches to different articulations. As with any signifier, repeated, 
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similar articulations strengthen these ideas by substantiating them over and over again. 
These four particular signifiers have been co-articulated before, in ways that are 
strikingly similar to the neoliberal articulation.  
One such articulation was quite pronounced during the Gilded Age, when 
antagonistic articulations sprung from capital and labor, as they negotiated the meaning 
and spread of industrialization.129 One prominent spokesperson for capital, William 
Graham Sumner, articulated laissez-faire economics as the best kind of solution for a 
good society, one that allowed the citizen he called “The Forgotten Man” to truly 
thrive.130 In 1883, Sumner argued that government interference in the economy hurt the 
hard-working, average American. In a scientistic tone not unlike Friedman’s, Sumner 
offered “cold hard fact[s]” to dispel mass hysteria about rich people, positioning himself 
as a kind of “chemist” who dispelled the lies of the “alchemist.” In Sumner’s articulation, 
efficient business practices created jobs and kept prices low for consumers. The economy 
was a natural force that would re-calibrate itself if we simply left it alone, a move that 
would strengthen freedom and “true liberty.” 
The Gilded Age saw fierce antagonisms between articulations, which often took 
the form of brutal, physical violence. Capital and labor quite literally fought over 
competing articulations of freedom and economy. Moreover, communists and socialists 
were systematically persecuted by both the U.S. government and private corporations 
during the Gilded Age and World War I, when Russia Bolshevized.131 The reforms of the 
Progressive Era, and the subsequent laissez-faire economy of the 1920s can largely be 
considered outgrowths of these fierce turn-of-the-century battles.132  
 30 
The rhetoric of free-market capitalists during the Great Depression also 
historically anchors neoliberal articulations of freedom and political economy. This 
particular articulation of big government, unions, and communism would be very 
important in the development of the neoliberal order. Thus, articulations of freedom, 
market, and democracy from the 1930s and 1940s, along with the Cold War era, merit 
detailed attention.133 In the 1930s and 1940s, Franklin Delano Roosevelt’s administration 
made sweeping changes to the structure of the U.S. government, and the president argued 
vehemently that a strong federal government was indispensable to stabilizing an economy 
that had been destroyed by laissez-faire practices.134 Emboldened by the New Deal, union 
activists became increasingly militant, particularly the Congress of Industrial 
Organizations, who split from the American Federation of Labor amidst disputes over 
inclusion and militancy.135  
In response to these changes threatening capital, many voices lambasted both 
Roosevelt’s regulation and union activity as assaults on American freedom and 
democracy. For example, Father Charles E. Coughlin painted Roosevelt as a dictator, not 
unlike the Nazi and Communist tyrants abroad. Coughlin alerted the American people to 
the dangers of using the war as justification to extend the government’s reach into 
multiple sectors of life. He warned his audience that governmental overreach could 
amount to Bolshevism, which was both “anti-God and anti-Christ.”136 Focusing on 
militant unions, the National Association of Manufacturers printed and circulated a 
pamphlet entitled, “Join the CIO and Help Build a Soviet America,” that used patriotic 
appeals and red threats to steer workers away from the industrial union. 137 For instance, 
on the second page of the pamphlet, an image depicted a mob of men beating a single 
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man. The caption to this image read, “Pictured here are the coercive methods by which 
CIO built its power.” 
Perhaps most reminiscent the neoliberal articulation, conservative Senator Josiah 
Bailey (D-NC) led a coalition to oppose the New Deal, and this group wrote and 
circulated the 1937 “Conservative Manifesto.”138 This Manifesto, discussed in the Senate, 
articulated the goals of ensuring “expanding enterprise” because “private enterprise, 
properly fostered, carries the indispensable element of rigor” that was needed to fight 
domestic economic insecurity. The Manifesto positioned private enterprise as key to “Our 
American competitive system,” which was “superior to any form of the collectivist 
program,” implying communism and fascism. The document pledged to “preserve and 
foster” the American capitalist system “as the means of employment, of livelihood, and 
of maintaining our standard of living.” Thus, the document co-articulated “the American 
system of private enterprise,” “initiative,” “responsibility,” and “our American form of 
government.” This move sutured capitalism, self-reliance, and democracy as markers of 
the American system which, though not perfect, was “far superior to and infinitely to be 
preferred to any other so far devised” because it preserved the “priceless content of 
liberty and the dignity of man.” The Manifesto condemned sit-down strikes and argued 
that the federal government should reduce taxes, balance its budget, and reduce its power 
in favor of increasing states’ rights. It was widely circulated in both newspapers and as 
handbills.139 Today, this Manifesto reads like a blueprint for neoliberalization. 
The rhetoric that articulated capitalism with self-reliance and democracy 
intensified during the Cold War era. It was during this period, between 1945 and 1989, 
that democracy, individualism, and capitalism became profoundly co-articulated in a 
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strong and well-circulated discourse. During the early Cold War, the United States and 
the Soviets engaged in an ideological clash that was supplemented by armed conflicts, 
both actualized and threatened. The United States’ discursive arsenal was replete with 
polemic articulations that constructed the United States and the Soviet Union as 
promoting diametrically opposed “way[s] of life.”140 For example, in his highly 
influential, anonymously published Foreign Affairs essay on Soviet-American relations, 
George Kennan established a “basic antagonism between the capitalist and Socialist 
worlds,” so much so that there was “no real faith in the possibility of a permanent happy 
coexistence of the Socialist and capitalist worlds.”141 Thus, American capitalism would 
have to destroy Soviet communism through a patient and determined strategy of 
containment and elimination. Similarly, both the Harry S. Truman and Dwight D. 
Eisenhower Administrations sought to attack communism with covert and overt, 
domestic and international propaganda that celebrated the American democratic-capitalist 
system.142 In the early Cold War years, democracy, individualism, and capitalism would 
became an essential characteristic of the American “way of life,” which was 
diametrically opposed to the collectivism, tyranny, and communism of the Soviets.  
This discursive articulation, as with any articulation, also had material dimensions 
that it drew together under its “way of life” banner. For example, this “way of life” 
discourse celebrated the abundance of physical items and subsequent leisure that 
American families enjoyed, as compared to the oppressed Soviets. As a symbol of 
American prosperity, the suburban home became a place of fulfillment and leisure, where 
home goods simultaneously provided stability and showcased the wonder of a capitalist 
American home.143 The consumer goods made it so that homemakers did not have to 
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manually work in the home.144 These consumer housewives had more time for private 
leisure thanks to their material products, which were unavailable in the Soviet Union.145 
These kinds of discourses sutured capitalism, consumerism, and individual happiness and 
made them markers of a healthy, democratic polity.  
As the Cold War carried on, decade after decade, the democracy-communism 
dichotomy grew stronger, and one of the consequences of this discourse was an eventual 
denigration of the state as a social actor. One of the most feared elements of communism 
was its totalitarian government, which controlled every aspect of social life. Senator 
Joseph McCarthy (R-WI) launched several investigations of “un-American” members of 
the U.S. government, dampening many efforts at social change—especially those 
opposed to business interests—by constructing them as a communist threat.146 McCarthy 
contended that the government was “thoroughly infested with Communists,” and his 
hearings and accusations were televised unedited, thus widely disseminating the idea that 
democracy was vulnerable to the “virile” communist threat.147 Even though McCarthy’s 
hearings turned out to be ineffective as he eventually lost credibility, the rhetoric of the 
communist “menace” continued throughout the Eisenhower Administration and 
beyond.148 Michael Kazin and Laclau both argued that McCarthy’s fierce accusations 
took on a “populist” tone that charged a corrupt elite (the federal government) with a 
conspiracy (communism) that was harmful to the general populace (the American 
people).149 Throughout the Cold War, there circulated a palpable ambivalence toward the 
federal government, and a strong federal government was articulated on many fronts as 
an oppressive power.  
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This fear penetrated the United States while the New Deal logic of a strong and 
protective government continued to structure much of public policy, with such initiatives 
as the G.I. Bill and President Lyndon B. Johnson’s Great Society.150 Johnson extended 
the New Deal logic of state intervention into the 1960s, implementing such policy 
initiatives as Medicare and Medicaid and introducing the sweeping goal of winning a 
“War on Poverty.” As David Zarefsky argued, the Johnson Administration faced a 
significant problem managing its rhetorical vision for the long term. 151 From the 
perspective of the administration’s conservative critics, the War on Poverty had failed 
because it did not defeat poverty, and it encouraged dependence on the state. The lofty 
rhetoric of the “War on Poverty” fueled the conservative fire against it because critics 
could make the argument that the programs failed to “defeat” poverty, and thus 
government intervention was ineffectual. Of course, the Vietnam War and the Watergate 
Scandal deepened any lingering distrust of the government.152  
In sum, the building blocks of American neoliberalism—individual freedom, 
democracy, and free market capitalism—had pronounced antecedents since at least the 
Gilded Age. These commitments were strongly co-articulated during the Great 
Depression to the mid-Cold War amidst communist and fascist threats abroad. This 
articulation gained strength over the decades of tensions between the United States and 
the Soviet Union. By the late Cold War in the 1970s, neoliberalism began to take hold 
and would gather strength, particularly as the Soviet Union crumbled and fell with the 




Cultural Practices and Structural Adjustments 
The neoliberal articulation was amplified when the state and corporations sought 
to deal with the crisis of the 1970s. Strengthened by the decades-long co-articulation of 
democracy, freedom, and capitalism, the U.S. populace was primed for Ronald Reagan’s 
presidency, which ushered in significant structural and attitudinal changes. Reagan, the 
“Great Communicator,” expertly espoused neoliberal commitments to individual 
freedom, democracy, and free market capitalism. For example, in his First Inaugural 
Address, Reagan dismantled the articulation of strong government by celebrating 
everyday individual enterprise and denigrating governmental intrusion into individual 
private lives. 153 In a populist rhetoric, Reagan constructed big government as a kind of 
“elite” that interfered with and thus harmed individual citizens’ lives. Famously, he told 
the American people, “the government is not the solution to our problem; government is 
the problem.” Reagan thus dismantled the idea that government could be a useful social 
referee and instead constructed an active government as an “intrusion” that created 
“roadblocks” to being truly “free.” Reagan affirmed his commitment to protecting the 
freedom of hard-working, individual Americans, as the “business of our nation” was 
restored. He hailed the individual “heroes” who upheld the “world’s strongest economy,” 
its “beacon of hope….and freedom.” Among others, these individual heroes were 
“entrepreneurs with faith in themselves and faith in an idea, who create new jobs, new 
wealth and opportunity.” Reagan’s first inaugural stands a prime example of the 
neoliberal ideal, combining capitalism, freedom, and individual responsibility.  
Together, as a governing articulation, these principles make coherent a world 
order that encourages and justifies particular structural practices and adjustments, which 
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Reagan and his successors would implement. Domestically, Reagan demonstrated a 
commitment to deregulating private enterprise, dismantling unions, and limiting federal 
social services.154 Internationally, Reagan was committed to spreading the democratic-
capitalist articulation everywhere it could take seed. In a 1987 speech, standing near the 
Berlin Wall, which physically separated democracy-capitalism from communism, Reagan 
implored Soviet Leader Mikhail Gorbachev to “tear down this wall” in the name of 
“freedom” and “world peace.”155 When the Berlin Wall fell in 1989, it seemed to many 
that neoliberal capitalism had won its rightful place as the system that best promoted 
individual freedom and dignity.156 As such, Reagan’s presidential successors and other 
political leaders largely continued the trends associated with the growing neoliberal 
order. 
Since at least Reagan’s election in 1980, the neoliberal articulation has motivated 
a series of structural and cultural changes. Three such changes have become particularly 
ubiquitous: the globalization of free trade capitalism, the individualization of collectives, 
and the privatization of public life. First, the neoliberal articulation globalizes free trade 
capitalism by removing structural and cultural barriers to free trade and by encouraging 
the spread of free market capitalism into ever-expanding social spheres.157 When 
President Bill Clinton signed the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) into 
law in 1993, he asserted that free trade would “promote more growth, more equality, 
better preservation of the environment, and a greater possibility of world peace.” 158 
Opening trade borders between the United States, Mexico, and Canada was thus 
constructed not only as an economic opportunity, but also as a “force for social progress.” 
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In this model, “growth” is always a preferred term, one that ensures widespread 
prosperity and social harmony.  
The logic favoring the free market has made its way into other realms of social 
life beyond trade—war, education, public space, and housing, among others.159 Wendy 
Brown and Christine Harold have demonstrated that neoliberal articulation converts all 
social spaces into markets and promises that social fulfillment can come from privileging 
soaring profits, even in arenas of life that were not previously linked to “profit,” such as 
government.160 This articulation, then, assumes that capital needs market-based 
“flexibility” to improve the social system, and anything that encumbers capital’s 
movement impedes social progress.  
Next, the neoliberal articulation individualizes collectives, particularly ones that 
are inimical to the accumulation of capital. The neoliberal framework celebrates 
individual freedom and dignity as primary political ideals, and because individual 
freedom is based on free-market capitalism, neoliberal practice first and foremost 
dismantles collectives that threaten capital. 161 For example, violent repression of labor 
was standard procedure in Latin America, where neoliberal policies were forcibly 
implemented through U.S.-backed military coups.162 Domestically, the Reagan 
Administration actively dismantled labor organizations by offering benefits to individual 
laborers as incentives to not participate in collective action; and because the bureaucratic 
union structure could be debilitating, many individuals took those benefits, weakening 
collective power.163 In neoliberal discourse, “flexibility” individualizes the workforce, 
with unemployment always functioning as discipline for not being “flexible” enough.164  
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Labor is thus converted into a commodity more easily exploited if it is not 
organized into collectives with agency. The individualized “disposable worker” is 
powerless in this short-term, flexible, “business friendly” environment.165 As Jennifer 
Wingard explained, “workers are made to feel completely replaceable and dispensable. 
The more disposable workers become, the more anxious they feel,” and this anxiety has 
led to the erosion of  “worker” as a strong site of identity.166 In addition, as Zygmunt 
Bauman argued, the temporal focus on individual flexibility now as opposed to, for 
example, collective stability later forecloses upon future-oriented ameliorative collective 
action on the part of workers.167 Anxious workers are treated as individuals rather than as 
a class, thereby diverting attention from structural practices that consolidate power in the 
hands of the few.  
This kind of individualization extends to other political identities, beyond 
workers. For Jodi Dean, neoliberal identities are too individual, “too fleeting and unstable 
to serve as sites of politicization.”168 When people see themselves as fluid individuals, 
they attribute success and failure to individual agency regardless of systemic barriers to 
success.169 For example, Dana L. Cloud demonstrated that “the rhetoric of <family 
values>” popularized throughout the 1980s and 1990s “suggests that […social] problems 
are not structural features of capitalist society but rather are the product of personal 
family failures.”170 Similarly, Darrel Enck-Wanzer argued that racist attitudes have been 
readily attributed to personal, individual, deviant racism, not structural inequality.171 
Thus, ostensibly “apolitical” neoliberal discourses that praise personal responsibility lead 
to what Bradley Jones and Roopali Mukherjee called a “privatization of social 
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difference,” wherein people attribute social difference to individuals and thus curtail 
collective forms of intervention.172 
The hegemonic neoliberal articulation, then, privatizes social life, positing that the 
choices of private individuals, in aggregate, make up a society. In this model, market 
freedom guarantees individual freedom, and a neoliberal state is thus oriented toward the 
interests of corporations and other private owners as guarantors of its citizenry’s 
freedoms.173 This free association of individually-responsible citizens follows a free-
market logic of unfettered interaction based on individual “economic incentives and 
disincentives,” where self-managed choices aimed at self-interest constitute civic 
morality.174 All difference, success, and failure are attributed to private individuals 
making private decisions.175 As Aihwa Ong explained, the move toward an individually 
responsible, private citizen constitutes “a fundamental shift in the ethics of subject 
formation, or the ethics of citizenship.”176 Ong demonstrated how neoliberalism 
disarticulates civic identity from elements associated with liberal democratic citizenship 
such as “rights, entitlements, territoriality, a nation” and rearticulates citizenship as a 
market-based relationship. 177 This move changes the characteristics of valued citizens, 
creating a class of “preferred citizens” who are flexible, unattached individuals who 
associate freedom with consumer choice and engage in individual self-governance.178 
These structural and cultural changes have, by most accounts, yielded negative 
consequences for most people in both the United States and the world more generally. In 
practice, neoliberal globalization, individualization, and privatization have benefitted 
upper and corporate classes as a whole.179 This kind of inequality does not square with 
the neoliberal articulation that treats markets as inevitable progress for all of humankind. 
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However, when the powerful neoliberal articulation discourse is challenged, market 
apologists claim either inevitability or not enough market freedom. For example, when 
signing NAFTA, President Clinton said, “We cannot stop global change. We cannot 
repeal the international economic competition that is everywhere. We can only harness 
the energy to our benefit.”180 Further, many free market advocates argue that the problem 
is that there is not enough freedom, there is too much regulation, and that is why the 
market is not regulating itself.181  
The neoliberal articulation is strong. It is repeated and broadcast, put into practice, 
then glorified, even amidst turmoil. Still, as with any articulation, neoliberalism is not 
consistent, and it is plagued with multiple contradictions, especially when its stated ideals 
are put into practice.182 This project demonstrates how particular rhetorics antagonize this 
strong economic discourse, which presents itself as natural and inevitable. 
Antagonizing the Neoliberal Articulation 
The following chapters interrogate how three rhetorical engagements—a pastoral 
letter, a mediated controversy, and a street protest—antagonized this hegemonic 
discourse. I chose these particular disruptions because they significantly antagonized the 
hegemonic articulation in their times, in ways that continue to resonate today. With each 
case, I demonstrate how neoliberal discourses themselves fostered a particular tension in 
the hegemonic articulation. Then, I show how activists and mainstream news media, by 
exploiting these tensions, antagonized the hegemonic articulation.  
Chapter two analyzes the U.S. Catholic Bishops’ 1986 treatise, Economic Justice 
for All: Pastoral Letter on Catholic Social Teaching and the U.S. Economy (EJA). The 
chapter describes the state of the neoliberal articulation of the long 1980s, which began 
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with the oil crises of the 1970s and extended to the rise of Reaganite neoliberalism. I 
suggest that Reaganism fostered a tension between understanding economics as a 
technocratic science and as a moral philosophy. I then argue that EJA antagonized the 
neoliberal articulation by leveraging the Christianized political milieu to emphasize the 
moral-philosophical dimensions of economics. Further, I contend that the bishops 
harnessed the pastoral letter genre to establish their ethos as critics of neoliberalism and 
to pivot from a generalized Christian conception of economics to a specifically Catholic 
one. Ultimately, this chapter shows how EJA introduced Catholic Social Teaching as a 
counterweight to the burgeoning neoliberal articulation. 
Chapter three examines the 1996 controversy over allegations that Kathie Lee 
Gifford used underage sweatshop labor to produce her Wal-Mart clothing line. This 
chapter describes the state of the neoliberal articulation in the early-to-mid 1990s, when 
prominent figureheads and institutions circulated what I term “free market optimism.” 
This public emotion constructed the free market as a social good that promised to provide 
peaceful prosperity to the globe and self-realization to individuals. I suggest that in 
constructing such optimism, neoliberal messages uneasily combined market freedom and 
social responsibility. I then argue that the Gifford controversy antagonized the neoliberal 
articulation by circulating class shame and guilt about bourgeois prosperity and self-
realization. I demonstrate how the controversy transformed class shame into class guilt 
by appropriating neoliberal attachments in ways that privileged social responsibility over 
free market expansion.  
Chapter four considers the 1999 World Trade Organization (WTO) protests in 
Seattle in the context of neoliberal globalization. The chapter explores how, in the mid-
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to-late 1990s, prominent discourses marked democracy as a primary legitimating term for 
the global expansion of neoliberal policy. Proponents of economic liberalization 
simultaneously co-articulated and dis-articulated free markets and democracy, thus 
fostering a tension that the Seattle protests would engage. Various publics also 
constructed a similar tension around the WTO as leaders, institutions, and critics 
negotiated the nature and value of the institution’s globalized agency. In this chapter, I 
argue that the 1999 protests in Seattle antagonized the neoliberal articulation by dis-
articulating democracy and free trade while co-articulating free trade and violence. The 
chapter shows how the protests articulated a widely-circulated choice for the globalizing 
world: neoliberal autocracy or economic democracy.  
Chapter five puts the three case studies in conversation and shows how they have 
reverberated in recent years. I demonstrate that each of these disruptions enacted forms of 
agency that enabled subsequent antagonisms. I also argue that the tensions identified in 
each chapter continue to animate neoliberal discourse and therefore remain ripe for 
amplification. Ultimately, my dissertation suggests that activists can continue to exploit 
each tension in multi-modal ways, and that, through accumulation and circulation, 
consistent antagonisms can disrupt neoliberal hegemony in significant ways. 
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Economic Justice for All: 
The U.S. Catholic Bishops’ Antagonistic Metaphysics 
 
At the 1980 meeting of the United States Conference of Catholic Bishops 
(USCCB), Bishop Peter A. Rosazza recommended “that the Conference address the evils 
of capitalism.”1 The bishops had just published their Pastoral Letter on Marxist 
Communism, and Rosazza, among others, suggested that they balance their economic 
judgments by interrogating the moral dimensions of capitalism. The motion to write such 
a “correlative statement on capitalism…passed on a voice vote” at the meeting, 
establishing the “Christianity and Capitalism Committee,” which would go on to draft the 
1986 publication Economic Justice for All: Pastoral Letter on Catholic Social Teaching 
and the U.S. Economy (EJA).2  
This committee was comprised of five bishops, each of whom brought his own 
perspective on economic morality. Archbishop John Roach appointed Rembert G. 
Weakland as the committee’s chair because Roach and his staff were fond of how 
Weakland “had led bishops through some more delicate liturgical issues” in the past.3 
Although he had limited technocratic economic knowledge, Weakland could pull on his 
“experience of living on welfare” during “the Depression.”4 The other committee 
members each came with his own experiences with specific sectors of the economic 
landscape: William K. Weigand championed the poor in Latin America, Rosazza raised 
concerns about immigrants in inner cities, George H. Speltz advocated for small farmers, 
and Thomas A. Donnellan maintained a commitment to civil rights.5  
The Christianity and Capitalism Committee would soon narrow its scope from 
“capitalism” generally to the capitalist “American economic system.”6 As Weakland 
	 55 
explained in his report to the NCCB, the bishops wanted to limit their scope to examining 
“capitalism as it exists in this society” because “The United States is one of the major, 
possibly the major, capitalist economy in the world. This creates a responsibility for the 
Church in this country to apply the more general framework of papal teaching to our own 
socio-economic reality.”7 The committee wanted to change its name to something akin to 
“Christianity and the American Economy” in order “to be accurate and yet raise no 
ideological flags.”8  The bishops understood that any criticism of “capitalism” as a 
system might alarm a country actively re-engaging in the Cold War against the 
communist Soviet Union.  
The committee’s aim was public, yet ostensibly apolitical. Weakland described 
“The basic aim” of the letter—“to suggest moral principles that can help public officials, 
corporate leaders, union representatives, and other citizens to reflect on current economic 
questions.” 9 The letter was designed to “note problems and injustices brought on by past 
and present economic policies” and “suggest morally sound ways of approaching the 
future.”10 Speaking to a New York Times reporter, Weakland explained that the bishops 
“are not writing for political reasons... The bishops aren’t staking out political 
territory.”11 Instead, he insisted, “‘We want to begin serious discussions from a moral 
viewpoint on the major issues of our times.’ It isn't easy,” he told the reporter, but “being 
a Catholic in this generation means that you have to think deeply about all these 
questions.”  
But, of course, the bishops’ letter was political, as it publicly deliberated and 
adjudicated the pressing political-economic issues of Ronald Reagan’s America. EJA 
insisted that God called people to live in dignity and justice and to orient themselves 
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toward the common good. Furthermore, the bishops called for a moral economic system 
that privileged the poor and opened opportunities for widespread economic participation. 
They also argued that the government and labor unions could act as positive economic 
forces. This construction of moral economics challenged burgeoning neoliberal political 
landscape by questioning many of its tenets and by articulating an alternative worldview. 
Writing and publishing the letter took nearly six years and involved dozens of hearings 
from Catholic and non-Catholic experts and lay people. The drafting also included two 
public drafts and widespread, consistent media coverage.12 The bishops approved EJA in 
its final form, and it passed by a 225 to nine vote on November 13, 1986.13 
This letter was certainly not the first time the Catholic Church entered the 
politico-economic fray. Before the rise of the modern state, the Catholic curia played 
political and economic roles on par with Europe’s monarchs. Modern states and 
economic systems hastened the dissolution of the Catholic Church’s widespread power, 
and to the Church, the liberal assertion that “Economic man” is autonomous amounted to 
a “heresy” that separated people from God and each other; indeed, the early bourgeoisie 
needed to be freed of the Church’s common good requirements to create and keep their 
wealth.14  
Even after its power succumbed to sweeping political and economic modernism, 
the Catholic Church continued to engage in political economics, developing a body of 
thought called Catholic Social Teaching (CST). The CST tradition has constituted a 
counterweight to liberal economics because, since the rise of liberalism, as R. Bruce 
Douglas demonstrated, “the church’s teaching has taken the form of a fairly elaborate 
body of social and economic theory designed specifically to challenge the autonomy of 
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economic man.”15 CST considers both liberalism and Marxism atheistic movements that 
privilege the material over the spiritual.16 This body of thought has criticized Marxism for 
its denigration of human dignity and religion as well as its glorification of class conflict, 
and it has criticized liberal capitalism for treating human beings as commodities and 
creating deep socio-economic divisions.17  
EJA re-articulated CST for the 1980s’ neoliberalizing context. In this chapter, I 
argue that EJA antagonized the neoliberal articulation by leveraging the Christianized 
political milieu to articulate economics as moral philosophy. Further, I contend that the 
bishops harnessed the pastoral letter genre to establish their ethos as critics of 
neoliberalism and to pivot from generalized Christian conception of economics to a 
specifically Catholic one. Ultimately, this chapter shows how EJA introduced CST as a 
counterweight to the burgeoning neoliberal articulation.  
To make this argument, I first describe the state of the neoliberal articulation 
during what I call the long 1980s, which began with the oil crises of the 1970s and 
extended to the rise of a Reaganite neoliberalism. In this section, I show how the crises 
and Reaganism fostered a tension between understanding economics as technocratic 
science and as moral philosophy—a tension that EJA leveraged to challenge the 
neoliberalizing worldview. Next, I analyze the letter and its drafting process to show how 
contextual shifts and Catholic traditions constituted the bishops as political-economic 
agents and how EJA harnessed contextual opportunities to antagonize the growing 
neoliberal articulation. Finally, I offer conclusions about EJA’s challenge to Reaganite 
neoliberalism and the case study’s implications for theories of articulation. 
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The Long 1980s: Burgeoning Neoliberal Articulation  
The neoliberal articulation was just beginning to coalesce when the bishops 
embarked on their economic pastoral in 1980. Issued in 1986, the letter responded to 
Reaganite economic policies, which actively fought inflation, raised military spending, 
cut taxes, and limited government involvement in social welfare.18 Although Reagan was 
certainly not the Jimmy Carter Administration’s neoliberalizing tendencies and 
accentuated the tension between science and philosophy undergirding neoliberal 
economics. 
Crisis 
Although many commentators considered Reagan’s 1980 electoral victory a 
repudiation of President Carter, some of the economic policies that Reagan championed 
in the 1980s were initiated by Carter to deal with the crumbling economy of the 1970s.19 
Thus, Reagan’s prominent contribution to the neoliberal articulation was rooted in the 
economic crises of the 1970s, Carter’s responses to them, and public discourses that 
sought to make sense of them.  
The economic crises of the 1970s combined high oil prices, stagflation, and rising 
property taxes. Petroleum prices doubled between 1973 and 1974 as the Organization of 
Petroleum Exporting Countries declared an oil embargo on allies of Israel.20 Oil prices 
surged again in 1979 and 1980 because of the Iranian protests that culminated in the 
revolution that ousted the country’s Shah.21 Furthermore, inflation and unemployment 
rose simultaneously, and people found themselves in precarious employment situations 
with diminished purchasing power. Concurrently, house values and, along with them, 
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property taxes rose, prompting people across political and economic spectrums to voice 
discontent about soaring taxes amidst economic insecurity.22  
This three-tiered crisis destabilized dominant economic theories on both scientific 
and philosophical grounds. The oil emergencies engendered an acute awareness of the 
interconnectedness of global economies, destabilizing the idea that national economies 
maintained significant autonomy from one another. 23 Furthermore, Keynesian economics 
endorsed the Phillips curve, which suggested that employment and inflation rates 
functioned in an inverse relationship, but in the 1970s, the two rose simultaneously, 
causing economists and politicians to doubt the empirical accuracy of economic models 
that framed the post-World War II boom.24 The tax system was also thrown into doubt as 
people’s anxieties over property taxes eventually generalized into discourses that 
characterized all taxes as oppressive, lumping together property taxes with even the 
income taxes of the very wealthy, which most publics had accepted as a social good since 
the Great Depression.25 Discourses thus questioned both the empirical science and the 
social philosophy undergirding postwar economics, doubting the validity of the scientific 
models as well as the social worth of what Paul S. Nadler characterized as the imposition 
of “political goals on economic policies in the area of environment, affirmative action, 
consumerism, worker and public safety.”26  
Amidst the destabilized economic common sense, the neoliberal articulation 
began to take root. Carter’s first impulse was to address unemployment, but public 
discourse and internal pressure from financing communities privileged fighting 
inflation.27 By 1979, the Carter Administration, widely perceived as weak and 
ineffective, pivoted toward tackling inflation.28 Prominent discourses constructed Carter’s 
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decisions as necessities dictated by empirical realities. The Washington Post reported, 
“Some administration officials privately admit that…Carter had no alternative but to 
name a man like [Paul] Volcker, with impeccable conservative credentials, to manage the 
central bank.”29 Volcker defended his unprecedented plan to deal with inflation—
shrinking the money supply to curb inflation—saying, “We have reached the point in this 
inflationary situation where decisive action is necessary.”30 This scientific 
conceptualization of economics empowered technocrats like Volcker to assess economic 
processes through scientific methods and adjust social policies to better accommodate 
already-existing economic mechanisms.31 The neoliberal orientation toward finance-
sector interests and market freedoms thus took root as an empirical response to a situation 
that commentators across political spectra deemed a crisis, replete with painful 
transformations that disrupted dominant assumptions about how economies function.  
The economic crisis took center stage during the 1980 presidential contest as 
Carter and Reagan each articulated his vision for the American economy in technocratic 
and philosophical terms. For example, in an address to the National Press Club, Carter 
simultaneously treated economics as an empirical science and as a moral philosophy. 
Carter explained, “If living standards are to rise, productivity must grow – there’s no way 
around this as an economic fact of life,” thus constructing economics as unassailable, 
empirical conditions to which people must adjust. 32 Carter also described the economy’s 
aims as facilitating “full employment” and “maintain[ing] a compassionate and a 
progressive society,” thus characterizing economics as a field concerned with promoting 
the good life.33 Similarly, Reagan seamlessly blended scientific and philosophical 
approaches, as exemplified by his speech to the International Business Council. 34 The 
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Republican candidate treated economics as a combination of “principles” that could be 
apprehended by “distinguished economists and businessmen.” 35 Further, he constructed 
economics as “not merely a matter of lines and graphs on a chart,” but also a moral realm 
in which “Individuals and families are being hurt and hurt badly.” 36 Reagan thus called 
on people who shared his “economic philosophy” to help “the American people to 
reclaim their dream.”37 
The 1980 presidential election functioned as a referendum on the state of the 
economy and the future’s potential. The Carter Administration became entangled with 
pessimistic hardship as Carter’s attempts to fight inflation brought on a mid-year 
recession in 1980, and his approval ratings sank.38 In contrast, Reagan presented an 
optimistic vision, which he showcased in mediated spectacles.39 By promising a return to 
greatness, Reagan addressed largely white, working-to-middle-class Americans who had 
seen a better economy in their lives and who had been on top of the social hierarchy 
before the upheaval of the 1960s.40 His campaign combined their aspirations with those 
of business leaders and evangelical Christians to form a coalition that swept him and 
twelve additional Republican senators into office.41 Reagan and his allies touted their 
electoral “mandate” to enlist their policies in the fight against economic and social crises, 
and neoliberal apologists enjoyed support in many sectors for their plans, vision, and 
policy.42 
The election’s comingling of economic realism and reverie showcased a tension 
between science and philosophy that inhabits all economic discourse. Philosophical 
questions have undergirded economic theory since at least Adam Smith, who 
philosophized that exchange markets had the best ability to harness human nature to do 
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the most good.43 Although technocratic economics have largely overshadowed economic 
philosophy as a point of discussion, assumptions about human nature, ethics, and public 
policy inhabit even the most technocratic economic discourses, and in the long 1980s, 
these assumptions made themselves known.44  
Reaganite Freedom Economics  
Reagan’s administration simultaneously treated economics as a technocratic 
science that distributed resources and as a moralistic philosophy that emphasized 
freedom. The president and his technocratic allies relied on “monetarist” and “supply-
side” economic theories, thus treating the economy as a force with its own natural rules 
that experts could ascertain and manage through policy.45 Monetarist theories suggested 
“that slowing the growth of the money supply is the only true way to stop inflation,” and 
“supply side theory” suggested that reduced taxes would spur “fast economic growth,” 
which would “cut unemployment and whittle away the deficit” as “Growth would 
generate more tax revenues.”46 Famous monetarist and architect of neoliberal economics 
Milton Friedman advised Reagan on economic policies, and he staunchly defended the 
scientific economic viewpoint, largely rejecting distinctions between “natural sciences” 
and economics.47  
Perhaps more powerful than the technocratic approach was Reaganites’ 
promulgation of economic philosophies. Reagan and his allies embodied a faith in 
monetarist and supply-side economic theories even when their policies showed empirical 
cracks. The New York Times reported that as “Mr. Reagan has tightened his embrace of 
supply-side doctrine,” many “Mainstream economists insist… that they have found little 
evidence” to support such policy. 48 Instead, these economists compiled “evidence, 
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including analyses of the latest tax return data,” which suggested “that any significant 
supply-side impact of tax cuts is limited to the highest-income groups.”49 Responding to 
criticism of Reagan’s economic policies coming even from within his administration, the 
president said, “I hope you’ll keep in mind that economic forecasting is far from a perfect 
science,” thereby questioning the validity of economic scientism.50 Instead, The 
Washington Post reported that Reagan “remains a true believer in the ‘supply side’ theory 
of economics” whose “faith was not shaken in the least by the deep recession of 1981-
1982, even though that event was not part of the supply siders’ rosy vision.”51 When 
monetarist policies were similarly criticized in 1983, The New York Times reported 
Friedman responding “that the Fed used the label of monetarism as a guise for reducing 
inflation with high interest rates, but that…‘There was no monetarist experiment and 
there was never an intent for a monetarist experiment.’”52 Reaganites thus publicly 
defended supply-side and monetarist economic theories amidst empirical evidence 
undermining such positions in two ways; they either assuredly reaffirmed faith in the 
theories as Reagan did or, following Friedman’s lead, they lambasted policies as not 
adequately conforming to the theory. This attitude of faith shifted their economic 
emphasis from empiricism to philosophy by publicly maintaining a belief in a theory of 
economics over empirical evidence derived through technocratic means. 
Furthermore, Reaganite discourses promoted a philosophy of economics that 
sutured wealth and capitalism with personal and political freedom. Reagan asserted that 
individuals must be “free to follow their dreams” because “Freedom and incentives 
unleash the drive and entrepreneurial genius that are at the core of human progress.”53 
Reaganism tied personal freedom and social progress to wealth, constructing economic 
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privilege as both a reward for making smart choices and as a resource that would 
eventually lift all of society, as wealthy people created opportunities for other individuals 
to make their own fortunes.54 Furthermore, Reaganite discourse co-articulated individual 
and market freedoms with democracy; Reagan asserted that the goal of the “American 
Revolution” was being “reborn” in the 1980s as “Americans courageously supported the 
struggle for liberty, self-government, and free enterprise throughout the world.”55 
To promote such freedom economics in the United States, Reaganist domestic 
policies often placed responsibility on individuals to pursue success or succumb to their 
own failures. Reagan-era tax policy favored cutting the marginal rates on the highest tax 
brackets to give wealthy individuals more autonomy to invest their money as they saw 
fit.56 Reagan also treated workers as individuals; when he fired the striking PATCO 
workers in 1981, he argued that each of them individually quit by going on strike. 57 
Reaganite policies thus treated people as individuals whose personal fulfillment was 
fostered by a context of economic freedom. 
Reaganites also sought to spread supply-side economics around the world, 
prompting U.S. military buildup and intervention.58 Reagan constructed the capitalist 
United States as the “last and greatest bastion of freedom” in a world teetering on the 
brink of totalitarianism, resuscitating the tenor of pre-détente cold war rhetoric by 
constructing a bi-polar world in which the United States incarnated freedom, 
righteousness, and peace, while the Soviet Union embodied totalitarianism, treachery, 
and terrorism.59 Reagan aimed to reestablish the United States’ military prominence over 
the USSR, and he focused on discrediting state communism as a legitimate political-
economic system.60 Thus, despite their mantra of small government, Reaganites increased 
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funding and government oversight for the military, insisting that capitalist-democratic 
freedom was so virtuous that it had to be protected and promulgated with military force.61  
The Reagan Administration took a firm stance against communism around the 
world, backing a series of anti-communist regimes and insurgents, even as some of them 
engaged in human rights abuses. The U.S. military publicly intervened in conflicts in 
such places as Libya and Grenada, arguing that they were staving off the mounting 
communist-terrorist threat. 62 In both overt and covert ways, the Reagan Administration 
and the CIA also supported the anti-communist regimes around the world; some of these 
regimes committed brutal atrocities against Leftists in their countries, supported in part 
by U.S. power. 63 Reagan’s foreign policy, then, committed to spreading its particular 
freedom-capitalism-democracy amalgam around the world, which meant staunchly 
opposing communist or socialist regimes or movements, even when communism was 
instituted as a result of democratic practices. 
In sum, Reaganism blended scientific and philosophical approaches to economics 
into a burgeoning neoliberal amalgam of supply-side capitalism, monetarist policy, and 
individual freedom. Furthermore, Reagan’s public discourse consistently emphasized the 
philosophical dimensions of capitalist “freedom” economics, thus de-centering 
technocratic economic discourses. This emphasis opened a space for addressing the social 
purposes of economics, a space that EJA would ultimately capitalize on to challenge the 
growing neoliberal articulation. 
Christianized Agency and Moral Economics  
The bishops could enact political agency, in part, because of the Christianized 
socio-political milieu of the long 1980s, wherein popular and political discourses 
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legitimized Christian influences on governance. The bishops’ letter seized on these 
opportunities; as Christian agents working with a Christian ontology and epistemology, 
the bishops further de-centered the technical dimensions of economics and emphasized 
the philosophical-moral dimensions. 
Christianized Politics 
Several prominent discourses co-articulated Christianity and governance in the 
long 1980s. Even before Reagan’s tenure, Carter infused presidential politics with 
religious discourses when he took office as an avowedly “born-again Christian,” who 
openly described his life as having “been shaped in the church.”64 The long 1980s also 
saw the New Religious Right (NRR) become “a surging new force in politics” as media 
attention catapulted the movement’s “godly positions” into widespread public 
consciousness.65 Christianity played a prominent public role in the 1980 election, as both 
the Reagan and Carter campaigns explicitly leveraged the candidates’ Christianity at the 
same time that the Reagan campaign allied with the NRR.66 With these widely circulated 
discourses merging Christianity with politics, as Andrew P. Hogue argued, “the 1980 
election became one that was based in an unprecedented manner on ‘religious,’ ‘family’ 
and ‘moral’ values.”67 Both the Carter and Reagan campaigns attempted to define the 
political trajectory of the United States in terms of Christian values, with Reaganite 
discourses emphasizing traditional families, fetal life, and church-state issues and 
Carterite discourses emphasizing common humanity, tolerance, and human rights.68  
Reagan’s presidency also functioned as a node that articulated Christianity with 
the free market, as his public persona deftly acclaimed a Christianized environment in 
which a moral capitalism could thrive. 69 Reagan’s discourse resuscitated earlier Cold 
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War rhetorics that constructed a “crusade for freedom” from Soviets, and some religious 
Cold Warriors constructed worldwide intervention on the part of U.S. style capitalism-
democracy as a matter of upholding the “Judeo-Christian heritage told in the Bible.”70 As 
part of his call to accept this divine mission, Reagan insisted that the nation had to assert 
its “moral leadership in the world” and develop “a foreign policy which understands the 
danger we face from governments and ideologies that are at war with the very ideas of 
religion and freedom,” thus constructing the Soviet Union and its allies as a threat to both 
American-style capitalism, democracy, and religion.71 
Throughout the Reagan era, other Christianized politics abounded. For example, 
politicians and their constituents debated whether prayer had a place in public schools.72 
Moreover, the news media reported on polls that amplified connections between religion 
and public policy, with The New York Times reporting in 1981 that “65 percent of the 
public believes that religion can provide answers to modern problems.”73 One year later, 
the same newspaper reported on “a 1982 Gallup Poll” that showed that “85 percent of the 
American public sampled believes that Jesus was the divine Son of God.”74  
The widespread circulation of Christian discourses created a space primed for the 
sort of political-moral-religious agency that the bishops could enact. As Catherine Chaput 
suggested, rhetoric gains the power to constitute as it circulates, such that “the repetition 
of values added and exchanged through disparate communicative acts” set the boundaries 
for acceptable political action.75 During the long 1980s, rhetorics that emphasized the 
intersections of U.S. public policy and Christian morality consistently and widely 
circulated, thus naturalizing politicized Christianity as a kind of political agency and 
inviting discourses that further Christianized politics.  
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EJA’s Christian Economics 
The bishops engaged this milieu by touting EJA’s Christianity and the bishops’ 
Christian ethos, referring to its contents and its authors as “Christian” one hundred and 
eleven times.76 The bishops identified as “followers of Christ,” who called upon “the 
Christian community” to join them in “Challenging U.S. economic life with the Christian 
vision” of economics.77 The letter further constructed its authors as moral counselors who 
wrote “as pastors, not public officials. We speak as moral teachers,” they wrote, “not 
economic technicians.”78 These moral instructors noted that “the human and ethical 
dimensions of economic life” were “aspects too often neglected in public discussion,” 
thus using the letter’s explicit Christian identifications to construct its authors as qualified 
economic commentators who could supplement the existing preoccupations with 
technocratic dimensions of economics.79 In these ways, EJA leveraged Christianized 
politics to assert the bishops’ authority over economic morality. As Christian agents in a 
milieu that amplified such subjectivities, the bishops could raise questions of economic 
morality.  
Having constructed their moral qualifications as Christians, the bishops invoked a 
familiar and increasingly public Christian ontology in which a Judeo-Christian God 
created human beings and thus claimed significant jurisdiction over human affairs. 
Drawing on the Bible as an epistemological authority, EJA proclaimed that, as beings 
“created in the image of God (Gn 1:27),” humans were “holy and sacred” creatures 
whose inherent “dignity comes from God.”80 They asserted that as dignified creatures, 
humans had rights that were “bestowed on human beings by God and … not created by 
society. Indeed,” the bishops wrote, “society has a duty to secure and protect them.”81 
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This Christian ontology at once elevated human beings as sacred creatures and 
subordinated human society to God’s moral authority, proclaiming that “no dimension of 
human life lies beyond God’s care and concern.”82 The bishops’ document harnessed a 
milieu replete with political references to Christianity and Scripture to place human 
affairs within a divinely ordered moral universe. Because they claimed Christianity in 
such a milieu, the bishops could construct themselves as moral agents for whom it was 
appropriate to proclaim religious truths and engage Scripture as epistemology to address 
public policy.  
In offering “The Christian Vision of Economic Life,” the bishops’ letter treated 
economics as a dimension of human life that, as such, was within God’s moral reach.83 
The bishops declared, “The economy is a human reality” that “has been built by the labor 
of human hands and minds” and “can be changed by them.”84 This formulation granted 
people agency over the creation and maintenance of economic forces because, in the 
letter’s view, “The economy is not a machine that operates according to its own 
inexorable laws, and persons are not mere objects tossed about by economic forces.”85 
The bishops’ account cast humans as economic agents who labored to create and manage 
economic production and circulation, contrasting the neoliberal conception of financial 
markets as natural, self-regulating systems. The letter defined economies as comprised of 
“men and women working together to develop and care for the whole of God’s creation,” 
thus suggesting that economies were not divinely created—indeed, they were constructed 
and directed by human beings. However, like all human affairs, they were subject to 
divine principles, and humans had the will to try to interpret and follow the divinely 
inspired path or ignore and stray from it.86 Therefore, although the letter established 
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human agency over economics, it also placed economics under divine purview, 
navigating a perennial Christian tension between divine plan and human will.87  
EJA anchored its economic analysis within a Christian epistemology of Biblical 
hermeneutics; the bishops explained, “we turn first to the Scriptures for guidance” so that 
they might “attend to the Bible’s deeper vision of God, of the purpose of creation, and of 
the dignity of human life in society.”88 They asserted that understanding these 
fundamental arrangements would aid people in a “quest for an economic life worthy of 
divine revelation.” 89 The bishops drew evidence from the Old and New Testaments to 
assert that people, who were “Created in God’s Image,” had a “Covenant” with God and 
were “Called to” pursue “the Reign of God” in all human affairs, including “Poverty, 
Riches, and the Challenges of Discipleship.”90 EJA elucidated three prominent Biblical 
narratives to show the complex ways that human affairs were subject to God’s laws: the 
creation story, Israel’s covenant, and Jesus’ life, death, and resurrection.91 For example, 
the bishops drew on the Book of Genesis to tell a truncated “theology of creation,” 
wherein God created “heaven and earth (Gn 1-11)” as well as “man and woman, made in 
God’s image (Gn 1:26-27),” who were meant to “share in the creative activity of God,” 
such that “by their labor they are unfolding the Creator’s work.”92 This creation story 
positioned human beings as proximate to the divine, descendent from it, helping it to 
flourish on earth, and subject to its rules. “One legacy of this theology,” the letter 
explicated, “is the conviction that no dimension of human life lies beyond God’s care and 
concern,” including the economic.93 This biblical narrative constructed human affairs as 
part of God’s moral domain, at the same time that it granted people agency to either 
choose to follow God’s vision or stray from it by recounting the fall of Adam and Eve 
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who “disrupted God’s design by trying to live independently of God through a denial of 
their status as creatures.”94 Each of the letter’s Biblical narratives constructed human 
affairs as subject to God’s moral pull, but also granted people agency to either resist or 
succumb to God’s call, thus crafting a complex human agency, wherein people at once 
had the power to shape their affairs, but in order for the affairs to be moral, they had to 
conform to God’s vision. 
As Christian agents working with a Biblical epistemology, the bishops further de-
centered the technical dimensions of economics and emphasized the philosophical-moral 
dimensions. The authors acknowledged that people had “many partial ways to measure 
and debate the health of our economy: Gross National Product, per capita income, stock 
market prices, and so forth,” highlighting the incompleteness of these technical 
measures.95 They presented their aim as going “beyond purely technical issues to 
fundamental questions of value and human purpose.”96 As such, EJA suggested that its 
philosophical-moral inquiry was vital to the health and wellbeing of the economy because 
it addressed the roots of economic issues, which technicalities could only partially 
measure, at best, and could completely obscure, at worst. EJA thusly engaged the 
opportunities afforded by the milieu to incorporate Christian epistemologies and 
ontologies to craft a complex form of human economic agency that was morally subject 
to God’s call. EJA, then, challenged the neoliberal impulse to treat the free market as the 
pinnacle of humanity by positing that God, not the market, reigned over human affairs. 
U.S. Pastoral Letter Genre 
Although the bishops were clearly figureheads of a Christian faith, they were also 
unmistakably Catholic, members of an immense international institution with traditions 
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dating back nearly two millennia. Throughout the letter’s drafting process, press outlets 
identified the authors as members of “the Catholic hierarchy” who intended to offer “a set 
of religious reflections, or pastoral letter, on Roman Catholic social teaching and the 
United States economy.”97 Publicly understood as Catholic agents and members of an 
institutional order that linked the United States with the larger Roman Catholic world, the 
bishops harnessed the U.S. pastoral letter genre to challenge the burgeoning neoliberal 
order. This genre constituted the U.S. bishops as situationally embedded, yet morally 
transcendent political actors called to address the philosophical and moral dimensions of 
U.S. economics.  
The Catholic pastoral letter is a flexible genre of episcopal discourse in which 
bishops interpret doctrine to guide the Catholic laity’s actions in particular 
circumstances.98 Rhetorical scholars have identified several generic characteristics of 
Catholic pastoral letters, including the use of doctrinal evidence, the tendency to assert 
more than to argue, and the negotiation of multiple audiences that are both within the 
Church and beyond it.99 Since 1792, the U.S. subset of this genre has itself developed 
three dynamic characteristics that EJA would also manifest: collective enunciation, dual 
subjectivities, and publicized doctrine.  
First, U.S. pastoral letters collectively enunciate an institutional position. 
Although the earliest pastorals were largely single-authored documents that were not 
tethered to a national organization, they nonetheless articulated the collective positions of 
Catholic bishops as members of a global religious institution.100 The U.S. bishops 
nationalized their voice and institutionalized their collective agency when they formed 
the USCCB in 1917.101 Since the early twentieth century, the USCCB has approved and 
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disseminated national pastoral letters that were largely written by single authors.102 As 
John Lynch demonstrated, these bishops’ letters generically function as “middle-level” 
documents in a hierarchical organization that strive for either the explicit or tacit approval 
of the upper echelons of the hierarchy.103 The USCCB’s 1983 pastoral on nuclear 
warfare, The Challenge of Peace: God’s Promise and Our Response, pushed the 
collectivity of the U.S. pastoral into novel territory as the bishops wrote it by committee, 
rather than signing on to a single-authored treatise.104 The letters’ collectivity constituted 
the bishops as agents who could speak for the whole of the U.S. Catholic Church, 
granting their treatises an institutional heft. 
Second, U.S. pastoral letters manifest dual subjectivities, as they carefully 
negotiate Americanism and Romanism. Overtly addressed to American Catholics, U.S. 
pastorals explain how to live a Catholic life in the context of the United States, but they 
have also often implicitly and explicitly addressed other audiences, including all levels of 
Church hierarchy as well as non-Catholic publics and institutions.105 The earliest letters 
explicitly undertook Catholics’ doctrinal concerns and implicitly addressed wider U.S. 
publics’ anxieties about Catholics by pronouncing the compatibility of Catholic and 
American values.106 Once the bishops formed the USCCB, the pastoral letters 
increasingly pivoted away from “defensive” patriotism toward openly criticizing aspects 
of American policy, as the bishops’ institution gained legitimacy.107 The Second Vatican 
Council—which convened between 1962 and 1965 and profoundly transformed the 
Church—further encouraged the public negotiation of multiple subjectivities by orienting 
the institution to the contemporary world.108 As a post-Vatican II document, The 
Challenge of Peace pushed dual subjectivity into new terrain by breaching pastorals’ 
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insular drafting process; the bishops consulted technical experts, debated the issue 
internally, and solicited input from both Catholic and non-Catholic Americans by 
circulating drafts in popular media outlets.109 Pastoral letters’ generic negotiation of dual 
subjectivities often positions bishops as both inside and beyond the dominant system, 
enabling them to simultaneously reify and challenge the structure.  
Third, U.S. pastoral letters publicize and concretize Catholic doctrine by 
advocating public moral positions on specific national issues. The earliest pastorals drew 
on Catholic doctrine to instruct Catholics about how to keep the faith in a largely hostile, 
Protestant environment.110 Toward the beginning of the twentieth century, as the bishops 
retreated from a defensive posture, their pastorals often applied Catholic doctrine to 
controversial and prominent social issues, blending Catholic teaching with messages of 
more generalized morality on public matters.111 Vatican II legitimated such a move in 
1965 as it urged the Catholic hierarchy to engage with the contemporary social world, 
pursuing the realization of its doctrine with various publics, religious and non-religious 
alike.112 Again, The Challenge of Peace made significant contributions to the scope and 
form of pastorals’ public and concretized doctrine. Harnessing the increasingly 
Christianized publicity of the 1980s, the bishops addressed the controversial nuclear arms 
race as public moralists, blending technical expertise with Catholic doctrine and more 
generalized Christian values.113 The pastorals’ public doctrine constituted the bishops as 
agents who were compelled by their religious genre to engage with the morality of 
current affairs. 
EJA mobilized the genre’s characteristics to establish the bishops’ ethos as critics 
of neoliberalism and to pivot from generalized Christian conception of economics to a 
	 75 
specifically Catholic one in three ways. First, the pastoral letter’s collective enunciation 
co-articulated the credibility and resources of the world’s oldest institution with the 
document. Second, the letter’s negotiation of dual subjectivities allowed the bishops to 
simultaneously reify and critique the U.S. economic system. Finally, the letter’s 
publicizing of concretized Catholic doctrine offered this body of thought as a public 
resource for policy deliberation. 
Collective Enunciation 
Harnessing the pastoral genre, EJA embodied its collectivity in practice and 
embraced it in prose. The economic pastoral was written by a committee of bishops who 
reviewed thousands of letters from Catholics, and the USCCB deliberated on the letter’s 
1984 draft before approving the final letter in 1986 by a 96 percent majority.114 
Furthermore, the letter’s prose pointed to the collective nature of its positions by using 
“we” and “our” pronouns, referring to the U.S. Catholic bishops as an institutional body. 
EJA’s prose also adopted the collective voice of the Catholic Church by calling upon 
their institution’s “long tradition of thought and action on the moral dimensions of 
economic activity” that included such historical behemoths as the “Hebrew prophets,” 
“Jesus,” and “Pope John Paul II.”115 In pointing to “Catholic social and ethical 
traditions,” the bishops constructed their letter as a collective document that announced 
the Catholic position on economics, thereby harnessing the power associated with a 
massive religious institution.116 
The institutional and religious collectivity of the letter established the document’s 
credibility as a worthy challenge to the neoliberal orientation. The collective and 
centuries-long traditions of the Catholic Church lent the letter significant force because 
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this institution is comprised of an extensive history, countless resources, and a 
metaphysical system of meaning that purports to manage people’s material and spiritual 
lives.117 The Church can be understood, in Michel Foucault’s words, as “an institution 
that claims to govern men [sic] in their daily life on the grounds of leading them to 
eternal life in the other world.”118 Foucault demonstrated that this institution is 
simultaneously understood as an earthly one comprised of “laws, rules, techniques, and 
procedures” and a spiritual one that guides people toward bringing the “will of God” to 
fruition.119 As a document affiliated with the Catholic Church, the letter took on the heft 
of such an institution, enabling it to function as a philosophical-moral counterweight to 
the burgeoning neoliberal order. EJA framed its economic critique as a dutiful imposition 
of a spiritual institution when it explained, “The Church must…stand ready to challenge 
practices and institutions that impede or carry us farther away from realizing this [divine] 
vision.”120 The letter thus enunciated a collective and institutional challenge that 
manifested as a traditional duty to guide people’s earthly actions to match a divine 
morality. 
Dual Subjectivities 
The tradition of the pastoral genre also compelled the bishops to negotiate their 
Americanism and Catholicism, and EJA’s navigation of these subjectivities positioned 
the bishops as critics uniquely able to assess the neoliberalizing U.S. economy from both 
within and beyond it. The document’s prose and its drafting process constructed the 
bishops as embedded members of the American democratic-capitalist system in both 
linguistic and embodied ways. EJA’s prose constructed the letter as an American 
document by overtly embracing prominent American narratives and values.121 The 
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bishops explicitly referred to themselves “As Americans” who were “grateful for the gift 
of freedom and committed to the dream of ‘liberty and justice for all.’”122 EJA’s language 
embraced the ubiquitous discourses of American “freedom” and expressed devotion to 
their nation’s idealized construction of itself as a “bold experiment in democracy.”123 
Furthermore, EJA enunciated exceptionalist discourses by explicitly referring to the 
United States as a nation “blessed with extraordinary resources” that has “provided an 
unprecedented standard of living for millions of people,” thus invoking a long-standing 
trope of American abundance wherein the United States stands above other nations as a 
land replete with natural resources, human talent, and consumer goods.124 This common 
trope has long articulated American exceptionalism with capitalism, such that capitalist 
America is understood as an idealized node yoking ingenuity, freedom, and abundance.125 
In no uncertain terms, the bishops praised the United States as “among the most 
economically powerful nations on earth” that, as “a land of vast natural resources and 
fertile soil,” has “encouraged citizens to undertake bold ventures” such that “Through 
hard work, self-sacrifice and cooperation, families have flourished; towns, cities and a 
powerful nation have been created.”126 By affirming these laudatory constructions of the 
capitalist-democratic United States, the bishops engaged as patriots committed to a 
dominant American ethos.  
Moreover, the bishops reified the American mythos of democratic governance by 
opening their inquiries to public and expert deliberation and by emphasizing 
participation.127 Between 1980 and 1983, the bishops held twelve hearings on the state of 
the U.S. economic system, inviting economists, charity workers, labor leaders, public 
officials, and business leaders, among others, to testify.128 EJA’s committee also held a 
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symposium in 1983 at Notre Dame University, where “More than 250 people packed the 
sessions,” and Archbishop Weakland testified in Congress after publishing the final 
draft.129 By holding these hearings and responding to both religious and secular 
comments, the committee embodied a commitment to public and pluralistic dialogue, 
which their letter embraced as an integral component of the “American pragmatic 
tradition of reform” wherein “the rich plurality of social institutions” and perspectives 
“enhance personal freedom” and offer “opportunity for participation in community 
life.”130 This emphasis reified the prominent idea that symbolic “participation” and 
“voice” themselves make a society more “democratic,” no matter how many of those 
diverse and often contradictory “voices” ever meaningfully influence a society’s cultural, 
economic, and political fabric.131 As such, the bishops constructed their pastoral as part of 
an American tradition of pluralistic and democratic engagement.  
As members of the democratic-capitalist American system, the bishops’ critique 
of the U.S. economy could be positioned as a self-assessment designed to more 
completely fulfill “The promise of the ‘American dream.’”132 The bishops thus activated 
what Robert L. Scott called the “conservative voice” when they reified conservative 
values—American freedom, pluralistic democracy, and capitalist abundance—by 
constructing themselves as protectors of those principles.133 The bishops marshaled 
dominant epideictic discourse to construct themselves as ingroup Americans who could 
critique American capitalism as members of the system. As Patricia Roberts-Miller 
explained, “ingroup” refers to “an imagined construct to which we belong” that can be 
understood as a “positive stereotype” that has significant repercussions for collective and 
individual identities.134 Group identity often relies on the assumption that there exists a 
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unifying essence that characterizes the group as a whole. Furthermore, people tend to 
“attribute good motives to the same behavior in ingroup members that they describe with 
bad motives in outgroup members.”135 Therefore, constructing themselves as patriotic 
Americans offered the bishops’ document the possibility of ingroup identification, 
suggesting that as patriots, they were essentially well-intentioned and pro-American 
participants of the system they were assessing. In a context of heightened polarization 
between the “us” of the United States and the “them” of the Soviet Union, the bishops’ 
declarations of American interiority provided grounds for legitimacy.  
Although EJA signaled that the pastoral was an ingroup text, the pastoral’s prose 
also firmly established the bishops as Roman Catholics. EJA used the word “Catholic” 
one-hundred and fifty-five times, and it called on Catholic doctrine and papal authority as 
evidence and as markers of its purpose. For example, EJA argued that the bishops’ 
positions “were strongly affirmed as implications of Catholic social teaching by Pope 
John Paul II.”136 This example—one of a multitude—marked the document as Catholic 
because it used doctrinal evidence, a type of verification that is more accessible and 
significantly more authoritative for members of the Catholic community than for non-
members.137 Indeed, the bishops explained that they wrote the letter “first of all to 
provide guidance for members of our own Church as they seek to form their consciences 
about economic matters.”138  
The bishops’ explicit Catholic subjectivity positioned EJA’s critique as beyond 
the American economic system in two significant ways. First, the Catholic subjectivity 
allowed the bishops to take a global perspective on the nation’s economy. As members of 
such a worldwide institution, the bishops could, as Weakland explained in a letter to the 
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USCCB, “address the international implications and impact of the American economy in 
an interdependent world.”139 EJA’s prose embraced the Church’s globalism as it 
emphasized “Traditional Catholic teaching on…global interdependence,” its concern for 
“the unity of the human family,” and “the need to pursue the international common 
good.”140 EJA explained that the Church recognized that all nations were members of 
“the human community” and, as Catholic agents, the bishops had to “recognize the moral 
bonds among all people” that went “beyond national sovereignty” to include fellowship 
between “industrialized countries of the North and the developing countries of the 
South.”141 EJA’s prose tethered the church’s globalism to the long 1980s’ increasing 
awareness of globalization, positioning the Catholic bishops as agents well-disposed to 
navigate the “increasingly interdependent global economy” in which “nations separated 
by geography, culture, and ideology are linked in a complex commercial, financial, 
technological, and environmental network.”142 
The Church’s globalism also allowed the bishops to incorporate perspectives that 
had trouble flourishing within the neoliberalizing United States, but that were gaining 
traction outside of it. For example, EJA borrowed the term “preferential option for the 
poor” from their Left-leaning Latin American counterparts and adjusted it to the U.S. 
context.143 This concept is rooted in Liberation Theology, which emerged from Latin 
America in the mid-twentieth century as a response to the region’s widespread poverty. 
Liberation Theologians reacted to the prevailing economic push in the 1960s and 1970s 
to transform “underdeveloped” economies in Latin America into systems modeled after 
“developed” nations. People in Latin America had largely witnessed the failure of this 
approach, as they were made poorer and worse off by “development,” which fostered 
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Latin American dependence on first world structures.144 At their 1968 conference in 
Medellín, Colombia, Latin American bishops developed a robust set of teachings with a 
Marxian tint, focusing on empowering the poor. They insisted on a “hermeneutic 
privilege of the poor” because “the poor are essentially situated to hear the Word of God 
as a word addressed to those in oppression and as a word of justice and liberation from 
that oppression.”145 This option called Catholics to see the world as the poor and 
marginalized do.146 The U.S. bishops embraced only parts of Liberation Theology’s 
option, and mainly focused on showing middle class audiences and policy experts why 
they should act on behalf of the poor.147 Although the letter itself mostly focused on 
advocating for the poor, it promoted a posture that re-imagined the poor in a neoliberal 
milieu that emphasized the virtue of wealth. 
Next, their Catholic subjectivity allowed the bishops to present their views as 
beyond ideology and politics, instead constructing them as matters of religious calling. 
Within the first few paragraphs of the pastoral, the bishops wrote, “We seek not to make 
some political or ideological point but to lift up the human and ethical dimensions of 
economic life.”148 The bishops’ prose elevated their mission beyond the realm of 
instrumental politics, focusing audiences’ attentions on issues that they constructed as 
broader and more fundamental. Furthermore, they explained, “The Church’s experience 
through history and in nations throughout the world today has made it wary of all 
ideologies that claim to have the final answer to humanity’s problems,” thus using the 
Church’s long history to further distance themselves from any set of principles that could 
be understood as a political “ideology.”149  
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Americanism and Catholicism thus converged in EJA’s prose, which embraced 
the “dual heritage of Catholic social teaching and traditional American values.”150 EJA 
articulated the bishops’ dual identities—at once within the system and beyond it—into 
the singular subjectivity of “moral teachers,” unique in their ability to guide Catholics 
and Americans toward an assessment of the underlying morality of economics.”151 EJA 
combined subjectivities that often function in conservative ways—American patriotism 
and Catholic institutionalism—to create a subjectivity that could challenge the 
fundamental philosophies undergirding the neoliberalizing world.  
Publicized Doctrine 
The episcopal genre also enabled the bishops to engage forms of publicity that 
applied Catholic doctrine to contemporary issues. EJA explained, “we are trying to look 
at economic life through the eyes of faith, applying traditional church teaching to the U.S. 
economy,” and the document characterized “economic life” as “one of the chief areas 
where we live out our faith.”152 Although this chapter will explicate the specific tenets of 
Catholic doctrine in the next section, the very act of application also functioned 
rhetorically; this move reshaped boundaries between idealism and realism by calling to 
mind the challenge of living religious ideals in everyday life—a common imperative 
circulating during the long 1980s. “Followers of Christ must avoid a tragic separation 
between faith and everyday life,” EJA proclaimed, as it lightly inoculated its audiences to 
the challenges confronting such a plan, explaining, “We should not be surprised if we 
find Catholic social teaching to be demanding. The Gospel is demanding.”153 EJA 
reconfigured idealism and realism by suggesting that Christian life meant negotiating the 
expedient and the moral in ways that privileged the idealistic but heeded the realistic. 
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Their warning that such an undertaking would be “challenging” subsumed any strictly 
realism-based obstacles under a Christian ontology of fall, struggle, and redemption, 
recasting these challenges as predicted hurdles that must be overcome in a religious 
journey toward the moral.154 Such an orientation challenged the economic realism of the 
neoliberalizing order and created a space in which Catholic doctrine could be introduced 
as a resource for solving economic problems.  
Although U.S. pastoral letters have always been public to varying degrees, the 
publicity of The Challenge of Peace set a spotlight on the economic pastoral, allowing its 
application of Catholic doctrine to circulate widely. As one New York Times article put it, 
“in the aftershocks of the nuclear pastoral, the letter on the economy has become the 
subject of … intense and ambivalent anticipation and debate.”155 EJA fulfilled such 
expectations by participating in four forms of publicity throughout its drafting and 
circulation process.  
First, the economic pastoral committee opened their research and drafting process 
to various publics, thus integrating Catholic doctrine, economics, and public policy. In 
preparation for the research hearings that the bishops held, the committee requested that 
each invited speaker submit a written statement before the meetings in which they 
addressed “the major characteristics and trends of the U.S. economy today.”156 During 
the hearings, speakers were allotted “fifteen minutes for oral presentation,” then engaged 
in “open discussion with the Committee.”157 Such a structure, which resembled academic, 
governmental, and professional meetings, positioned the committee of Catholic bishops 
as officials charged with understanding and addressing a complex and pressing social 
issue. The bishops assumed the position of officials who would be educated by experts on 
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the complexities of the multifaceted U.S. economy so they could adjudicate the proper 
way forward.  
Myriad experts and advocates testified in front of the committee, such that the 
hearings, in their totality, co-articulated economics, public policy, and Catholic doctrine. 
The bishops heard from speakers with expertise in economic policy and administration, 
such as representatives from the Council of Economic Advisors from the Nixon, Ford, 
and Carter Administrations as well as officials from the Department of Housing and 
Urban Development. Financial experts also testified, including prominent economists, 
financial advisors, and officers of the World Bank. The bishops also met with experts in 
labor-management relations, such as representatives from the AFL-CIO, managers from 
General Motors, and small business associations. In addition to these economic experts, 
the bishops solicited testimonies on intersections between Catholic doctrine and U.S. 
economics from professors of theology, representatives from Catholic Charities, and lay 
Catholic economic advocates from across the political spectrum.158 Taken as a whole, the 
hearings created a space for experts in economics and finance to subject their knowledge 
to moral questions and for experts in Catholic doctrine to apply Catholic precepts to 
economic situations. The speakers’ participation also suggested that the bishops’ 
committee was a legitimate forum for their expertise, thus strengthening the comingling 
of economics, public policy, and Catholic doctrine.  
Second, the bishops constructed a publicly oriented, yet doctrinally anchored 
argument; that is, they offered reasons for their claims that would be most readily 
accessible to Catholics but also could be comprehended by non-Catholics. For example, 
the bishops asserted, “The most urgent priority for domestic policy is the creation of new 
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jobs with adequate pay and decent working conditions.”159 In support of this assertion, 
the bishops called upon Catholic doctrine, explaining that “Employment is a basic 
right….which flows from the principles of justice which we have outlined.” 160 
Furthermore, they marshaled the “deep conviction of American culture that work is 
central to the freedom and well-being of people” in support of a goal of full 
employment.161 Finally, the bishops evidenced their claim with statistics to show that 
un(der)employment was a serious social problem. Using numbers from the U.S. 
Department of Labor, the bishops explained, “There are about 8 million people in the 
United States looking for a job who cannot find one. They represent about 7 percent of 
the labor force.”162 Combining psychological and public policy research with widely 
circulating Christianized discourses of protecting the traditional family, the bishops 
argued that un(der)employment “gives rise to family quarrels, greater consumption of 
alcohol, child abuse, spouse abuse, divorce, and higher rates of infant mortality.”163 EJA 
co-articulated Catholic doctrine with more publicly accessible forms of reasoning, thus 
introducing doctrine as one source of evidence for identifying and addressing social 
problems for wider U.S. publics. 
Third, the pastoral’s moral-economic message enjoyed widespread circulation 
within the Catholic Church. EJA’s first draft, published by the Church’s press, sold over 
93,000 copies within six months.164 The USCCB allotted $525,000 to form an Office of 
Implementation for the vision articulated in EJA.165 Among other things, this office 
printed and disseminated pledge pamphlets called “A Pledge of Commitment for 
Economic Justice.” The pamphlets summarized the tenets of the letter and asked 
parishioners to sign a promissory card that asked the signatory to write specific “actions” 
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that they would “undertake” to show their “own personal commitment to economic 
justice.”166 This widespread circulation encouraged Catholics to approach the Church’s 
doctrine as a resource for assessing economic practices. 
Fourth, the pastoral and its themes circulated in news media and in public policy 
circles throughout its drafting process and in its final form. EJA enjoyed significant 
media attention in newspapers such as The New York Times and The Washington Post, 
which attended to its drafting process and the final publication.167 For example, with the 
release of the letter’s first draft, The New York Times featured a story that characterized 
“The Roman Catholic pastoral letter on the economy” as “the first comprehensive attempt 
to apply a tradition from scripture, theology and papal pronouncements to the United 
States economy” in which “the bishops speak as religious leaders and American citizens, 
saying that there are certain issues that must be addressed from a Catholic 
perspective.”168 This article, like many others featured in the secular press, legitimated 
Catholic doctrine’s entrance into “the secular debate over economic policy” by devoting 
significant space to covering the letter and by publicizing the acceptance of the letter by 
wider religious communities. For instance, the article quoted a Jewish leader saying, 
“The bishops have reminded us that … the narrow question, ‘Are you better off?’… is the 
wrong question.” 169 Thus, the secular press publicized EJA’s Catholicism as an 
acceptable moral intervention in economic policy debate. Furthermore, one month after 
the release of the pastoral’s final draft, the U.S. Congress’ Joint Economic Committee 
invited several of the letter’s drafters, theologians, and public policy experts to discuss 
the pastoral’s themes and public implications.170 In his opening remarks, Chairman David 
R. Obey (D) said that the letter’s importance lay in its recognition “that economics is not 
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just a matter of mathematics,” but that “economic performance” also has impacts “on our 
own social values” such as “family health.”171 In holding such a hearing, the 
Congressional Joint Economic Committee affirmed the public relevance of the Catholic 
perspective in public debate on economic issues, co-articulating the pastoral letter with 
public policy. Thus, the pastoral letter genre allowed Catholic doctrine to circulate as a 
public resource for comprehending and judging U.S. economic practices. 
Catholic Social Teaching 
The bishops’ economic pastoral also turned to the CST tradition, which positioned 
the bishops as moral-economic agents who could, as a matter of religious tradition, 
challenge the dominant economic worldview by turning to their institutional 
epistemology.172 EJA publicized the CST tradition as a set of heuristics for moral 
economic judgment, thereby challenging the burgeoning neoliberal paradigm on 
ontological and axiological grounds.  
By 1980, the CST tradition had grown into a relatively coherent worldview whose 
adherents had intervened in economics at pressing historical moments. CST’s formal 
inception came with Pope Leo XIII’s 1891 encyclical Rerum Novarum, which asserted 
his duty as a moral leader to “speak on the condition of the working classes.”173 The 
encyclical rejected the material orientation of both capitalism and communism and 
announced a distinctly Catholic position on economic justice that emphasized the 
common good, human dignity, traditional family structures, and justice for society’s 
powerless.174 In subsequent decades, the Catholic hierarchy intermittently developed CST 
with pronouncements and enactments. 175 In its most general form, CST positions humans 
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as interdependent, spiritual, and material beings who are called by their God to respect 
human dignity, promote the common good, and secure justice on Earth.176  
The U.S. hierarchy has actively taken up the mantel of CST during moments of 
pronounced economic turmoil. During the Gilded Age, U.S. Catholics articulated an 
economic worldview that bound Catholicism with U.S. circumstances, where immigrant 
Catholics were among the poorest and most marginalized communities, and Catholic lay 
people ranked among the most prominent labor leaders.177 American CST was again 
amplified during the Great Depression, when the Church founded labor schools that 
emphasized CST as an alternative to both free market capitalism and communism, and 
the USCCB issued statements on industrial relations, endorsing workers’ rights to 
organize, a living wage, and government regulation.178 The CST tradition influenced the 
construction and implementation of the New Deal, and CST Catholics enjoyed an 
unprecedented public position during the Depression decades.179 As discourses of 
economic justice became de-emphasized in the post-World War II United States, so, too, 
did CST recede to the margins until Vatican II prompted the Church to revitalize this 
tradition.180 
CST offered the U.S. bishops a robust alternative metaphysics by which to 
analyze economic upheaval. This alternative tradition normalized the bishops’ entrance 
into public economics as a point of history; simply put, the Catholic hierarchy had 
intervened morally in economics many times before, thus authorizing it to do so again. 
The CST tradition allowed the bishops to position themselves as moral-economic agents 
who could, as a matter of religious tradition, challenge the dominant economic worldview 
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by turning to their religious ontology and axiology, which were grounded in Catholic 
epistemology.  
This system of moral meaning allowed the bishops to engage an ontology and 
axiology that antagonized neoliberal commitments. EJA’s CST ontology challenged the 
neoliberal individual and the autonomy of the free market by offering a construction of 
human nature as inherently communal and subject to divine will. This ontology 
engendered a CST axiology that challenged neoliberal economic values and urged action 
to realign the economy with God’s moral vision for human life. EJA crafted their 
axiology by building value hierarchies that privileged dignity, the common good, and 
justice. Chaïm Perelman and Lucie Olbrechts-Tyteca suggested that rhetors order values 
because principles often conflict and hierarchies privilege some values over others. These 
values can be concrete—“attaching to a human being, a specific group, or a particular 
object considered a unique entity”—or they can be abstract, meaning that one value can 
attach to different unique entities.181 EJA’s value hierarchies promoted a Catholic vision 
of economic justice that challenged the neoliberal commitment to economic freedom.  
CST Ontology 
The bishops’ CST ontology featured three major tenets, each of which 
antagonized the growing neoliberal articulation. First, the document asserted that the 
Catholic Church should play an active role in politics as an institution that strives to 
balance people’s spiritual and material needs. In CST ontology, human beings are called 
by their God to act in ways that bring their material and spiritual wellbeing into 
alignment.182 The Church orients people to the material world by calling upon spiritual 
precepts to guide behavior, and the CST tradition maintains that the Church can play such 
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a role even in spiritually pluralistic societies by encoding its divine precepts in the 
language of generalized values and by offering reasons that are defensible in secular 
arenas.183  
Following this tradition, the letter constructed a world in which God handed 
sacred heuristics to people who interpreted them within the context of the Church, which 
EJA defined as “all the people of God, gathered in smaller faith communities, guided and 
served by a pope and a hierarchy of bishops, ministered to by priests, deacons, religious, 
and laity.”184 EJA’s Catholic ontology re-articulated an early modern connection between 
divinity and economics. As historian of philosophy Peter Harrison demonstrated, in the 
eighteenth century, Adam Smith’s “invisible hand” would have been understood as a 
reference to God’s providence over human and natural affairs.185 EJA’s insistence on 
God’s providence over economics resuscitated the divine connection, but did not 
construct it as inevitable. Unlike Smith’s construction of the “invisible hand” as God 
having “instituted general laws which matched human self-love with beneficial social 
ends,” EJA’s post-Vatican II perspective suggested that God’s vision for human affairs 
had to be fostered by the actions of human beings because God’s vision “is made real 
through effective action.” 186 The bishops’ Catholic ontology positioned the Church as an 
interpreter of God’s vision, thus casting EJA as a document uniquely qualified to guide 
people’s moral economic actions. This aspect of Catholic ontology suggested that the free 
market would not simply operate beneficially on its own; instead, the market would have 
to be guided by human moral action that the Catholic Church could apprehend because of 
its position as spiritual-material mediator. 
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Second, EJA waded into the powerful and contested terrain of human rights 
discourse by asserting ontological assumptions about the entitlements that God bestows 
upon all human beings. As contested, yet familiar rhetorical topoi, human rights rhetorics 
have offered, in Michael Ignatief’s words, “the dominant moral vocabulary in foreign 
affairs,” even as those vocabularies attach to conflicting meanings and commitments.187 
Human rights discourses have manifested tense ambiguities since they were codified in 
the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) by proponents who disagreed 
about which rights should take precedence and to what extent rights were individual or 
collective.188 The UDHR maintained that human rights had civil, political, economic, 
social, and cultural dimensions, but, as the United Nations’ Office of Human Rights 
explained, in the polarizing context of the Cold War, “The market economies of the West 
tended to put greater emphasis on civil and political rights, while the centrally planned 
economies of the Eastern bloc highlighted the importance of economic, social and 
cultural rights.”189 Furthermore, Western proponents have historically constructed human 
rights as individualistic universals that apply to every person, whereas Eastern proponents 
have historically constructed these rights as contextually bound and communally 
oriented.190  
Even amidst their polarized Cold War context, the bishops rejected the historical 
division of entitlements into Eastern and Western camps as EJA articulated a holistic 
Catholic understanding of human rights as “The Minimum Conditions for Life in 
Community.”191 EJA’s ontology maintained that individual human beings, as dignified 
creatures, possessed inherent human rights that included economic and participatory 
entitlements. EJA explained, “fundamental rights…are bestowed on human beings by 
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God and …are not created by society.”192 The bishops’ ontology understood human 
rights as divine a priori privileges that applied to all people, thus participating in Western 
universalist notions of human rights as principles inherently attached to individual 
persons. EJA expanded this conception of human rights to include economic 
dimensions—traditionally understood as Eastern-communal human rights—explaining, 
“In Catholic teaching, human rights include not only civil and political rights but also 
economic rights” because “when people are without a chance to earn a living, and must 
go hungry and homeless, they are being denied basic rights.”193 Finally, the bishops 
asserted that participation was a hallmark of being a member “of the human race,” and as 
such, “All people have a right to participate in the economic life of society.”194 The 
bishops’ Catholic ontology harnessed the language of universal human rights to assert 
that each individual human being was imbued with the divine privilege of participating in 
economic life. 
This construction of human rights challenged neoliberalism by co-articulating 
capitalist commitments to individualistic civil and political rights with communist 
concerns over collectivist economic and social rights. As Arabella Lyon and Lester C. 
Olson explained, human rights precepts present themselves as “ostensibly ‘universal,’” 
meaning that “human rights principles can never be compromised.”195 The bishops 
included economic rights in the universalist discourse that promoted civil and political 
rights, arguing that a commitment to human rights necessitated a commitment to their 
economic dimensions. EJA denied distinctions between types of rights, thereby pointing 
to the moral limit of neoliberal human rights discourses that ignored economic rights by 
suggesting that there could be no partial commitment to human rights. Furthermore, 
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EJA’s ontology challenged the neoliberal commitment to the unfettered individual by re-
articulating human rights as simultaneously individual and social, suggesting that 
individual human rights could not be realized outside the context of a community. 
Third, EJA asserted that God created individual humans as communal and 
interdependent beings, echoing CST’s position that humans are bound together in God 
and their mutual experiences of suffering, sin, and salvation.196 The bishops followed this 
communal trajectory when they declared that “the human person is not only sacred but 
also social.”197 EJA proclaimed, “human life is fulfilled in the knowledge and love of the 
living God in communion with others” such that “Human life” can only be understood as 
“life in community.”198 This ontology constructed humans as social beings whose 
divinely created “common bond of humanity” necessitated an “interdependence” on one 
another.199 The bishops concretized this ontology by applying it to circulating discourses 
of globalization. They referred to “today’s interdependent world” as they detailed the 
“growth of more complex relations of interdependence.”200 The letter noted the 
“increasingly interdependent global economy” and called attention to the cascading 
effects of interlocking economic actions; “Decisions made here have immediate effects in 
other countries; decisions made abroad have immediate consequences for steelworkers in 
Pittsburgh.”201 EJA’s ontology constructed human nature as fundamentally communal 
and interdependent. 
Catholic epistemology allowed the bishops to articulate a CST ontology that 
positioned God as the pinnacle of all existence and the Church as an institutional 
mediator of spiritual and material dimensions of human nature. This ontology 
emphasized people’s inherent economic rights and their interdependence, and it 
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antagonized the neoliberal articulation by offering an alternative tradition that lay claim 
to fundamental spiritual-material truths about the human condition and, by extension, 
human affairs. 
CST Axiology 
Because the bishops’ ontology constructed human beings as “created in the image 
of God (Gn 1:27),” human dignity ascended to the top of the bishops’ value hierarchy as 
a universal and unassailable good.202 The bishops upheld human dignity as a primary 
virtue against which to judge economic practices, encouraging people to determine 
whether economic practices protected or undermined human sanctity. The bishops told 
readers of the pastoral, “The economy should serve people, not the other way around,” 
preaching that the goal of economies should be the promotion of human dignity.203 EJA’s 
placement of human dignity at the apex of its hierarchy resonated with neoliberal 
discourses that lauded human dignity as a primary reason to spread unfettered capitalism 
around the globe.  
Even as they echoed neoliberal commitments to the abstract principle of dignity, 
the bishops applied the moral heuristic in ways that challenged neoliberalism’s concrete 
policy commitments. For example, EJA touted the Church’s position on human labor, 
insisting that work “has great dignity” because people “can justly consider that by their 
labor they are unfolding the Creator’s work.”204 In the name of promoting “the dignity of 
…labor,” the bishops urged policies that would “enable the working person to become 
‘more a human being,’ more capable of acting intelligently, freely, and in ways that lead 
to self-realization.”205 In this instance, the bishops attached the “dignity” signifier to pro-
labor social policies that promoted “full employment” with “adequate pay and decent 
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working conditions.”206 EJA insisted that “the dignity of workers also requires” various 
benefits, including “adequate health care” and “weekly rest,” among other “provisions” 
that were “essential if workers are to be treated as persons rather than simply as a ‘factor 
production.’”207 Amidst the growing neoliberal tendency to view the labor movement and 
fair labor practices as barriers to monetary value creation—as “factors of production” that 
should be minimized—the bishops yoked abstracted dignity with concrete labor policies, 
suggesting that the neoliberal commitment to dignity fell short of God’s moral plan if it 
did not concretize in ways that promoted workers’ spiritual and material fulfillment. 
EJA further dislodged the dignity signifier from its location in the individual when 
it reasoned that dignity could only be fostered within a loving community, thus elevating 
the common good as a value on par with dignity. The bishops stressed that, because God 
created all people with dignity and bound us together in divine love, the dignity of one 
person was tethered to the dignity of another. The bishops maintained that love of God 
was “made real through effective action” toward other human beings.208 Love meant 
taking on responsibility for all members of the community and “ensuring that the 
minimum conditions of human dignity are met for all.”209 Furthermore, God called all 
people to associate communally, so EJA invited its audiences to pursue a “cooperative 
approach that draws on all the resources of the community” through “reasonable 
coordination among the different parts of the body politic,” so that, together, we could 
“attend to the good of the whole human family.”210  
The letter thus instructed its audiences to judge the economy based on the extent 
to which it promoted “the common good” and to engage in actions that brought the 
economy in greater alignment with a divine communal plan.211 The bishops explained, 
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“The Christian vision of economic life …asks, Does economic life enhance or threaten 
our life together as a community?”212 The foremost economic duty of all people, the 
bishops asserted, was to consider how individual behaviors “affect the economic well-
being of others,” redefining individual responsibility as a social phenomenon.213 EJA 
antagonized the neoliberal “personal responsibility” value by co-articulating dignity and 
responsibility with community in the “common good” concept such that society could be 
understood as an entity that fostered the development of its individual members through 
active and positive action, rather than leaving individuals to their own devices. 
According to EJA, the government shouldered responsibilities for fostering the 
common good. In the letter’s formulation, “it is government’s role to guarantee the 
minimum conditions” for life in society.214 As such, the bishops bestowed upon the 
government an active role in shaping economic policy so that this world could be a 
righteous place. For example, the letter maintained that the government had a moral 
obligation to regulate business affairs so that financial arrangements benefited the 
common good. Although the bishops echoed CST’s “Support of private ownership,” they 
argued that “The common good may sometimes demand that the right to own be limited 
by public involvement in the planning or ownership of certain sectors of the economy.”215 
The bishops thus led with a concept on which they agreed with proponents of unfettered 
capitalism—the importance of private property—but then qualified their endorsement by 
subsuming this concrete commitment to the more abstract principle of the “common 
good.” In this hierarchy, the common good was more important than private ownership, 
and so it could limit private property’s reach. EJA’s axiology dislodged the freedom 
signifier from its grounding in neoliberal ontology, attached it to community, and 
	 97 
privileged the positive perspective on liberty that demands action and planning, rather 
than an elimination of all restrictions.216 The bishops insisted that “God’s intentions for 
us” were simultaneously “Being free and being a co-responsible community,” thus 
placing social responsibility on par with freedom.217 This construction of government 
intervention as moral responsibility challenged the neoliberal denigration of the state as a 
tyrannical apparatus.  
In constructing an interdependent world oriented toward the common good, the 
letter emphasized widespread inclusion.218 The bishops asserted that societies would be 
moral only when “all persons” had the ability “to share in and contribute to the common 
good.”219 In step with globalizing impulses of the neoliberal age, the letter expanded the 
jurisdiction of “all” beyond national borders, positing that people should “serve the 
common good of the entire planet,” embracing “the whole of humanity” in the pursuit “to 
use the goods of this earth for the benefit of all.”220 The bishops’ construction of this 
“whole” drew attention to communities at the margins of economic life because they 
argued for “Increasing active participation in economic life by those who are presently 
excluded or vulnerable” and because they de-centered “privileged economic power in 
favor of the well-being of all.”221 
Focusing on all people antagonized the neoliberal articulation of free markets, 
prosperity, and individualism by inviting audiences to focus on the margins of neoliberal 
prosperity. Rhetorics of unity tend to be problematic because they create a whole where 
important divisions exist by either eliding those differences or purging divergent entities 
in order to create that wholeness.222 In the case of EJA, though, its rhetoric of unity and 
inclusion pointed to the limits of neoliberal prosperity’s reach. It argued that we could not 
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judge the morality of an economy by its general prosperity; instead, we had to examine 
how it treats everyone, including the poor and the so-called Third World. Consequently, 
the letter’s rhetoric of “all” emphasized the populations that neoliberal prosperity left 
behind. EJA’s emphasis on “all” suggested that we could not conceive of ourselves as 
individuals whose aggregate actions created general prosperity; instead, the bishops 
urged their audiences to view people as creatures pursuing a common good together, a 
pursuit that included those people excluded from neoliberal narratives of success. Dignity 
and the common good stood together at the apex of EJA’s CST axiology because they 
were values by which God structured human life.  
Economic Justice 
Justice—defined as being “in a proper relation to God, by observing God’s 
laws”—also served as a significant abstract value that protected the two highest order 
values.223 Drawing on medieval theologian Thomas Aquinas, CST has generally defined 
justice as those actions that move something toward its natural end, and because human 
society’s natural end is a dignified community, justice applies to those actions that uphold 
human dignity and advance the common good.224 The bishops’ CST pastoral letter 
explained that justice was a complex virtue that “suggests what is right or what should 
happen,” and the bishops urged their audiences to work toward securing the “Catholic 
vision of economic justice” advanced in their letter.225  
EJA observed that negotiating material and spiritual life on Earth tended to create 
significant power inequalities, which posed moral problems. The bishops referred to 
historical patterns of unequal “distribution of power” perpetuated by human social 
systems, which caused “extreme inequalities of income and consumption,” stripped 
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people of their “dignity” by subjecting them to “dehumanizing conditions,” and posed a 
“threat to the solidarity of the human community.”226 These disparities severed human 
societies from their creator’s vision for human life by stunting the development of dignity 
and the common good. 
To correct this perilous situation, the bishops turned to their religious tradition of 
privileging of the powerless and poor and approaching material wealth with caution. The 
bishops asserted that “the Scriptures and church teaching” suggest that “the justice of a 
community is measured by its treatment of the powerless in society.”227 The letter defined 
poverty as “lack of material goods” combined with “dependence and powerlessness” and 
characterized “The poor” as “an exiled and oppressed people whom God will rescue (Is 
51:21-23).” 228 EJA explained that poverty was aligned with righteousness because the 
poor “are neither blinded by wealth nor make it into an idol” so “the poor can be open to 
God’s presence.” 229 In contrast, the bishops wrote that the Bible describes “wealth” as a 
“constant danger” because “The rich are wise in their own eyes (Prv 28:11) and are prone 
to apostasy and idolatry (Am 5:4-13; Is. 2:6-8), as well as to violence and oppression (Jas 
2:6-7).”230 Further mining Scripture, the letter recounted the many ways that “the poor 
are agents of God’s transforming power.”231 The letter also referred to the Biblical Jesus’ 
privileging of the poor: “Jesus takes the side of those most in need…so dramatically” that 
“in Matthew’s Gospel, we are told that we will be judged according to how we respond to 
the hungry, the thirsty, the naked, the stranger.”232 EJA constructed earthly poverty as a 
“misfortune and a cause of sadness,” but one for which God takes “special concern.”233  
This construction reversed neoliberalism’s wealth and poverty hierarchy. The 
CST tradition has privileged poverty as a central concern, and the Catholic Church has 
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long assumed the responsibility of administering services to poor people.234 EJA testified 
to the bishops’ experiences attending to the economically powerless: “The poor and 
vulnerable are on our doorsteps, in our parishes, in our service agencies, and in our 
shelters.”235 In addition to affirming such a focus on poverty as “traditional church 
teaching,” EJA co-articulated the Catholic emphasis on poverty with more general 
Scriptural references, positioning the Bible as a document that privileged the poor.236 
“The example of Jesus,” EJA explained, “imposes a prophetic mandate to speak for those 
who have no one to speak for them, to be a defender of the defenseless, who in biblical 
terms are the poor.”237 The Bible, of course, can be read in many different ways, but the 
bishops presented their Catholic emphasis on poverty as a central message of the Bible, 
thus antagonizing the neoliberal commitment to wealth and denigration of the poor as 
antithetical to God’s economic message. 
The bishops explained that the principle of economic justice called the United 
States to place the poor at the summit of its economic value hierarchy. The bishops 
argued that because divine law demanded that the dignity of everyone be secured, those 
people who “who are presently excluded or vulnerable” must take precedence over 
people with more power in order to dignify populations that experienced economic 
exclusion.238 Society had “the responsibility of caring for those who are in need” because 
“the deprivation and powerlessness of the poor wounds the whole community” such that 
we could not be a fully functioning social body while people struggled to secure “basic 
necessities” required for maintaining a dignified life. 239 The letter proclaimed that the 
responsibility to establish “a floor of material well-being on which all can stand” fell 
particularly at the feet of “those with greater resources,” thereby taking into account 
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patterns of economic inequity and promoting action that redressed such power 
imbalances.240 EJA asserted that Jesus’ example “demands a compassionate vision that 
enables the Church to see things from the side of the poor and powerless and to assess 
lifestyle, policies, and social institutions in terms of their impact on the poor.”241 In these 
ways, the bishops placed historically marginalized populations at the top of their social 
priority hierarchy as they positioned powerful populations as more responsible for 
creating parity than the less powerful.  
The letter referred to this perspective as the “preferential option for the poor,” 
which meant a kind of advocacy and approach to policy involving a combination of 
encountering the poor, speaking for the poor, and empowering the poor to speak for 
themselves.242 Although the letter itself mostly focused on advocating for the poor, it 
promoted a posture that re-imagined the poor in a neoliberal milieu that emphasized the 
virtue of wealth. For the U.S. bishops, this option first and foremost meant encountering 
poor people, rather than relegating them to shadows. The letter asserted that people of 
faith must “identify more closely with the poor in their struggle for participation” because 
“The Church has a special call to be a servant of the poor, the sick, and the 
marginalized…—a mission shared by every member of the Christian community.”243 The 
bishops explained that as they encountered the poor, people were called to “charity,” 
which they articulated as a justice-oriented advocacy that went beyond philanthropic aid 
to public advocacy to change the structures that perpetuate poverty. For the bishops, 
“True charity leads to advocacy” because “It should probe the meaning of suffering and 
provoke a response that seeks to remedy causes.”244  
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In part, the EJA drafting process embodied “preferential option” advocacy as 
privileged people acting on behalf of the marginalized poor. In drafting their document, 
the bishops heard primarily from experts speaking for the poor, including “economists, 
moral theologians, business people, labor-union officials, social service coordinators, and 
legislators.”245 Furthermore, the letter spoke from the bishops’ position of power, as an 
institutional voice circulated by various media.  
As an amplified rhetoric, the letter “frankly” challenged “misunderstandings and 
stereotypes of the poor.”246 The bishops addressed the racial dimensions of poverty, 
writing, “a common misconception is that most of the poor are racial minorities. In fact, 
about two-thirds of the poor are white.”247 The bishops provided no other commentary 
about race, letting the prevailing racial assumptions of the Reagan presidency animate 
this finding.248 By declaring poor people as predominantly white, the bishops dislodged 
the prominent link between poverty and people of color, instead including whiteness in 
their poverty articulation. Next, they addressed the interlocking stereotypes “that the rolls 
of Aid to Families with Dependent Children are filled with able-bodied adults who could 
but will not work,” and that mothers on welfare “are also accused of having more 
children so that they can raise their allowances.” 249 Instead, they provided “the truth”; 
“The majority of AFDC recipients are young children and their mothers who must remain 
at home,” and “70 percent of AFDC families have only one or two children.” 250 The 
bishops reified the gendered family to reconstruct people on welfare as responsible 
mothers who cared for their children. They also used the language of “family” to applaud 
people on welfare for responsibly creating the most natural of social bonds through the 
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rate of procreation that could be accepted as reasonable to many audiences; two children 
was a perfectly normal number to Americans in the 1980s.251  
The bishops also constructed poverty as a result of a structural “concentration of 
privilege” that had developed “from institutional relationships that distribute power and 
wealth inequitably,” actively challenging the construction of poor people as lacking 
“talent or…desire to work.”252 In support of their position, they reported, “Research has 
consistently demonstrated that people who are poor have the same strong desire to work 
that characterizes the rest of the population.”253 The bishops re-envisioned poor families 
on welfare as protectors of the familial bonds between mothers and children, challenging 
Reagan’s assertion that “instead of helping the poor, government programs ruptured the 
bonds holding poor families together.”254 In these ways, EJA spoke for poor people, 
constructing them as active and meritorious members of society, challenging the 
neoliberal notion that poor people were themselves responsible for their dire situations. 
In addition to speaking for the poor, EJA’s “preferential option” urged actions that 
would “enable the poor to do for themselves.”255 The bishops differentiated between 
“justice” and “charity,” infusing justice with agency for historically powerless 
populations.256 “The prime purpose of this special commitment to the poor,” they 
explained, “is to enable them to become active participants in the life of society.”257 The 
letter applauded efforts that encouraged “greater solidarity…among the poor 
themselves,” pointing to ongoing “Grassroots efforts by the poor themselves” wherein 
poor people “assist each other in their struggles.”258  
This “preferential option” advocacy set poverty as a moral and social priority both 
domestically and internationally. Domestically, the bishops asserted that meeting the 
	 104 
demands of justice “means that the poor have the single most urgent economic claim on 
the conscience of the nation.”259 The letter further declared, “the impact of national 
economic policies on the poor and the vulnerable is the primary criterion for judging 
their moral value.”260 The bishops strengthened their hierarchy when they asserted that, 
in no uncertain terms, “meeting fundamental human needs must come before the 
fulfillment of desires for luxury consumer goods, for profits not conducive to the 
common good, and for unnecessary military hardware.”261 EJA constructed a hierarchy in 
which fulfilling poor people’s needs superseded all other social concerns and pursuits, 
particularly subordinating wealth and military spending, two of the Reagan 
Administration’s most prized values.  
The bishops extended their economic hierarchy beyond U.S. borders, challenging 
contemporary U.S. foreign policy toward so-called “developing countries.”262 EJA took 
the unequivocal position that “The special place of the poor…means that meeting the 
basic needs of the millions of deprived and hungry people in the world must be the 
number one objective of international policy,” and the letter insisted that “extreme 
material deprivation” worldwide “can be reduced if our own country, so rich in resources, 
chooses to increase its assistance.”263 The bishops issued a challenge to policy-makers 
and citizens to reevaluate U.S. foreign policy to privilege the poor, saying ,“Standard 
foreign policy analysis deals with calculations of power and definitions of national 
interest; but the poor are, by definition, not powerful.” EJA explained that, if we wanted 
to engage with the world in a moral way by focusing on poverty, the priorities of foreign 
policy had to evolve “beyond economic gain or national security.” The bishops declared 
their solidarity “with the poor everywhere,” offering their vision of a moral foreign policy 
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wherein “relations between the United States and developing nations should be 
determined in the first place by a concern for basic human needs and respect for cultural 
traditions.”264 Quoting Pope Paul VI, the USCCB warned U.S. elites to resist “‘the most 
evident form of moral underdevelopment,’ namely greed” when engaging with less 
powerful countries.265 The bishops’ view of international poverty and foreign aid 
redefined “development” on moral grounds and implicitly indicted the U.S. government’s 
warfare and cultural dominance over the economically “developing” world as morally 
deficient. 
EJA extended its biblical critique of wealth to the present-day, relegating personal 
wealth and the profit motive to the nadir of their moral hierarchy. The writers referenced 
the parable in which a wealthy man ignores Lazarus “to warn the prosperous not to be 
blind to the great poverty that exists beside great wealth,” counseling that “The great 
wealth of the United States can easily blind us to the poverty that exists in this nation and 
the destitution of hundreds of millions of people in other parts of the world.”266 They thus 
constructed wealth as a disability that made it difficult to access the truth and morality 
associated with poverty.  
Although EJA constructed wealth as a constant moral danger, the bishops 
proposed a path toward redemption for “the more fortunate” that enveloped wealth in the 
service of the poor. They instructed the wealthy to “renounce some of their rights so as to 
place their goods more generously at the service of others.”267 The pastoral, then, 
subordinated the concerns of the wealthy to those of the poor, constructing a moral 
hierarchy in which poor people struggling to survive were on top and wealthy people 
pursuing self-interest were on the bottom. In between the two extremes, though closer to 
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the poor than their wealthy counterparts, stood people who devoted their material 
prosperity to alleviating poverty and empowering the poor. This construction served as 
the radical opposite of neoliberal hierarchies of worth, which ostensibly posit that there 
are no hierarchies, that we are all considered equal individuals who succeed or fail on our 
own merits, but which functionally privilege wealthy people as creators of generalized 
prosperity and denigrate poor people as, at worst, deviant and, at best, worthy of some 
sympathetic charity offered by wealthy philanthropists.   
Conclusion 
EJA introduced CST ontology and axiology as heuristics for judging the morality 
of burgeoning neoliberal order. Ultimately, the letter pronounced neoliberal ethics 
deficient, thus functioning as an antagonism to the growing neoliberal consensus. This 
chapter demonstrated how the bishops were constituted as agents by their milieu and 
Catholic traditions. Furthermore, this chapter argued that EJA rearticulated economics as 
moral philosophy by leveraging the Christianized political milieu of the long 1980s as 
well as the tension between economic philosophy and science that became pronounced 
during Reagan’s presidency. Specifically, I argued that the bishops harnessed the pastoral 
letter genre to establish their ethos as critics of neoliberalism and to pivot from 
generalized Christian conception of economics to a specifically Catholic one, ultimately 
turning to a CST metaphysics that antagonized neoliberal economics and ethics. The 
bishops’ message of economic justice circulated widely, thus providing a highly 
publicized antagonism to neoliberalism. 
Even with the wide circulation, such a message was eventually muted because 
many lay Catholics lacked interest and because the Church became focused on issues of 
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sexuality in the late 1980s. Catholics in the 1980s were largely middle class, and for 
many of them, the economy was still working favorably, and they were skeptical that big 
government could and should intervene to help the poor.268 Furthermore, the Catholic 
Church, including its U.S. contingent, became mired in sex abuse scandals when 
allegations of sexual abuse of children by Catholic priests and nuns began coming to the 
fore in the late 1980s.269 With such a horrid scandal at the fore, the Catholic Church could 
not sound a convincing moral cry about the economy to a wider audience. Moreover, 
following the Vatican’s lead, the Catholic Church largely pivoted away from economic 
issues between the 1990s and the beginning of Pope Francis’ tenure. Instead, the Church 
focused on advocating against abortion and homosexuality, publicly touting the sanctity 
of the traditional, heteronormative family structure.270  
Despite the lack of sustained widespread attention, the letter and CST continue to 
animate philosophical-moral considerations about the economy. The letter has provided a 
framework for several models of business ethics.271 It has also been revisited in numerous 
symposia and publications.272 Furthermore, the letter’s CST tenets have become 
prominent again under the leadership of Pope Francis, who has been focusing the 
church’s resources on the plight of the poor and on the wreckage of neoliberal 
capitalism.273 EJA, then, continues to constitute an important antagonism to neoliberal 
articulation. 
This case study offers three larger implications for understanding rhetorics that 
antagonize the neoliberal articulation. First, this case study demonstrates the significance 
of engaging economic philosophies. Tensions between philosophy and science inhabit all 
economic discourses and practices. Although the discipline of economics morphed from a 
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philosophy into a social science over three centuries, it has retained its philosophical and, 
even moral, underpinnings. The neoliberal articulation tends to treat economics as if they 
were natural phenomena that can be ascertained through scientific inquiry, but 
philosophical and moral matters pervade even this approach, as concerns over individual 
freedom and government tyranny animate neoliberal theories and practices. This case 
study demonstrated that this tension is significant area for antagonistic invention. By 
asking overtly moral and philosophical questions about the means and ends of economic 
progress, activist rhetorics challenge people to assess economics as a human endeavor, 
not a force that occurs beyond our intervention.  
Second, EJA shows the antagonistic power of engaging alternative traditions and 
institutions. Many observers have argued that neoliberalism’s reach pervades every 
aspect of human life, but this case study suggests that alternative ways of being can serve 
as counterweights to the neoliberal order. If the force of articulation and antagonism 
relies on accumulation, alternative traditions and institutions that predated the neoliberal 
turn can be powerful counterbalancing tools because they come with significant heft in 
the form of histories, metaphysics, and resources. The Catholic Church, in this case 
study’s instance, offered such an alternative weight to pull back upon neoliberalism’s 
growing reach. Furthermore, this case study demonstrated that religious rhetorics can 
serve as powerful antagonisms to the neoliberal order, particularly in contexts that 
privilege such religious subjectivities. Religious institutions and traditions can offer 
particularly forceful challenges because they present themselves as beyond worldly 
politics, beyond ideology, as divinely inspired ways of living that answer to a higher 
power. 
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Finally, this case study demonstrates that the “developing” world, and Latin 
America in particular, stand as poignant geographical-philosophical antagonisms to 
neoliberal freedom. The bishops’ global subjectivity allowed them to articulate these 
places as challenges to the ethics of neoliberal policies by highlighting examples of 
coercive economic dependence that haunt neoliberal discourse of progress built on an 
ethos of non-coercion and equality. Furthermore, the bishops’ Latin American 
counterparts offered them an alternative way of assessing neoliberalizing economics by 
focusing their gaze on a “preferential option for the poor,” thereby pointing to the limits 
of neoliberal prosperity.  
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Sweatshop Shame and Gifford Guilt: 
Antagonistic Emotion and Free Market Optimism  
 
 In 1996, Kathie Lee Gifford reigned as “America’s Sweetheart” – a charming 
celebrity who could connect with “a major cross-section of American women.”1 Gifford 
became a household name when she co-hosted Live! with Regis and Kathie Lee, a 
wholesome morning talk show that featured what The Washington Post called a “daily 
hour of small talk and tomfoolery.”2 By 1991, the show reached “three and a half million 
households each day, and the wait for tickets in the studio audience” was up to one year.3 
For many, Live! served as what The Washington Post called “an oasis of homespun hoke 
and folksy charm” amidst daytime television’s ubiquitous “quadrasexuals and spouse 
beaters and exhibitionistic tell-alls.”4  
As the co-star of a disarmingly folksy and popular daytime program, Gifford’s 
celebrity persona embraced her subjectivity as a white bourgeois wife and mother.5 
Gifford’s appearances on the Live! stage showcased her pastel outfits, carefully coiffed 
hair, and impeccably made up face.6 Gifford emotionally and humorously recounted 
personal experiences, mostly about her children and husband, thus inviting a rather 
intimate connection with the “suburban homemakers” who comprised much of the 
show’s audience.7 “You love her,” The Atlanta Journal and Constitution explained, 
“because she talks about vaguely risque stay-at-home-mom things, like how her nipples 
‘went out this far’ during a mastitis infection. Or tearfully announced her miscarriage on 
the air” only to later celebrate that “she was expecting again” on the program. 8 Although 
she detailed intimate experiences, she created distance with humor and narratives of 
overcoming, such that her confessions circulated as “charming” and decidedly “not 
heavy.”9 Gifford’s “cute-as-a-button brand of openness” about her adventures in 
	 120 
bourgeois womanhood read to many commentators and audiences as “unpretentious,” 
and Gifford encouraged such a construction.10  
Gifford’s performance of wholesome womanhood resonated with audiences, who 
forged personal and consumer connections with her. She was named “No. 1 TV mom,” 
and marketers marveled at Gifford’s “incredible relationship with her fans” recounting 
how sincerely “Women relate to her.”11 Gifford, her “eyes misting” from the “outpouring 
of real love,” reported having received “thousands of cards” and “gifts, such as handmade 
blankets” from “viewers” after her the birth of her first child.12 Gifford’s fans were 
offered many ways to consume her celebrity persona; in addition to viewing Gifford on 
Live!, consumers could enjoy Gifford’s celebrity in other forms, including “commercials, 
public appearances, [an] autobiography, and 800-number record albums,” as well as “a 
prime-time ABC special” called “Kathie Lee Gifford’s Celebration of Motherhood.”13 In 
1995, Gifford signed a deal to create the Kathie Lee Collection clothing brand for Wal-
Mart. The manufacturers gleefully looked to the future profits of such a deal; the 
president of Halmode Manufacturing remarked that with Gifford’s “effervescent persona 
and style capturing the attention of a major cross-section of American women,” the 
manufacturers anticipated “a multimillion-dollar success story.”14 
This success surged until Gifford’s clothing line became the target of sweatshop 
activism in 1996. Charles Kernaghan, the executive director of the pro-labor National 
Labor Committee (NLC) visited clothing factories in Honduras, where a Global Fashions 
employee surreptitiously handed him a Gifford clothing label.15 Shortly thereafter, NLC 
delivered letters to Gifford and Wal-Mart, alleging that “at least one factory producing 
Kathie Lee clothing has illegally employed child labor” in “humiliating” conditions that 
	 121 
constituted “violations of children’s and women’s rights.”16 After these letters were 
ignored, NLC organized Congressional hearings, news conferences, and press releases, in 
which activists from both the United States and Latin America broadcast these allegations 
to media outlets, who were more than willing to cover a controversy in which “A 
Sweetheart Becomes Suspect.”17  
The national news and tabloid media thus drew critical scrutiny to global 
production at a time when the neoliberal articulation was experiencing an optimistic 
surge. Optimism, according to Lauren Berlant is an emotion that orients people toward an 
object that promises to deliver “the good life.”18 With the fall of the Soviet Union, a 
growing economy, and accelerating globalization, the early-to-mid 1990s pulsated with 
hope about the free market’s promise to usher in peaceful prosperity for the globe and 
self-realization for individuals. Figureheads and institutions circulated optimistic 
discourses that oriented people toward the promise of the consolidating neoliberal order.  
Although hopeful market discourses were ubiquitous in the early-to-mid 1990s, 
pronounced anxieties about manufacturing blunted the force of free market optimism. 
The first dimension of this anxiety was distress about disappearing U.S. jobs, particularly 
in manufacturing sectors. Activists and politicians publicly linked downsizing to the 
globalization of U.S. corporations’ workforces.19 In 1992, news outlets reported on an 
NLC report entitled Paying to Lose Our Jobs, which argued “that the U.S. government 
has spent ‘hundreds of millions of dollars’ … funding foreign organizations that are 
effectively transferring U.S. manufacturing jobs … to low-wage Latin America.”20 That 
same year, Independent presidential candidate Ross Perot famously warned that the North 
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) would cause “a giant sucking sound of jobs 
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being pulled out of this country.”21 These sorts of anxious discourses circulated with 
regularity and punctured the wholeness of free market optimism by suggesting that free 
market mechanisms could reduce the availability of gainful employment in the United 
States. 
The second dimension of anxiety over manufacturing was activists’ re-
deployment of the “sweatshop” signifier. The term “sweatshop” has, since at least the 
mid-nineteenth century, operated as a contested term of critique aimed at sub-standard 
labor conditions in the manufacturing sector.22 In the early-to-mid-1990s, labor activists 
and officials revived the signifier to critique the rapid globalization of manufacturing. For 
example, in 1992, the Child Labor Coalition launched the Bangladesh Campaign to 
expose and condemn “How Our Greed Keeps Kids Trapped in Foreign Sweatshops.”23 
Two years later, NLC released a documentary called Zoned for Slavery, which showed 
Latin American girls riding reclaimed U.S. school buses to “monstrous sweatshops,” 
where they worked long hours for abysmal wages and endured abuse from managers.24 In 
1995, the sweatshop moved from the global to the local when labor and immigration 
officials raided an apartment complex in El Monte, CA.25 There, they found “70 illegal 
immigrants from Thailand” working in a “sweatshop,” defined in one New York Times 
article as “a prison-like California garment factory.”26  
In 1996, the sweatshop signifier attached to America’s Sweetheart, whose 
gendered performance of free market optimism spectacularly clashed with activists’ 
charges. This chapter shows how the mediated Gifford sweatshop controversy inhibited 
free market optimism by circulating classed shame and guilt. Shame and guilt both refer 
to a constellation of uncomfortable emotions that occur, in psychiatrist Donald L. 
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Nathanson’s words, “whenever desire outruns fulfillment.”27 Although they are similar 
emotions, scholars such as June Price Tangney and Ronda L. Dearing have demonstrated 
that they have important distinctions. Shame refers to the discomfort, resulting from an 
encounter with a judgmental other, that dampens positive affects with a negative self-
judgment. Guilt is similar to shame, but the judgment is focused on behaviors rather than 
an essential sense of self.28 I contend that the Gifford controversy first circulated class 
shame and then transformed this emotion into class guilt by harnessing neoliberal 
attachments to personal responsibility, consumer agency, and corporate benevolence. 
This chapter shows how this transformation created significant, if limited, forms of 
antagonistic agency.  
More specifically, I argue that this shame, which initially attached to Gifford 
herself, was transformed into a guilt that implicated corporations and consumers in 
addition to Gifford. Activist, news, and tabloid texts first attached shame exclusively to 
Gifford’s celebrity persona. Although this shame was not overtly directed at corporations 
and consumers, the shame circulated within spaces that celebrated entrepreneurship and 
consumption, thereby allowing the discomfort to implicitly permeate market-based self-
realization. Gifford’s mediated emotional defense prompted reporters to investigate the 
sweatshop charge as a controversy, and as media reports assigned responsibility for such 
shameful abuses, they transformed Gifford’s shame into more widespread guilt aimed 
explicitly at Gifford, corporations, and consumers. As reports showed Gifford taking 
responsibility, corporations and consumers were encouraged to do the same. Thus, 
Gifford’s shame transformed into more ubiquitous guilt that implicated multiple 
structural actors in a neoliberalizing world. Unlike scapegoating, in which a sacrificed 
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victim takes on collective guilt to ostensibly redeem the moral failings of a society,29 this 
case study shows an episode in which shame and guilt articulated the structural moral 
failings of free market expansion.  
To make this argument, I first define free market optimism as the promise of 
peaceful prosperity and self-realization that was widely circulated in the early-to-mid 
1990s. I argue that optimistic discourses fostered a tension between market freedom and 
social responsibility and promoted attachments to three neoliberal values: personal 
responsibility, consumer agency, and corporate benevolence. I then demonstrate how 
Gifford, as a talk show host and celebrity brand name, personified free market optimism. 
Next, I analyze how activist and media discourses built and circulated classed shame and 
guilt. I show how these public emotions inhibited free market optimism, made several 
antagonistic subjectivities possible, and ultimately privileged social responsibility over 
market freedom. Finally, I explain how this case study demonstrates the antagonistic 
potential of public emotion.  
Early-to-Mid 1990s: Free Market Optimism 
In the early-to-mid 1990s, prominent figureheads and institutions circulated free 
market optimism, which oriented people toward the promise of the consolidating 
neoliberal order. Optimism is an emotion, which critical affect/emotion scholars largely 
define as the socially negotiated meaning(s) that attach to bodily intensities, which are 
called affects. 30 Affective intensities, triggered by some stimulus, regularly flow through 
bodies at a neurological level and can pass unconsciously or register consciously as 
feelings. These affects are contagious, but what these intensities mean to particular 
people may differ, as meaning-making structures translate felt affects into emotions.31 
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Although they feel intensely personal, emotions are collectively constructed and socially 
contingent meanings that have congealed with affects so that we can identify an intensity 
as a meaningful moment. 32 Furthermore, public emotions circulate widely in dominant 
discourses as well as antagonistic ones, consistently drawing collectives and their 
individual members, in Sarah Ahmed’s words, “toward certain objects, which then 
circulate as social goods” and away from other objects, which are understood as sites of 
“bad feeling.”33  
To feel optimistic is to experience a hopeful attachment to the potential 
fulfillment of a desire. In the Lacanian psychoanalytic tradition, people can never fulfill 
their (un)conscious desires and thus conjure up narratives—called fantasies—that 
manage and perpetuate the constant deferral of satisfaction.34 Lauren Berlant’s work on 
Cruel Optimism argued that any “object of desire” is a “cluster of promises” about how 
someone can achieve “the good life.”35 For Berlant, optimism orients people toward 
fantasies that allow them “to expect that this time, nearness to this thing will help you or 
a world to become different in just the right way.”36 Optimism thus motivates a 
movement toward “the satisfying something that you cannot generate on your own” but 
that you sense is possible to obtain.37 As a public emotion, optimism works in 
conjunction with fantasies to orient us toward the world in particular ways. 
 This era’s neoliberal messages constructed the free market as a social good that 
promised to provide peaceful prosperity to the globe and self-realization to individuals. In 
constructing such optimism, these messages uneasily combined market freedom and 
social responsibility, and free market optimism promoted attachments to personal 
responsibility, consumer agency, and corporate benevolence—values that Gifford’s 
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critics and media reporting appropriated as the controversy antagonized the surging 
neoliberal order. 
Peaceful Prosperity 
Prominent voices celebrated the free market as the promise of a democratic world 
beyond ideological strife. As the Soviet Union crumbled, Western interventionists urged 
former communist countries to simultaneously adopt market economies and democratic 
political structures.38 News outlets reported former Soviet Bloc countries, Russia 
included, “Reaching for [the] Free Market,” and leaders spoke of “emerging market 
democracies” when referring to countries on the United States’ periphery.39 These 
discourses showed former adversaries working together on market economies, thus 
promoting the free market as a promise for ideological transcendence and political self-
governance. Amidst these transformations, Francis Fukuyama touted the “end of history,” 
arguing that the globe was steadily moving toward “a remarkable consensus” about the 
legitimacy of liberal economics and democracy, promising an eventual end to ideology as 
the globe adopted the free market and its attendant democracy.40 In his 1993 Inaugural 
Address, Bill Clinton linked the United States with countries emerging from the 
“shadows of the Cold War,” declaring, “Their cause is America’s cause.”41 Prominent 
discourses of the early-to-mid 1990s thus suggested that free market capitalism would 
triumph over ideological animosity and would propagate democratic governance 
globally.  
By signaling a post-ideological world, free market optimism also promised an end 
to violent warfare. Both the George H.W. Bush and Clinton Administrations’ foreign 
policies pivoted away from military intervention and toward economic cooperation and 
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competition, which would secure U.S. power. Bush’s Secretary of State James A. Baker 
III explained that “economic freedom” was an important “pillar” in the plan to “replace 
the dangerous period of the Cold War with a democratic peace.”42 The Clinton 
Administration positioned the United States as a peace-oriented political and economic 
leader that “would strive to promote democracy and free enterprise around the world.”43 
Free market optimism promised to replace traditional warfare with, in Clinton’s words, 
“peaceful competition with people all across the Earth.”44 In line with many liberal 
discourses, these depictions of foreign policy constructed the free market as an 
unaggressive mechanism of mutual benefit that ultimately promised to end violent 
domination.45  
Free market proponents also promised that liberal economics could engender 
widespread prosperity. At the dawn of the decade, Baker maintained that promoting the 
“free market in Russia and Eurasia” would bring these countries “prosperity.”46 
Domestically, Republicans insisted that de-regulation would spur economic growth and 
prosperity for Americans by encouraging competition and creating good jobs.47 Across 
the political aisle, Clinton insisted that the transnational free market would “serve 
ordinary Americans by launching a new era of global growth.” 48 Clinton explained that 
loosening trade restrictions would “help every American family, every American worker, 
every American farmer benefit from the worldwide growth and the prosperity it 
[NAFTA] will yield.”49 Government leaders thus constructed the free market as a 
guarantor of widespread economic fortune. 
Furthermore, optimistic discourses linked privatization with peace and prosperity. 
Reports claimed that corporations could only do business in places that had achieved at 
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least some modicum of political stability, thus co-articulating political peace with 
corporate interests. David Mulford, who worked in International Affairs under Bush, 
explained in 1993 that U.S. corporations should invest in Latin America because the 
region “is now made up almost exclusively of democratic governments,” suggesting that 
democracy and privatization were inherently intertwined.50 The Journal of Commerce 
declared “Latin American Nations” the “Comeback Kids of the ‘90s” because these 
countries were able to harness “private investment” to place them “back on the path to 
prosperity…after languishing in political and economic woes in the ‘80s.”51 Reports 
insisted that the 1990s’ wave of corporate expansion into Latin America would bring the 
prosperity that all people desired. A Washington Post report claimed that “Deregulation, 
privatization, tax reform and free trade are combining to sweep the continent out of the 
economic backwater and into the global mainstream,” linking privatization with 
economic prosperity.52  
The free market’s promise of a peaceful and prosperous world was optimistic 
because it curated interconnected desires for global harmony and self-governance. The 
Cold War was “Cold” precisely because it was understood a prolonged period of 
primarily ideological tension. The collapse of the Soviet Union precipitated a flurry of 
hope and anxiety around the possibility of global peace.53 Free market optimism 
harnessed these anxious aspirations and attached them to democracy’s promise of self-
governance. In the words of political theorist Michaele L. Ferguson, democracy was an 
“alluring ideal” for many because it suggested that people could exercise agency over 
their lives, while at the same time maintaining “a relatively ordered social 
environment.”54 This ideal allowed many people to expect peaceful political agency and 
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autonomy without the tumult of traditional revolution. Free market optimism bundled 
these hopes with a pronounced desire for security, implied in the empty signifier 
“prosperity.” This promise suggested that all strife could be solved by creating an 
atmosphere of economic prosperity that gave people enough opportunities to create the 
kind of life that they wanted.55 The peaceful prosperity promised by free market 
optimism thus promoted interconnected global desires and suggested that the free market 
could deliver them all.  
This optimistic promise of peaceful prosperity uneasily combined liberal 
economics and social responsibility into a vision of what political scientists Manfred B. 
Steger and Ravi K. Roy called “a socially conscious market globalism.”56 On the one 
hand, these discourses suggested that free markets could transcend ideological barriers 
because they were non-ideological entities focused on economic exchange. On the other 
hand, these discourses functioned as optimism precisely because they saddled free 
markets with the promise of fulfilling the social desires of post-ideological peace, self-
governance, and prosperity.  
Self-Realization  
Optimistic discourses suggested that the free market could facilitate individuals’ 
self-realization by promising a landscape of options that would ignite individual agency. 
Commentators touted a free market approach to public services and policy, suggesting 
that marketization would usher in “freedom of choice” for individuals.57 For example, the 
GOP insisted that the government “inject free-market forces into the Medicare program 
to … increase beneficiaries’ options,” offering Medicare recipients the agency to choose 
their own healthcare coverage.58 In 1992, Colorado moved to “create the first statewide 
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voucher system for school in the nation,” and proponents argued that creating a market 
for schools would empower parents to push for better education.59 As market proponent 
Ron Pierce said, “schools will improve only if parents can act as consumers with 
choices.”60 Conservative talk show host Rush Limbaugh claimed that legislators should 
“let the marketplace rule” because it was the one system that encouraged an agentic, self-
realizing mantra: “think for yourselves.”61 Free market optimists thus constructed the free 
market as an agent-creating force, offering citizens the promise of self-realization through 
personal decision-making. 
Furthermore, proponents celebrated the free market’s promise of individual 
fulfillment through entrepreneurship. Optimistic discourses lauded the entrepreneur as a 
self-realizing agent that the free market made possible. For example, Internet and 
technology entrepreneur Stewart Brand explained how the free market embraced the 
1960s liberation spirit, saying, “‘Do your own thing’ easily translated into ‘Start your 
own business.’”62 Also, as hip hop culture moved into the commercial mainstream, 
commentators and artists celebrated “hip-hop entrepreneurs” as achieving “total 
autonomy” in entertainment and fashion industries.63 Internationally, USA Today drew 
attention to the “Thousands of small eastern European entrepreneurs” who were 
“working for themselves for the first time in their lives” once their economic systems 
embraced the free market.64 Optimistic discourses thus suggested that engaging private 
enterprise in the form of the entrepreneur-agent would fulfill individuals’ desires for 
autonomous self-realization. 
Free market optimism also offered individuals the promise of fulfillment through 
consumption. Amidst the various choices provided by an abundant consumer economy, 
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marketing discourses constructed purchases as primary modes of defining their 
identities.65 As Harvard Business Review detailed, corporations selling consumer 
products shifted their emphases in the 1990s “from the design and manufacture of the 
product…to the consumer and the brand,” thus focusing on co-articulating their products 
with people’s desires for self-fulfillment and identity-construction.66 Phil Knight, the 
CEO of Nike, Inc. explained that the company wanted to tie “who the consumer is” to 
“what the brand represents.”67 Knight detailed how Nike’s “advertising tries to link 
consumers to the Nike brand through the emotions of sports and fitness,” showing 
“competition, determination, achievement, fun, and even the spiritual rewards of 
participating in those activities.”68 By purchasing Nike products, then, people could 
identify as themselves possessing or pursuing these characteristics.  
Many marketing strategies in this era promoted such visions of self-realization 
through consumption. For example, Levi’s marketing built “sharply contrasting 
campaigns” to give their company’s different types of jeans “separate identities” for 
consumers.69 Levi’s advertised their loose-fitting jeans in a campaign called “Loose” to 
people who wanted to “typify hipness.” 70 This set of advertisements featured images of 
young, racially diverse people jumping, dancing, hula-hooping, skate-boarding, and 
smiling in their loose jeans of various colors. This campaign embraced the slogan, 
“There’s no one way to do it,” suggesting that people could choose specialized identities 
by purchasing a type and color of loose-fitting denim.71 In their “Got to Be Real” 
campaign, Levi’s advertisements featured young men and women wearing Levi’s 501 
jeans and chatting about their subtle, effortless authenticity.72 These advertising 
campaigns combined people’s narratives of expression and self-development with Levi’s 
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denim, offering two different senses of self-realization through purchasing Levi’s jeans: 
you could be the epitome of cool in loose jeans, or you could be your authentic self in 
501s. Advertisement revenues spiked in 1994, as brands sold themselves as meaningful 
ways of life and sponsors of cultural expression.73  
Free market optimism promised self-realization by organizing interconnected 
desires for agency and social recognition around individual choice and two capitalist 
subjectivities: the entrepreneur and the consumer. This optimism situated agents 
primarily in the marketplace, interpolating people as individualized and fluid subjects 
who had the capacity to take charge over their personal and social lives by choosing from 
options in free exchange as owners and consumers.74 Both of these identities largely 
revolved around the commodity, which in the Marxist tradition, refers to an object that 
has left the realm of production and entered the world of exchange. Following the 
psychoanalytic Marxist trajectory, exchange processes infuse the commodity with the 
promise to fulfill desires that go beyond the use-value of any object.75 Political theorist 
Yannis Stavrakakis argued that advertisements “can stimulate and channel desire” for 
consumers “by constructing a whole mythology” around commodities.76 Consumption, in 
Berlant’s words, “promises satisfaction” by suggesting that a person “can achieve [social] 
recognition” by purchasing commodities.77 Discourses of entrepreneurship attached to 
consumption fantasies by placing business owners as leaders of the satisfaction industry, 
themselves satisfied by private ownership. Free market optimism thus saddled liberal 




Promoting Neoliberal Attachments  
Free market optimism, which promised peaceful prosperity and self-realization, 
happily oriented the globe toward neoliberal capitalism. As Joseph Stieglitz remembered, 
“At the height of the 1990s economic boom—a period of unprecedented growth—
capitalism American-style seemed triumphant.”78 Consumer markets were deemed a 
universal human desire, and, as such, were defended and promulgated across the globe.79 
Such widespread optimism promoted attachments to three prominent neoliberal 
commitments: personal responsibility, consumer agency, and corporate benevolence. 
Free market optimism highlighted the importance of personal responsibility to 
manage the tension between market freedom and social responsibility. Optimistic 
discourses constructed the free market as an inevitability teeming with opportunity and 
suggested that people needed to grasp the opportunity by taking personal responsibility. 
For example, Clinton suggested that the lesson of “the collapse of the Berlin Wall” was 
that “even a totally controlled society cannot resist the winds of change that economics, 
and technology, and information flow have imposed” on the world.80 In the face of such 
inevitability, Clinton signed NAFTA into law, explaining that free trade was an 
“opportunity” that the United States “must not squander.”81 In the world that NAFTA 
advocacy articulated, opportunity functioned as a future-oriented promise that could only 
come to fruition if the Administration exercised agency over it by implementing free 
market principles. This rhetoric put the onus of fulfilling the promise of opportunity on 
various agents—government, individuals, corporations. Clinton argued that the “only 
realistic option is to embrace these changes and create the jobs of tomorrow.”82 Free 
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market optimism thus suggested that agents could harness inevitable, non-ideological 
changes by leveraging them in ways that could fulfill social desires, like employment. 
One such agent was the responsible, individual person. In his first inaugural, 
Clinton celebrated how the “new world” of free trade and technological innovation “has 
already enriched the lives of millions of Americans who are able to compete and win in 
it.”83 Clinton thus suggested that private individuals could succeed in the free market 
milieu if they would “take more responsibility” upon themselves for seizing 
“opportunity.”84 Such responsibility rhetoric also bolstered moves to chip away at the 
welfare state; the Clinton/Gore ticket, for example, promised to “end welfare as we know 
it” by replacing it with a system that encouraged personal responsibility by mandating 
work.85 The rhetoric of responsibility encouraged people see themselves as calculating 
individuals, thereby attributing success and failure to individual agents, not systemic 
obstacles.86 Free market optimism thus suggested that individuals were agents who could 
harness the free market’s benefits by taking personal responsibility within a setting of 
opportunity. 
Free market optimism also positioned individuals as consumer-agents who could 
simultaneously fulfill themselves and promote peaceful prosperity by purchasing 
commodities. While corporations began privileging marketing in the United States over 
production, the consumer identity began replacing the worker identity as a primary mode 
of agentic identification. 87 Free market optimism proposed consumer agency as the 
apolitical movement that could change the world. For example, superstar CEO Knight 
explained about Nike, “Now we realize that everything spins off the consumer” such that 
Nike had to “come up with what the consumer wants…at the grassroots level.”88 Knight’s 
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use of “grassroots” linked consumerism with connotations of agency and social change, a 
connection that other discourses also perpetuated. USA Today reported on the “still-quiet 
consumer revolution brewing in the West” that could “fundamentally change the way the 
nation buys its electricity,” as individual consumers decided “who supplies their 
power.”89 A 1994 Global Futures poll indicated that 71 percent of respondents perceived 
“Consumers, with their choices” as the group that did “the most by their actions to protect 
the environment.”90 Global trade institutions also understood consumers as vessels of 
economic agency. Through such mechanisms as the World Trade Organization, the 
United States enticed other nations into entering trade agreements with the promise of the 
large American consumer base that could purchase another country’s goods.91 
Finally, corporations also circulated as agents of the capitalist good life because 
private enterprise was deemed a primary form of agency. Many “New Democrats” 
argued that private corporations could fulfill public responsibilities—such as healthcare, 
education, and environmental protections—better than the federal government because 
corporations reacted to market incentives that benefited consumers and were not subject 
to tumultuous politics.92 As public funds for social services and cultural practices were 
slashed, organizations partnered with corporations to make up lost funds in the form of 
public-private partnerships.93 This transition to widespread corporate funding constructed 
private sponsorship as an integral component of social and cultural practices.94 Corporate 
spokespeople echoed the idea “that businesses should be good citizens.”95 Knight pointed 
to Nike’s beneficent acts, saying, “we sponsor a lot of sports clinics for youth. And we’re 
underwriting a series called Ghostwriting that the Children’s Television Workshop is 
developing to teach kids how to read and write.”96 Knight explained that charitable acts 
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of corporate citizenship were both good for society and for the corporation’s bottom line. 
“We’re doing it because we think it’s the right thing to do, but we also want the 
visibility,” Knight explained, suggesting that corporate profits and social benevolence 
were mutually reinforcing.97 In sum, free market optimism oriented people toward 
personal responsibility, consumer agency, and corporate benevolence—priorities that 
Gifford’s critics and media coverage appropriated as the sweatshop scandal antagonized 
the neoliberal order. 
Gifford as Free Market Optimist 
As a talk show celebrity and brand name in a capitalist society, Gifford 
personified free market optimism in the early-to-mid 1990s. In P. David Marshall’s 
words, celebrities are “hyperindividual[s]” who, through a mediated legitimation process, 
“are given greater presence and a wider scope of activity and agency” than other 
people.98 Celebrity is powerful because this “public personality” circulates as a product 
of collective desires, values, and resentments.99 Thus, a celebrity in a capitalist-
democratic society is simultaneously “a real, living and breathing human being” and a 
“marketable commodity” that is constructed by media and audiences.100 As both human 
and product, celebrities in consumer cultures provide a “humanness and familiarity” to 
“consumer objects” and capitalist-democratic institutions.101 Gifford, herself both a 
human and a commodity, embodied the hopeful promises of free market capitalism, as 
her branded persona incarnated self-realization and peaceful prosperity. 
Gifford’s persona suggested that people could find personal fulfillment in the 
marketplace, and that the free market rewarded attention to the fulfillments of private life. 
In 1992, Halmode manufacturing signed a deal with Gifford to design a dress line for 
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which she was perfect as “a mother and TV star married to a football star.”102 The 
marketplace thus promised Gifford fulfillment by allowing her subjectivity to flourish in 
the clothing commodity business. Similarly, in 1995, Gifford and her four-year-old-son 
released a book titled Listen to My Heart, which sold narrative experiences from the 
Giffords’ “all-American family.”103 This book blended the imperatives of the 
marketplace—sell books—with the promise of a fulfilling family life. Furthermore, 
Gifford affirmed the agency-producing choices offered by the market. For example, when 
asked about her many endeavors and rumors about her leaving Live!, Gifford responded, 
“I get bored easily.” 104 She explained that although she was “not bored here…with 
Reege,” she would leave if the show did not give her “opportunities… to do some of the 
other things that are offered me” elsewhere in the market.105 Gifford’s celebrity persona 
thus suggested that she found self-realization in the marketplace, which offered multiple 
opportunities for fulfillment and celebrated private life. 
Gifford’s clothing line extended this promise of self-realization to women across 
the United States. With her fashion line, Gifford participated in widespread consumerist 
discourses that construct fashion choices—particularly those endorsed by celebrities—as 
significant modes of self-expression.106 Gifford explained that her “clothing line came 
about…because she was getting so much fan mail about her TV clothes.”107 In response 
to her popularity, she offered to expand her fashion identification to women of moderate 
means as a promise of fulfillment; her line promised women that they could feel like and 
present as the bourgeois women they could not otherwise afford to be. Gifford promoted 
her “fall line” by suggesting that women would be delighted because they had “never had 
this kind of quality at this kind of price” before.108 Commentators celebrated Gifford for 
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“giving Wal-mart its first ever serious fashion statement,” remarking that celebrity-
endorsed clothing like Gifford’s allowed “Working women” to be “filling their closets 
with inexpensive designer-inspired clothing” without anxiety about price.109  
Gifford’s celebrity persona also embodied free market optimism’s promise of 
peaceful prosperity by celebrating post-ideological relationality and philanthropic charity. 
Gifford publicly embraced a post-ideological subjectivity, identifying politically as “very 
much a Democrat in terms of social issues” and “very Republican in terms of financial 
issues.”110 Gifford’s persona thus implied that once-salient political tensions were no 
longer relevant in a 1990s world, and that in this new milieu, people could find joy in 
their private lives, as Gifford did. Gifford’s persona concretized post-ideological 
relationality by revolving around her “private” life – the life of her heteronormative, 
bourgeois family and their experiences in the market.  
Gifford also embodied the free market’s promise of widespread prosperity 
through her philanthropic charity, which came in two forms. First, the marketing of 
Gifford’s clothing line proposed that she was providing a social service through her 
affordable clothing line. For example, Gifford’s Wal-Mart clothing featured items 
ranging in price from “$8.96 to $ 34.96.”111 Gifford explained that because “the economy 
is very bad at the moment,” her clothing offered “wives and mothers” a chance to treat 
themselves, even as they concentrated on taking care of their children in stressful 
financial times. She explained, “The fact that you can get a nice outfit for yourself, for 
under $100, is important to women.”112 Gifford’s clothing line, then, promised all 
people—even those struggling through an economic downturn—the enjoyment 
associated with the markings of prosperity: in this case, a “nice outfit.”  
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Second, Gifford promised that wealth could spread prosperity through charitable 
acts of donation. In 1992, Gifford publicized her family’s involvement with Variety, a 
children’s charity.113 Three years later, Gifford’s husband Frank told Larry King Live 
audiences that “all of the money that comes from the book” that bore Gifford and her 
son’s names went to “Cody House,” the Gifford wing of the Association to Benefit 
Children. Frank explained that the charity they created in their son’s name aimed to “help 
babies who are, by and large, born of crack-addicted mothers. They are HIV-positive, or 
they have AIDS.”114 Furthermore, Gifford marketed her clothing line as funding 
children’s charities, including Cody House and Variety Club International’s Children 
Charity.115 Gifford’s persona thus embodied the idea that private wealth and markets of 
exchange would provide social services that could promote widespread prosperity, even 
for those young children whose success was blighted by drug-addicted parents. Her 
marketing discourse suggested that wealthy charitable entrepreneurs, like her family, 
could join forces with the consumers who bought their products to help solve social 
problems like poverty, addiction, and disease. In sum, Gifford’s celebrity persona 
embodied free market optimism’s promise of peaceful prosperity and self-realization. 
Gifford’s celebrity persona optimistically organized desires for social harmony, 
agency, and social recognition. Gifford’s charm curated an interpersonal desire for social 
harmony because it lightened any potential strife, suggesting that people could smile and 
joke their way through conflict. For example, Gifford consistently handled on-air 
disagreements with her cohost by engaging in friendly banter accompanied by a toothy 
grin, making this charming, light-hearted fun Live!’s defining characteristic.116 On a 
systemic level, Gifford’s persona also organized desires for social harmony between 
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classes by performing the idea that wealthy philanthropists could positively affect both 
racialized and gendered classes. Gifford promised that her profits would benefit Cody 
House, her charity that positioned her bourgeois family as saviors of babies of color, who 
were suffering from addiction and disease; similarly, her clothing line offered to dress 
poorer women in a likeness of rich women’s clothing, promising them respect resulting 
from consumption. Gifford’s persona thus proposed a harmonious resolution to wealth 
inequality in which poor and wealthy alike would thrive from profit-creating ventures.  
Gifford’s celebrity persona also suggested that people could achieve social 
recognition for consumerist identity construction. Every day on Live! and in countless 
commercials and special appearances, viewers saw her craft her identity in the 
marketplace, as both a consumer and entrepreneur. Gifford dazzled audiences with her 
consumption choices—like her “huge emerald-cut diamond” and her “silk scarf”—that 
helped construct her as a fashionable, yet relatable woman.117 Herself satisfied in the 
marketplace’s consumption environment, Gifford performed as an entertainment 
entrepreneur who promised other women that they, too, could attain satisfaction of their 
desires through her products. 
As a free market optimist, Gifford’s persona blended liberal economics and social 
responsibility. Apropos the free market, Gifford pursued her own profit and social status 
by selling herself as a celebrity-commodity and by marketing other commodities. Her 
profit-making endeavors were so successful that in 1995, Gifford made nine million 
dollars from her clothing line alone.118 Following the imperatives of social responsibility, 
she wrapped her market success in the success of others, particularly promising 
fulfillment and joy to children and women. Gifford delighted in the success of her 
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clothing line among women of modest means, and she publicly donated one 
million dollars of her clothing profits to children’s charities.119 Gifford, as an 
embodiment of free market optimism, suggested that the free market facilitated both 
wealth accumulation and charity.  
As an embodiment of an overtly gendered free market optimism, Gifford became 
a potent target for sweatshop activists when she started her clothing brand. Gifford’s 
persona embraced all the markers of white bourgeois femininity, including the 
expectation that women will act as moral stewards over all of society and act as motherly 
figures who perform affective connections to all children.120 Gifford’s ultra-feminine 
persona incarnated the compassionate capitalism whose legitimacy institutional 
spokespeople promoted and sweatshop activists challenged.  Thus, she constituted a 
prime target for sweatshop activists because her celebrity was built upon on her meeting 
the expectations of white womanhood to seek social improvement, particularly for 
children. 
Circulating Class Shame 
The Gifford controversy circulated shame about the manufacturing conditions 
undergirding consumerism. Shame, according to Tompkins, refers to a constellation of 
uncomfortable emotions that dampen the experience of positive affects, even in situations 
that otherwise encourage increased interest or enjoyment.121 Shame is a negative self-
judgment that results from a moment of actual or threatened exposure of the self to some 
“disapproving other,” producing the vulnerable sense that the self’s intimate deficiencies 
are on display and that one’s social legitimacy is threatened.122 This emotion radically 
alters the presumed division between subject and object because the self, reacting to 
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exposure before the other, turns judgment upon itself, becoming both evaluator and the 
object of evaluation.123 Although shame is an emotion directed at the self, it results from 
thwarted communion with the other.124 Thus, in Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick’s words, shame 
makes a “double movement”: at once “toward uncontrollable relationality” by which our 
identity can be constituted and confirmed and “toward painful individuation” from the 
knowledge that our attempt at communion has been scorned.125 Early activist discourses 
and media coverage of the Gifford sweatshop controversy constructed classed shame 
around self-fulfillment in the free market and the promise of peaceful prosperity. This 
shame stunted the optimistic affect attaching to neoliberalization in three moments: 
revelations, accusations, and reactions. 
Revelations 
The initial revelation of labor abuses came from Kernaghan’s March 15 public 
letter to Gifford, and from the outset, activist discourse articulated production with 
Gifford’s celebrity identity. The letter opened with an appeal to Gifford’s character; 
“Respecting very much the important national role you play in the defense of children’s 
rights,” Kernaghan wrote, “I want to ask your help.” 126 His prose punctuated Gifford’s 
role as an agent by celebrating her self-promoted identity as a protector of children. In 
simple, direct language, the second sentence of the letter linked this identity to the 
processes of production that created her products: “At least one factory producing Kathie 
Lee clothing has illegally employed child labor.” This statement leveraged the self-
realizing discourses of celebrity endorsement to implicate Gifford in the production of the 
clothing brand that bore her name. The marketing of Gifford clothing promised 
consumers a piece of Gifford’s brand of self-realization, and this letter suggested that the 
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line belonged to Gifford and thus, she could enact agency over the line’s production 
practices.  
Furthermore, Kernaghan’s statement implied that Gifford’s identity as a defender 
of children necessarily meant that she would seek to protect children from unlawful labor 
practices. In line with dominant U.S. discourses of childhood in the 1990s, Gifford’s 
motherly persona suggested that children were a special class of people who merited 
protection and that childhood was a precious moment of growth deserving of defense.127 
Gifford explained that, “as a mother… you monitor … their development, their speech 
processes, the way they interact with other people, their heart” such that the child could 
grow up “to be a wonderful human being.”128 Gifford extended her protector role over 
other children with her well-publicized charity work. Kernaghan’s letter seized on 
Gifford’s constructions of childhood by asserting that factories were encroaching on the 
protected space of childhood. His letter extended childhood into adolescence as it 
estimated that “ten percent of the workers employed at Global Fashion were young 
teenaged girls, thirteen, fourteen and fifteen years old.” Kernaghan implored Gifford to 
act in accordance with her motherly persona and declare “that Kathie Lee garments will 
never be made by children.” His letter thus addressed Gifford as a motivated, moral actor 
who could make a difference in an issue that was a marker of her identity. 
Linking identity and production invited public shame to linger at the edges of this 
early revelation. Suggesting that production was a dimension of Gifford’s identity meant 
that judgments of these practices were also reflections of her character and grounds for 
questioning the legitimacy of her social standing as a wholesome celebrity. Gifford was 
particularly vulnerable to such judgments of character because her status as celebrity and 
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brand was reliant on people’s approval and their desire to commune with her. The letter 
treated Gifford as an agent of self-fulfillment as Kernaghan hailed the “important national 
role” that she acquired through entrepreneurship and consumerism. Kernaghan wrote, 
“Perhaps no other person in the U.S. could have so important an impact, or make such a 
difference…as you could.” In Kernaghan’s hopeful words lurked the implicit possibility 
of exposing Gifford’s wholesome celebrity persona as fraudulent, if she did not act. 
Kernaghan positioned himself as the potential judgmental other that could expose this 
shameful aspect of Gifford’s identity. Kernaghan ended the letter by offering three 
telephone numbers by which he “can be reached.” Punctuating the matter’s urgency, 
Kernaghan wrote, “I am anxious to work with you” because “The lives of these women 
and children … deserve our attention.” The letter thus suggested that Gifford’s call could 
thwart his negative judgment. 
The letter also threatened shame about the international class structures that 
undergirded bourgeois self-fulfillment. The letter only mentioned the United States once, 
when describing the manufacture of clothing “for export to the U.S.” It referred to other 
places, both specifically and in a generalized manner, in conjunction with production; the 
prose detailed manufacturing practices in “Choloma, Honduras,” “offshore,” “across 
Central America, Asia and beyond.” The letter thus yoked anxieties over manufacturing 
with the construction of the United States as a special place of self-fulfilling 
consumption. The United States stood as primarily a place of exchange with the 
generalized world “beyond” as a site of production. This construction of classed 
worlds—one of exchange and one of production—invited shame to linger at the edges of 
bourgeois self-fulfillment because it suggested that production practices precluded self-
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fulfillment for workers in the “developing” world as they worked to serve the desires of 
entrepreneurial and consumer societies.  
Kernaghan’s characterizations of workers also contributed to the threat of shame. 
Kernaghan referred to the factory workers as “young teenaged girls, thirteen, fourteen 
and fifteen years old” as he reported that “about 80 percent of the sewers are women, the 
majority of them very young.” The letter moved seamlessly between characterizations of 
workers as “children” and “women,” eliding differences between the two and co-
articulating “violations of children’s and women’s rights.” Kernghan’s construction of 
“these women and children” participated in widespread discourses that categorize 
“women and children” as a single category of innocent civilians who merit protection 
because they, unlike men, are not aggressor-agents.129 These workers were legible to the 
consuming worlds as people worthy of sympathy and protection in part because they 
were marked as women and children. This identification combined with their status as 
producers to promote the uncomfortable feeling that consumer fulfillment relied on 
innocent producers in distant lands. Shame often functions to enforce social norms, and 
in this case, the implied shame threatened to expose Gifford as violating the norm of not 
harming innocents.130 
Kernaghan’s characterization of working conditions cast innocents as victims of 
coercive and exploitative production practices. The letter leveraged discourses that 
construct victims as the pure, passive, and sympathetic recipients of violence and 
violation.131 In the letter’s case, Global Fashions—the factory, as synecdoche for the 
production system—transgressed upon the sympathetic innocents. The production 
system’s violent violations manifested in physical, emotional, and economic ways. The 
	 146 
letter detailed how workers were “forced” and “obligated” to work lengthy hours and 
how the factory employed “armed guards, who are used to intimidate the young women.”  
Women and children worked “grueling shifts...most frequently from 7:30 in the morning 
to 9:00 at night,” sometimes “sewing Kathie Lee clothing, straight through the night until 
5:00 a.m. the next morning.” Even “pregnant women” worked “on their feet 15 ½ hours” 
straight. Kernaghan explained that between the locked bathrooms and prohibitions on 
speaking, the factory was a “humiliating place to work.” He added, “There is a lot of 
screaming by the supervisors for the women to work faster and faster,” even as the 
exhausted workers earned no benefits and so little pay that “The mothers working at 
Global Fashion do not make enough to feed their children properly.” The factory was 
thus constructed as an exploitative and coercive place that violated pure, passive, 
sympathetic victims. 
The letter invited classed shame by leveraging neocolonial discourses to suggest 
that Gifford had a responsibility to act on these abusive conditions. Kernaghan’s 
construction of violations amplified familiar development discourses that construct 
suffering, need, and inadequacy to authorize intervention into the so-called Second and 
Third Worlds.132 NATO divided the world into these three classes during the Cold War: 
the prosperous First World included countries aligned with NATO, countries aligned with 
the Soviet Union comprised the Second World, and the dispossessed Third World 
encompassed unaligned countries.133 This partition cultivated an image of the Third 
World as lacking in agency, drowning in suffering, and waiting for a First World agent to 
save it.134 Development discourses have often featured women and children as the Third 
World’s sympathetic victims, and their assumed passive innocence has authorized the 
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First World to act upon the Third World to benevolently save such gendered and aged 
victims from harm.135 Kernaghan’s letter appropriated such tropes of suffering and 
agency and addressed them specifically to Gifford, imploring her to embrace her 
subjectivity as a First World agent to save the suffering Third World innocents. Implied 
shame animated Kernaghan’s imperative, suggesting that if she did not act, the legitimacy 
of her identity as a savior of innocents could be threatened.   
Ultimately, the letter invited class shame because it threatened to halt optimistic 
enjoyment of entrepreneurship and consumerism. Kernaghan engaged the rhetoric of 
“unmasking” when he purported to expose the hidden truth of production that the illusion 
of optimistic self-fulfillment obscured. As I explained elsewhere, the unmasking posture 
“implicates a faith in the transformational power of truth-knowledge; identifying the real 
problem, unmasking suggests, will get us closer to fixing it.”136 Kernaghan’s letter 
presented factory conditions as unassailable truths garnered from workers’ testimonies 
and his own observations. Having unmasked these practices, Kernaghan’s letter asked 
Gifford to prove her character by taking a specific action; “You could move the entire 
industry to set new human rights standards,” the letter explained, “if you would announce 
that independent human rights monitors will have access to all plants which produce 
clothing for Kathie Lee.” Kernaghan’s letter suggested that Gifford could continue to 
enjoy entrepreneurship and consumption if she acted in accordance with her benevolent 
persona; implicit in this directive, however, lurked the threat of shame if Gifford did not 
act. If she ignored his truth, she risked having Kernaghan, as judging other, inhibit her 




In the weeks after Kernaghan delivered his letter to Gifford and notified Wal-
Mart, the retail chain put Global Fashion on its “blacklist” of sweatshop manufacturers to 
avoid, and Gifford did not publicly respond.137 On April 29, Kernaghan testified before 
the Senate’s Democratic Policy Committee, where he repeated his March 15 revelations 
and added an accusation: that Gifford continued to harm workers, even as Wal-Mart 
blacklisted Global Fashion.138 Kernaghan’s testimony and subsequent media coverage 
began to shift the issue’s emotional tenor from implied toward overt shame.  
Kernaghan questioned Gifford’s commitment to self-realization and peaceful 
prosperity during his testimony. “The solution is not in taking Kathie Lee work out of 
Honduras,” he explained, because “These young women need jobs, just as the U.S. 
people do.” Kernaghan’s words had embedded in them the assumption that employment 
could lead to both self-realization and prosperity, and he suggested that Gifford had taken 
such opportunity away from “young women” in the already-victimized producing world. 
The “young women” characterization allowed Kernaghan to pivot away from the child 
labor issue into a critique of global production. He combined the dual anxieties over 
production—disappearing U.S. jobs and disconcerting sweatshops—into a single 
accusation of abandoning workers in both the developed and developing world. He 
implicitly charged Gifford with abandoning U.S. workers by moving factory jobs to the 
Third World, only to abandon victim producers by moving factories again. 
This accusation began to bring shame to the forefront of the Gifford issue. 
Kernaghan again positioned himself as the judging other who deemed Gifford’s actions 
insufficient and who questioned the veracity of her public persona. He aimed his criticism 
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at Gifford as a responsible market agent, who had promised the world bourgeois self-
realization and peaceful prosperity. Kernaghan “call[ed] upon Kathie Lee… to clean up 
these sweatshop conditions” so that jobs around the world would “respect basic 
internationally recognized human and workers’ rights.” Shame began to shift into overt 
view as Kernaghan explicitly, if rather softly, condemned Gifford’s actions as 
abandonment and offered his plan of action as the only acceptable solution. In sum, 
Kernaghan suggested that Gifford should be ashamed of herself for abandoning the 
women and children her public persona so vigorously defended. 
This testimony interrupted enjoyment of market optimism by exposing the market 
as an insufficient mechanism for securing social welfare. The act of Congressional 
testimony itself suggested that the market could not secure its promises without some 
form of governmental intervention. Kernaghan implied that he had tried a private 
approach by informing Gifford about the abuses. In response, Gifford moved work to 
another factory—in effect, choosing her brand over the fulfillment and prosperity of 
vulnerable producers. Her actions, as described in Kernaghan’s testimony, suggested that 
Gifford’s market-based choice would not sufficiently provide peaceful prosperity to the 
producers that she left behind. 
News media and the tabloid press circulated variations of Kernaghan’s 
accusation, creating classed anxieties that ultimately gave way to shame. News reports 
crafted class anxiety by negotiating Gifford’s ambiguous agency over production, 
characterizing Gifford as simultaneously unaware and agentic. Spokespeople stated that 
Gifford “is not involved in production and was ‘totally unaware’ of conditions at the 
plant” and that she “would never condone, tolerate or accept the exploitation of 
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children.”139 Even as they asserted Gifford’s ignorance about manufacturing, her 
spokespeople confirmed her agency over production by assuring the press that Gifford 
had “severed ties to the Choloma, Honduras, plant once problems were discovered,” and 
“that the Wal-Mart stores no longer manufacture the Kathie Lee Line at the factory.”140 
This ambiguity co-articulated anxieties over production with Gifford’s celebrity persona, 
questioning the extent to which bourgeois agency was responsible for producer 
subjugation. Severing relationships with the manufacturers confirmed the abject reality of 
the Honduran sweatshop and exposed Gifford as an agent in production decisions.  
Having constructed her as an agent, media accounts juxtaposed Gifford’s persona 
with sweatshop conditions. The Daily News characterized Gifford as a “Perky TV 
personality” whose “discount clothing line” was being manufactured in a “hellish 
Honduran sweatshop.”141 The story detailed how “underage and pregnant women work 
20-hour days in stifling heat, sewing garments” for the “Kathie Lee line… for 31 cents an 
hour, forbidden to speak.” 142 Newspapers reported that “Items in TV talk show host 
Kathie Lee Gifford’s signature line of women’s clothing are being made by Honduran 
children working up to 13 hours a day for ‘starvation wages.’”143 This juxtaposition 
provided perspective by incongruity, which Kenneth Burke theorized as a re-ordering of 
relationships between terms; this reorganization can destabilize a system of meaning by 
introducing elements into a system that do not usually belong in it.144 The media provided 
such perspective by placing terms of enjoyment and fulfillment—like “Perky TV 
personality” and “discount clothing line”—in the same sentence as terms of oppression 
and subjugation—like “hellish Honduran sweatshop” and “starvation wages.”  
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The media’s reporting circulated class shame by co-articulating the self-
realization of bourgeois entrepreneurship and consumption with the victimization of 
suffering producers. Using the rhetoric of unmasking, media accounts constructed self-
realization and victimization as mutually constituting, thus dampening the enjoyment of 
consumption and entrepreneurship by constructing production practices as the abject 
materiality that undergirded bourgeois enjoyment. Abject materiality refers to a 
destabilizing glimpse at some entity that has been, in Julia Kristeva’s words, “radically 
excluded” from a system of meaning; it is the eruption into existence of some body that, 
in Judith Butler’s words, “has been systematically deprived the privilege of ontology.”145 
The news media inserted descriptions of classed bodies working “20-hour days in stifling 
heat, sewing garments” into Gifford’s free market optimism.146 In 1996, these 
characterizations registered as descriptions of actually existing conditions because they fit 
into sweatshop tropes that constituted popular anxieties over production.147 The reporting 
induced shame by bundling these familiar tropes of suffering producers with Gifford’s 
promise of self-realization. 
Early news coverage further manifested shame as it depicted Gifford’s retreat 
from public view. News outlets reported that “Gifford could not be reached for comment” 
on the sweatshop allegations; instead, reactions came from “her attorney,” “a 
spokesman,” or “Gifford’s camp.”148 The reports showed Gifford exercising a form of 
agency available to celebrities, wherein she could hide from direct exposure, yet respond 
with crafted messages delivered by employees. This representational response was 
particularly notable for Gifford because audiences were accustomed to encountering her 
every morning, chatting openly about even the most intimate aspects of her life. Gifford, 
	 152 
then, could be understood as hiding from the allegations by not addressing them 
personally as her perky, open, chatty self. Hiding or escaping from perceived sources of 
shame are common and popularly recognized forms of reacting to the emotion.149 Thus, 
reports of Gifford’s escape from public view helped construct the allegations as a 
shameful moment, during which Gifford could not show her face. 
These news reports also circulated shame by constructing activists as judging 
others. News media publicized the accusations of “workers rights activists” broadly and 
Kernaghan and his “labor group…[the] National Labor Committee” specifically.150 
Reports detailed how activists “continued to hammer at” Gifford after she severed ties 
with the Honduran sweatshop, repeating Kernaghan’s accusation that “Just cutting and 
running” was “the worst thing Gifford could do.”151 The Daily Mail printed Kernaghan’s 
verbatim judgment of Gifford; “Exploiting these young women, these kids…and then just 
pulling out, and taking the jobs with you, and leaving these people in the gutter, that’s no 
answer.” Kernaghan judged Gifford as neglecting her responsibilities, saying that she and 
her retailer “owe those kids something.” 152 The Daily Mail printed Kernaghan’s assertion 
that the only way to rescue her character was for “Gifford to tour the factories and speak 
out against them.”153  
This coverage constructed labor activists like Kernaghan as judging others, who 
could assess modes of bourgeois self-fulfillment and peaceful prosperity and then either 
sanction them as legitimate or denounce them as fraudulent. Like many sweatshop 
discourses of the 1990s, this coverage constituted U.S. activists as agents over victimized 
Third World producers, thereby appropriating patterns of imperial hegemony to authorize 
activists’ judgments.154 The activists were constructed as First World agents who held 
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their compatriots to moral standards set by the First World. Early news coverage thus 
circulated shame by constructing activists as others who judged Gifford as a morally 
insufficient market agent. 
Reactions 
With news and tabloid media circulating the “bombshell allegations of using 
abused children to make her Wal-Mart clothing line,” Gifford targeted Kernaghan with 
an emotional outburst on Live!155 Looking directly into the camera with glistening tears 
in her eyes and an angry quiver in her lips, Gifford scolded the activist publicly.156 This 
outburst and its widespread media coverage further circulated class shame, situating the 
emotion in white, middle-class livings rooms across the country. Gifford’s eruption 
embodied the self-focused discomfort that accompanies a moment of non-recognition.157 
Gifford displayed signs of visceral discomfort; she quickly blinked her eyes as they 
welled up with tears, she shook her head back and forth as her voice jumped octaves, and 
she slammed papers on a coffee table.158 The next day, news and tabloid media noted the 
“unusual TV moment” in which “Kathie Lee los[t] her cool.”159 Outlets reported that 
“The usually bubbly Kathie Lee Gifford broke into tears Wednesday,” visibly 
“distraught” and “shaking” as she issued “a huffy, tearful on-camera denial.”160 As the 
reports made clear, audiences were accustomed to seeing this free market optimist bubble 
over with enthusiasm, and this outburst confronted audiences with a visceral discomfort 
around the identity of a self-realized, prosperous, and benevolent woman of the 
marketplace.   
Gifford’s discomfort centered on the status of her self, as she addressed 
allegations on a show that featured her identity as its centerpiece. She “defended herself 
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on the air” as she characterized Kernaghan’s allegations as a “personal” offensive on “my 
integrity,” and she rejected the idea that she was “personally responsible” for production 
practices.161 Live!’s camerawork confirmed the intimacy of the allegations by featuring 
Gifford’s monologue mostly in close-up view, allowing audiences to look directly into 
Gifford’s eyes as she defended her self.162 The day after, newspapers confirmed the focus 
of Gifford’s monologue; The Atlanta Journal and Constitution, for example, reported that 
during Gifford’s monologue, she “focus[ed] on the fact her name had been smudged.”163 
This coverage, and the outburst itself, showed her publicly performing the discomfort 
often associated with having one’s identity challenged.  
Although Gifford clearly constructed herself as the primary issue, her shame 
could be understood as applying more broadly to bourgeois fulfillment and peaceful 
prosperity. Not only was Gifford an embodiment of free market optimism, but this 
shameful episode was oriented around her clothing line’s capacity to provide self-
realization and peaceful prosperity. Furthermore, Gifford’s enactment of shame was 
situated in overlapping spaces of prosperous and peaceful fulfillment. Live!’s set was 
modeled after a middle class, white, suburban living room of the 1990s. The set featured 
Gifford and Regis sitting on light brown wicker chairs behind a short, light brown coffee 
table that held orange coffee mugs, newspapers, and magazines. The hosts were 
surrounded by other white, middle class accoutrement: light brown book cases decorated 
with trophies and vases, a white piano topped with a lavender vase brimming with pastel-
colored flowers, and a large imitation window that looked out onto a painted, tree-lined 
suburban street.164 This set situated Gifford’s shame in a televised version of a living 
room, inviting a para-social identification with audiences who valued bourgeois 
	 155 
domesticity. Moreover, this domesticity was beamed into the homes of Live!’s viewers, 
further situating the outburst of shame within people’s private homes. The shame thus 
permeated a prominent space of free market optimism—a prosperous family’s suburban 
living room. 
Gifford’s monologue broadcast two common reactions to shame: avoidance and 
attack. A person experiencing shame may avoid the negative evaluation of the self and 
seek to distract from it, which Gifford did as she offered evidence of her good deeds.165 “I 
started my clothing line to benefit children. Millions of dollars have gone to help 
children,” she argued.166 Gifford explained that upon hearing Kernaghan’s charges, “I 
immediately called Wal-Mart and said this is obscene if this is happening. They said, 
‘That happened months ago, we found out about it and took care of it.’”167 Gifford 
avoided shame, directly stating, “Today I am wearing with pride my Kathie Lee 
outfit.”168 Thus, Gifford sidestepped the negative evaluation of herself and free market 
optimism more broadly by pointing to shame’s opposite emotion—pride—in her charity 
work, her concern for humane production practices, and Wal-Mart’s swift action against 
sweatshops. These intentions and actions, she suggested, affirmed an optimistic attitude 
toward the market and its agents. 
Gifford also externalized blame for her discomfort by directly attacking 
Kernaghan. People may angrily attack others to defend themselves against shame’s 
painful self-evaluation.169 In Tangey and Dearing’s words, such “seething, bitter, 
resentful” externalization can be a powerful coping mechanism because blame’s 
“accompanying feelings of self-righteous anger can help the shamed person to regain 
some sense of agency and control.”170 Gifford scolded Kernaghan for “impugning my 
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integrity!” With squinted eyes and pursed lips, Gifford angrily said, “You can say I’m 
ugly. You can say I’m not talented.” Her words and delivery suggested that as a celebrity, 
she had grown resilient to criticism about her outward characteristics. Gifford then 
scolded Kernaghan as a righteous mother might reprimand a child who crossed 
boundaries of decency. Gifford lowered her eyebrows, leaned in toward the camera, and 
raised her voice. “But when you say I don’t care about children, and that I will exploit 
them for some sort of monetary gain,” she exclaimed with righteous anger, “for once, 
Mister, you better answer your phone because my attorney is calling you today.” Gifford 
punctuated her condemnation by throwing papers on the coffee table and exclaiming, 
“How dare you,” to which the audience responded with resounding applause.171 Gifford 
blamed her discomfort on Kernaghan’s infringement of decorum, suggesting that 
Kernaghan himself was avoiding consequences and that she was the activist’s righteous 
victim.  
Gifford’s dramatic public denial prompted subsequent investigation and coverage 
of Kernaghan’s accusations as news and tabloid media jumped at the chance to feature a 
dramatic confrontation between celebrity and activist. Media characterized Gifford’s 
monologue as “a blistering counteroffensive” against “an activist’s attack.”172 With such 
titles as “Kathie Lee Fights Back,” reports described Gifford as “defensive,” “angry,” and 
“mad as hell.”173 Further stoking the flames of a dramatic clash meant contextualizing 
Gifford’s outburst with Kernaghan’s charges and soliciting his response. For instance, 
New York’s Daily News provided such contextualization and rebuttal: “Labor activist 
Charles Kernaghan, who stirred the controversy Monday when he told a congressional 
committee that children and pregnant women had sewn clothes for the Kathie Lee 
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Gifford Collection, said yesterday he was disappointed by her response. ‘Doesn’t she care 
that abuses were done to make clothes that bear her name?’ he asked.”174 In this example, 
Kernaghan’s question explicitly charged Gifford with callously pursuing her self-
realization by marketing “clothes that bear her name” through “abuses” perpetrated on 
vulnerable producers. This shame suggested that free market optimism’s promise of 
peaceful prosperity did not apply to the global producer class. Such coverage sustained 
attention to the shameful dimensions of production by re-iterating charges and allowing 
Kernaghan to overtly shame Gifford about her defensive response.  
Other media coverage mirrored this example’s form, in which Kernaghan openly 
shamed Gifford’s response. For example, The Philadelphia Inquirer reported that 
Kernaghan “rejected Gifford’s demand for an apology, saying ‘the real victims are the 
children.’”175 This statement re-cast Gifford’s self-focused defense as further reason for 
shame, dampening any enjoyment that Gifford’s righteous anger may have engendered. 
Kernaghan’s words exposed Gifford as manufacturing her own victimhood, instead of 
focusing on what he considered the “real” victims—the young producer class. The 
Atlanta Journal and Constitution also depicted Kernaghan openly shaming Gifford and 
her corporate partners for pursuing their self-realization on the backs of the vulnerable; 
“Kathie Lee and Wal-Mart can’t go into a country and exploit children and then walk 
away,” the paper reported him saying. “Kathie Lee and Wal-Mart owe those children.”176 
The coverage cast Kernaghan as the judging other who would continue to shame Gifford 
until she accepted responsibility for children of the global producer class.  
Media coverage constituted this situation as a pressing shameful controversy. 
Several media outlets explicitly referred to the allegations and denial as a 
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“controversy.”177 The Daily News published a story in which a reporter accosted Gifford 
with Kernaghan’s charges, asking “if she would speak out against hellish sweatshops.”178 
As a paper known for pursuing “hard-hitting coverage of public issues” with a 
“titillating” bent, the very fact that the Daily News pursued this story constructed it as a 
controversy.179 True to the paper’s form, the story showed a reporter asking Gifford 
provocative questions in a sensationalized investigative style, which positioned the 
reporter and the viewer as enthusiastic partners in the search for the truth behind celebrity 
endorsement and sweatshops.180 The story covered Gifford stumbling over her responses 
to the allegations: “No…We’re thinking about it. I’m not really sure yet.” The reporter 
pressed on, asking “if she felt any anguish over children being paid 31 cents an hour to 
sew garments bearing her name,” to which “Gifford started to say, ‘No, I don’t . . .’ But 
before she could finish, her husband, Frank, interrupted the interview by grabbing a 
reporter’s arm and snapping, ‘She said everything she’s going to say.’” This emotionally-
charged account constructed the situation as a controversy by showing two oppositional 
perspectives—Kernaghan’s and Gifford’s—and by suggesting that the situation merited 
an investigation by a reporter working in the public interest. Furthermore, the story 
steeped the controversy in shame by showing the Giffords on the defensive, forcefully 
rejecting both Kernaghan’s allegations and the reporter’s request for answers.  
Primetime Live—a popular national television program—also constructed the 
sweatshop allegations as a shameful controversy when it featured an interview with 
Gifford on May 22.181 As a news magazine show, Primetime Live offered audiences 
longer coverage than standard newscasts, delivered in a documentary style that implied 
an ethos of investigative reporting.182 Interviewing Gifford on the show contributed to the 
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controversial nature of the sweatshop allegations because news magazine shows tend to 
broadcast, in Sarah R. Stein’s words, “stories that feature a dramatic urgency” that are 
“built around conflicts” and induce a “sense of outrage.”183  
The May 22 show generated shameful controversy by introducing Gifford as “a 
woman in the heat of the spot-light” and characterizing her as a “lightning rod.”184 
Reporter Cynthia McFadden told Gifford and audiences, “I used to think the world was 
divided into dog and cat people and I now come to understand that it’s divided into 
people who love Kathie Lee Gifford and who hate Kathie Lee Gifford.” Characterizing 
Gifford in these ways constructed a public debate over Gifford’s persona. McFadden 
reiterated Kernaghan’s charges on air and asked Gifford to respond to them, modeling an 
oppositional dialogue. McFadden reminded Gifford that she had “been accused of being a 
hypocrite, of saying that you care about children and yet of exploiting children to make 
your clothing line.” Gifford again responded by defending herself and attacking activists, 
again performing common reactions to shame on a popular television program, this time 
as a guest. Gifford asserted that critics “don’t know me. They don’t know the 20-plus 
years I’ve been working for children.” Constructing herself as a victim of critics’ attacks, 
she remembered, “I felt like I was being- of all people, being kicked in the teeth for- for 
trying to help kids.” Recalling how her son heard the allegations, Gifford turned again on 
Kernaghan, demanding, “how dare he make my own child question my integrity?” 
McFadden and Gifford’s back and forth constructed the shameful controversy, with the 
reporter taking Kernaghan’s perspective on Gifford’s character to challenge Gifford into 
publicly confronting such allegations. 
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Constructing the situation as a controversy also meant circulating information that 
could enable people to judge which side—Gifford or Kernaghan—should legitimately 
feel ashamed. The controversy thus drew attention to production practices, as reporters, 
activists, and Gifford’s team moved to blame someone or something for the 
uncomfortable emotions attaching to consumption and entrepreneurship. This coverage 
exposed the global marketing-production chain and imbued it with shame.  
Stories constructed celebrities as marketing agents located primarily in the 
consuming world and corporations as manufacturing agents that bridged the consuming 
world with the producing one. The Philadelphia Inquirer covered Gifford’s lawyer 
Ronald Konecky insisting that Gifford was not involved in the production end and was 
“‘totally unaware’ of factory conditions.”185 New York’s Daily News reported Konecky 
saying “that Gifford helps design the clothes but leaves it to Wal-Mart to find a 
manufacturer.”186 These stories showed a disconnect between marketing and production, 
and they began to bridge this chasm by co-articulating these practices in a reporting 
project that mapped relations of production and marketing.  
Reports expanded the coverage of production by showing that many corporations 
contracted with the producing world. The Washington Post explained that “Kathie Lee is 
not alone” in having “her Wal-Mart clothing line” produced overseas.187 The story listed 
some of the “plenty of other popular U.S. clothing retailers” who “rely on such factories 
around the world”: The Gap in El Salvador, JC Penny’s in Haiti, Nike in Indonesia, and 
Sears in Bangladesh. An Associated Press story that was published by several local 
newspapers co-articulated Gifford and the owner of her show’s broadcasting station, The 
Walt Disney Company. The story reported that in addition to Gifford’s overseas 
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production, Disney clothing “turned up” during the NLC’s “tour of Haitian plant.”188 
Harnessing the investigative impetus of the “controversy” frame, these stories offered a 
wider context to the Gifford story, articulating the global chain of production.  
These stories attached classed shame to this chain by suggesting that celebrities 
and corporations privileged their self-realization over peaceful prosperity. Stories 
publicized Kernaghan’s shaming words, writing that “Kernaghan said Wal-Mart took 
care of” the sweatshop issue “by moving the operation to Nicaragua, where conditions 
are even more repressive and the wages are even lower” than in Honduras.189 This 
narrative suggested that the Wal-Mart corporation only acted to escape bad publicity, as 
evidenced by locating production in areas with worse records of sweatshop practices. The 
Washington Post expanded such allegations beyond Gifford and Wal-Mart by publishing 
the working conditions for members of the producing world who created other popular 
commodities for the consuming world. For example, The Gap reportedly paid “56 cents 
an hour” to workers at the “Mandarin International Factory” in El Salvador, which 
employed “100 workers ages 14-17,” and Nike contracted production to “Pou Chen 
Complex” in Indonesia, which offered a wage of “17 cents an hour” and allegedly 
engaged in “intimidation of protesting workers.”190 Publicizing these conditions halted 
marketing exuberance over self-realization by exposing production practices as revoking 
the promise of peaceful prosperity. These stories re-cast bourgeois self-realization as 
exploitation. 
Media coverage amplified Kernaghan’s calls for celebrities and corporations to 
“do the right thing.”191 Psychologists have referred to shame as a “moral” emotion 
because it manages people’s interaction with the social world and its expectations.192 In 
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this case, stories featured Kernaghan, as judging other, prescribing the moral action: 
merging self-realization and peaceful prosperity in ways that could benefit people in the 
producing world alongside those in the consuming world. For example, The Philadelphia 
Inquirer quoted Kernaghan calling on Gifford to “clean up this place,” and The Atlanta 
Journal and Constitution reported, “He wants the popular TV star to tour the factories in 
Central America and bring more attention to foreign sweatshops to help improve working 
conditions.”193 USA Today and New York’s Daily News quoted Kernaghan asking 
Gifford to “come with us and take a look with her own eyes” to “see what conditions are 
like at these plants.”194 In these ways, media coverage publicized Kernaghan’s 
prescription for moral action: the authentic pursuit of global self-realization and peaceful 
prosperity through witnessing and advocating for vulnerable members of the producing 
world. 
Reports widely circulated the shameful marketing-production chain in various 
fora, implicating a variety of audiences in the classed shame. Newspaper and magazine 
stories about the marketing-production controversy appeared in multiple sections 
including News, Lifestyle, Features, Style, Gossip, and Movies among others.195 
Coverage also circulated on television news as well as tabloid and entertainment 
television programs.196 This controversy over production and marketing thus co-
articulated economics, politics, and entertainment, suggesting that everyone’s life in the 
consuming world was touched by the producing world. Although not explicitly centering 
consumers in the story, this classed shame began to implicate consumers by referring to 
common clothing brands and by inserting issues of production into entertainment 
commodities. The classed shame surrounding Gifford made its way into people’s homes 
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through their television sets, newspapers, and magazines, drawing audiences into the 
uncomfortable feelings attaching to self-realization in the free market. 
Transforming Class Shame into Class Guilt 
Although Gifford’s Primetime appearance mostly cultivated shame, the interview 
also apprehensively waded into the territory of guilt. As Tangney and Dearing explained, 
guilt refers to an emotion that, like shame, is a painful feeling that inhibits enjoyment.197 
Also like shame, guilt stems from a social infraction that prompts the person experiencing 
guilt to evaluate the self.198 Unlike shame, though, guilt prompts evaluation of the self’s 
behaviors rather than the person’s identity itself.199 Guilt centers on the effects of a 
transgression on others, and this emotion occurs on both individual and collective levels 
when someone or some group feels responsible for harming others.200 Nyla R. 
Branscombe, Ben Slugoski, and Diane M. Kappen argued that groups may feel guilt, 
instead of shame, if they perceive themselves as agents in the transgression and/or its 
outcome.201 These scholars defined collective guilt as the anxiety that accompanies a 
group’s acceptance of responsibility for illegitimate actions that have violated an 
accepted moral code.202 The extent to which groups feel guilt depends on social norms of 
assigning responsibility and deeming an action (un)justified.203 Both individual and 
collective guilt have tended to engender a desire to right the wrong in socially acceptable 
ways.204 From the Primetime interview on, the mediated Gifford controversy gradually 
transformed from a shameful episode to a performance of class guilt.  
Gifford explained in her Primetime interview that she had “been so upset” about 
the allegations that she was “announcing right now” that at her “own expense” she was 
starting her “own watchdog organization … who will be responsible for surprise visits 
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and regular inspections of every one of the twenty-four factories around the world” that 
manufactured “anything that bears my name.” 205 Gifford momentarily accepted 
Kernaghan’s prescription for ameliorative action, implicitly taking a modicum of 
responsibility for production before again attacking Kernaghan as someone concerned 
with his “own agenda” rather than “the exploitation that’s taking place.” Gifford again 
vacillated between postures of responsibility and self-defense when McFadden showed 
Gifford a picture “of some of the children” that Kernaghan “says were working in this 
factory.” McFadden explained that Kernaghan planned to bring “the little girl in the front 
row, who’s now fifteen…to New York. He wants to know whether or not you would 
meet with this child.” Gifford responded, “Absolutely, I would meet with this child. I’d 
meet with any child. Absolutely. But Cynthia, you do know that he could take any picture 
of any child and put something on the bottom.”  
These moments of oscillation performed on Primetime began the uneasy 
transformation of the controversy’s shame into guilt. At the beginning of this transition, 
the news and tabloid media established that a harm had been perpetrated abroad. For 
example, Nightline’s June 19 episode on sweatshops showed Kernaghan—a white, 
middle-aged man in glasses and a suit—explaining that overseas sweatshops harmed 
“minors, between twelve and fifteen.”206 A large black and white photograph propped up 
behind him showed more than a dozen children of color posing for a solemn picture in 
which their unsmiling, direct gazes confronted the viewer with their existence. These 
serious “minors” offered implicit evidence for Kernaghan’s charge of harm. The Los 
Angeles Times reported Kernaghan’s organizing work, narrating his surreptitious meeting 
with “a dozen or so workers” who were “huddled behind a roadside grocery stand, 
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attempting secrecy” so that they would not face retribution from their abusive bosses.207 
Media also featured Wendy Diaz, a 15-year-old Honduran sweatshop worker who 
Kernaghan brought to the United States to testify about her experiences of abuse. 
Nightline showed images of Diaz—a young woman of color with a lightly freckled face, 
big dark eyes, and with her hair in a modest, long, dark pony tail—as she testified to a 
Congressional committee and in subsequent interviews. Speaking in Spanish, with an 
English translation, Diaz was shown saying, “Conditions are very bad. We’re shouted at. 
Some of us are hit.” 208 Diaz was also shown describing the long days—“we work until 
7:00 at night almost the entire year. Sometimes we get out at 9:00 P.M.”—and the 
constant intimidation: “If you speak up, you can be sure you will lose your job.”209 The 
Los Angeles Times described Diaz as “effortlessly pitiable. An orphan who helps support 
three younger brothers, she has a weary but hopeful face that seems ennobled by 
poverty.”210 Drawing on neo-colonial discourses, media portrayals constituted these 
brown, young, Third World women—for whom Diaz stood as synecdoche—as the 
vulnerable producing class that was being victimized at work.  
Reports showed that this classed harm was also being perpetrated in the United 
States. Immediately after the Giffords’ Primetime interview, the Giffords learned from a 
Daily News reporter that “Just three subway stops from her TV studio, workers at one of 
the worst sweatshop buildings in New York have just finished making 50,000 Kathie Lee 
Gifford blouses.”211 These charges sent reporters to investigate the harm lurking in 
domestic sweatshops, and reports circulated depictions of classed abuse located in New 
York City. For example, CBS’ Eye on America accompanied “New York labor 
investigators” into “the heart of New York’s Chinatown down a narrow hallway, up six 
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flights of stairs” into “a classic sweatshop.”212 There, the camera showed a cramped, 
window-less cinderblock room, illuminated by harsh neon lights and littered with heaps 
of plastic, boxes, and fabric. The camera’s short-range shot focused on six Asian women 
sewing furiously at overcrowded stations cluttered with boxes and fabric. Another shot 
showed an Asian man in a black tank top pressing clothing in a quickly moving ironing 
machine, steam rising into the small fan near the machine. The camera then focused on 
one specific worker, who the reporter described as a “young girl, who tried to hide in the 
bathroom, who inspectors believe is underage.” On the screen, a large Asian man with 
missing fingers in a stained green t-shirt reluctantly opened a door. A young Asian 
woman stepped out from behind this door, wearing jeans and a t-shirt, smiling nervously 
and anxiously touching her neck. Similar images appeared across mediated sweatshop 
depictions, featuring people of color hunched over industrial sewing machines in 
cluttered, dirty rooms without windows.213 Again drawing on neocolonial discourses that 
mark people of color as dependents, the images’ racial, gendered, and aged dimensions 
mixed with depictions of their working conditions to visually characterize them as 
members of the vulnerable producing class. This time, though, Third World conditions 
were located squarely in one of the First World’s epicenters, challenging the idea that 
under-development was to blame for abusive labor practices.  
The news media began to attach responsibility for such harm to the First World’s 
self-realization imperative. Reports assessed, in ABC newscaster Ted Koppel’s words, 
“who’s to blame, and what to do” about what CBS anchor Peter Jennings called “The 
disgrace of American sweatshops.”214 Such assessments of responsibility meant co-
articulating sweatshop conditions with prominent agents of the neoliberalizing United 
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States: celebrities, corporations, and consumers. In assigning responsibility, media 
coverage enabled the transformation from shame to guilt by amplifying discourses of 
personal responsibility, corporate benevolence, and consumer agency. This guilt pointed 
to the limits of free market optimism by privileging social responsibility over free market 
expansion, and the circulation of this public emotion constituted potent, if limited, forms 
of antagonistic agency. 
Personal Responsibility 
Drawing on prevalent discourses of personal responsibility, news segments 
assigned liability to the celebrity whose face and name adorned the clothing produced in 
sweatshops. Reports co-articulated Gifford personally with the abuses that enabled her 
self-realization in the marketplace as an entrepreneur who encouraged commodity 
consumption. Gifford’s logo implicated her as a responsible party because it featured her 
smiling face as well as her signature. Stories suggested that Gifford’s logo signified 
ownership over all aspects of her clothing, inclusive of production. For example, ABC 
News showed a Gifford tag attached to a garment lying on a work station in a dismal 
production room. As the camera focused on Gifford’s smiling face and her signature, the 
newscaster reported that “a sewing shop here in New York violated labor laws producing 
her signature blouses.”215 NBC News showed images of Asian workers in a crowded 
cinderblock room with no windows or exits, as reporter Bob Kurr’s voice-over told 
audiences that “underpaid garment workers…make some of Kathie Lee’s line.”216 The 
Los Angeles Times explained that union organizers had found garments with “Kathie 
Lee’s contented face” on a tag in New York’s “Seo Fashions sweatshop.”217 Other media 
reports suggested that Gifford was responsible because she directly profited from the 
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exploitation of workers. For example, NBC News’ camera panned over seemingly 
endless racks replete with clothing whose tags featured Gifford’s smiling face. As the 
camera showed hundreds Gifford faces, the reporter’s voice-over argued that her clothing 
line had “meant big profits for Gifford.”218   
In a neoliberalizing milieu that encouraged people to see individuals as 
responsible agents in a world of opportunity, Gifford’s face, signature, and name implied 
that she, herself, was responsible for what she owned. The news reports co-articulated 
Gifford personally with the abused members of the producing class, thus suggesting that 
she had some responsibility over production. Juxtaposing the harmed producers with 
Gifford’s happy profit cultivated guilt by implying that Gifford’s pursuit of self-
realization in the marketplace had harmed vulnerable members of the producer class. 
Neoliberal discourses of personal responsibility suggested that Gifford should accept 
liability for what was hers. Furthermore, media reports implied that Gifford bore personal 
responsibility because she now knew that her clothing was manufactured in sweatshops 
and could no longer claim ignorance.219 Since free market optimism fostered an 
attachment to personal responsibility, media reports attributed some blame to Gifford 
personally as the self-realizing benefactor who was aware of sweatshop conditions. 
Beginning with Daily News’ May 23 story, the news and tabloid media narrated 
Gifford’s transformation from a shamed celebrity acting in self-defense to a guilty 
spokesperson taking personal responsibility for harming producers. 220 Stories began the 
narrative of transformation by publicizing Gifford’s original defensive stance. Nightline 
detailed how “At first, Kathie Lee acted like she wanted to sue the messenger,” as the 
news program re-played Gifford’s Live! outburst.221 The Los Angeles Times reported, 
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“For a while, Gifford’s instinct was to go on lashing back, and her TV show provided the 
luxury of rebuttal time.”222 In an interview on Larry King Live, Gifford recalled her initial 
reaction: “I remember being so stunned by the allegation that I was very angry about the 
way it was handled.”223  
After re-iterating her defensive posture, stories showed Gifford accepting personal 
responsibility for the harm enacted on vulnerable producers. Gifford and her husband 
publicly took such responsibility on May 22 when Gifford sent Frank to the New York 
City sweatshop to pay victimized workers.224 ABC News reported on May 25 that 
Gifford’s “husband Frank tried to make amends, showing up to give each worker a check 
for $300 in back pay.”225 On the screen, Frank handed out white envelopes saying, “Here 
you are sir” to a man of color who sat at a table in a cinderblock room with neon lighting. 
NBC News showed Frank saying, “They will be paid” at a make-shift news conference in 
a cinderblock sewing room. The camera zoomed in on Gifford’s burly, white hands, one 
finger adorned with a large ring, clutching onto white envelopes as the reporter narrated, 
“The Giffords recently brought envelopes of cash to underpaid garment workers in New 
York.”226 The St. Louis Dispatch reported that “Kathie Lee Gifford sent her sportscaster 
husband, Frank, to pay cash to sweatshop workers who…were underpaid for making 
blouses that carried her label.” The story quoted Frank saying, “There’s $300 in there, 
and I am really sorry” to “a 32-year-old illegal immigrant, who sobbed as he gave her the 
money.”227  
This public moment showed the Giffords taking personal responsibility for 
harming producers and featured them acting on their desire to personally remedy such a 
harm. In this episode, people saw celebrity embodiments of white, First World free 
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market optimism offering reparations to individual members of the vulnerable producing 
class. The juxtaposition between Frank’s bejeweled, white hands with envelopes of cash 
and a sobbing illegal immigrant woman accepting payment fostered classed guilt—the 
uncomfortable feeling that halted enjoying bourgeois pursuit of self-realization in the 
marketplace. This guilt suggested that such a pursuit was perpetuating harm on 
producers, who were marked as vulnerable by their working conditions and dimensions 
of their identities that designated them as victims in a neocolonial frame. The producers 
who presented as men could be understood as vulnerable because they were both 
producers working in terrible conditions and people of color, and this combination, from 
a neocolonial gaze, implied their limited agency. The producers who presented as women 
could be understood as even more vulnerable because their gender amplified the 
characteristics they shared with their male counterparts. Furthermore, some reports 
explicitly commented on the producers’ (illegal) immigrant status and others implied it 
with their depictions of workers as others, who either spoke limited or no English and 
presented as Latin American or Asian. These depictions furthered the guilt because they 
simultaneously suggested these workers’ vulnerability and the anxiety over white 
people’s disappearing manufacturing jobs. Media coverage of this episode cultivated 
personal classed guilt around market self-fulfillment because it showed the wealthy Frank 
making personal reparations to individual aggrieved producers. 
The Los Angeles Times publicized the Giffords’ guilt in stories that demonstrated 
the couple’s concern about and desire to remedy the harm for which they accepted 
personal responsibility.228 The paper reported that Gifford “educated herself in private” 
about “the prevalence of sweatshops,” and that the couple met with Secretary of Labor 
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Robert Reich, who “was impressed by their questions” and “thought his listeners were 
‘genuinely appalled’ by all they heard.”229 The story narrated the Giffords’ eagerness to 
right their wrong, reporting that when Reich asked, “Will you help us?” the Giffords 
responded, “By all means.”230 This story—and others like it—facilitated a shift from 
shame to guilt by moving away from negatively judging Gifford’s character toward 
focusing on how her actions could mirror her moral character. As Wendy Diaz said in the 
story, “If she’s good, she’ll help us.”231 This aspect of the coverage focused on Gifford’s 
personal involvement and her ability to bring her actions and character into alignment in 
the eyes of individual producers like Diaz and individual officials like Reich. 
Having established the Giffords’ discomfort and desire for redemption, stories 
focused on Gifford taking personal responsibility for a structural issue. Eye on America 
re-broadcast a moment from Live! in which Gifford said that her experience with 
sweatshops taught her that “It’s obvious that this is a pervasive problem.”232 Reports 
showed Gifford accepting responsibility by working with government officials to fight 
abusive labor practices. ABC News depicted Gifford testifying in Congress, the star 
sitting behind a desk with a microphone, wearing a light pink and white blazer, her 
voluminous blond hair framing her made-up face as she spoke to people situated just 
above her. The reporter narrated the scene: “On Capitol Hill today television co-host 
Kathie Lee Gifford…came to lobby for a child labor bill.”233 NBC News featured a close-
up shot of Gifford at the Congressional testimony, her glossed pink lips lightly quivering 
as she read her testimony, at times tentatively looking up from her paper at the 
Congressional audience. “This is what I’ve come to believe. That every one of us from 
the entertainer, the sports figure, whomever, who lends their name…has an obligation to 
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know how and why a garment was made.”234 Stories also depicted Gifford working with 
other government officials to eliminate domestic sweatshops. NBC News showed Gifford 
in a light peach colored suit, nodding her perfectly coifed blond hair and pursing her 
glossed lips as she stood behind Reich at a press conference. The reporter told audiences, 
“she appeared with Labor Secretary Reich to call for more oversight of sweatshop 
operations.”235 USA Today reported that the Giffords “appeared with New York Governor 
George Pataki” when he announced “legislation to ban the sale of apparel made by 
exploited workers.”236  
These stories co-articulated Gifford’s personal responsibility with government 
oversight. Such an articulation harnessed the neoliberal personal responsibility imperative 
to circulate guilt around a classed harm that was perpetuated on a structural level. The 
structural level was made legible by Gifford’s admission of the scope of the problem and 
by her partnering with governmental agencies to take sufficient action. Overwhelmed by 
the prevalence of sweatshops, yet prodded by the discomfort of her having perpetuated 
harm, Gifford was shown turning to government agencies as her way of enacting personal 
responsibility for harm. Gifford’s mediated performance of guilt and personal 
responsibility thus implicated the systemic production-marketing-profit chain, 
interrupting a systemic enjoyment of self-realization in the marketplace by suggesting 
that if she was personally responsible, so were other actors.  
Unlike shame, guilt offered future enjoyment and approval as rewards for 
correcting harmful behaviors.237 The Giffords enjoyed such public approval from 
multiple agents who applauded their taking personal responsibility. On May 25, ABC 
News reported labor officials saying that Frank’s wage reparation was a “remedy” and “a 
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step in the right direction.”238 The Philadelphia Inquirer detailed how “labor-rights 
advocates, including Labor Secretary Robert B. Reich, welcomed the spotlight Gifford 
brings.” 239 The story quoted “Jeff Ballinger of Press for Change, a nonprofit consumer 
education group” celebrating Gifford as a “gift from heaven” who “stepped up” and 
showed “a lot of integrity.” The same report commented on admirations Gifford received 
in Congress, including the “verbal bouquets from Rep. James P. Moran (D., Va.), who 
likened her to Gandhi.” Gifford’s acceptance of responsibility transformed classed shame 
into guilt, and her public performance of this emotion promised redemption if appropriate 
actions were taken. 
The episodes detailing Gifford’s acceptance of personal responsibility constituted 
several actors as guilt-tripping agents and challenged the market’s claim to peaceful 
prosperity. Media reports constructed labor activists like Kernaghan, Department of 
Labor (DOL) Officials like Reich, and Third-World workers like Diaz as agents who had 
moved Gifford into taking personal responsibility. As the Los Angeles Times explained, 
“Three crusaders—a gadfly zealot, a garment-makers union, the U.S. secretary of 
Labor—all have skillfully made Gifford a conscript in their anti-sweatshop 
campaigns.”240 White, male government officials and labor activists and an underage 
foreign worker emerged as agents capable of proscribing harmful action, prescribing 
remedial compensation, and praising a return to the moral fold. Gifford’s acceptance of 
personal responsibility within a structural framework demonstrated that, if left to its own 
devises, the market would not provide peaceful prosperity to producers. Her mediated 
acceptance of personal responsibility and the subsequent applause she received for it 
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privileged social responsibility over market freedom and demonstrated that the market 
was an insufficient mechanism for acting responsibly. 
Corporate Benevolence 
When stories showed Gifford taking personal responsibility for sweatshop harm 
and enjoying applause for such action, Gifford herself became a guilt-tripping agent who 
showed that market redemption was possible for celebrity endorsers and corporations. 
Gifford could be simultaneously understood as an individual and the personal face of a 
corporation because she was a celebrity and a brand name whose commodities were 
being sold by corporations; Wal-mart sold her clothing in stores, and Disney sold her 
personality on television. The Chicago Tribune depicted Gifford at an August White 
House sweatshop summit, where President Clinton praised Gifford, saying “She didn’t 
bury her head in the sand” when confronted with sweatshop revelations.241 Baltimore’s 
The Daily Record showed Gifford joining her guilt-tripping government counterpart 
Reich in calling on “national retailers, manufacturers and celebrities” to “demand that the 
industry accept the moral responsibility for ending Third World working conditions in the 
most prosperous nation on earth.”242 ABC News reported that labor officials “worry these 
conditions” for which Gifford accepted responsibility “will continue until retailers are 
held directly accountable.”243 Such mediated calls for corporate social responsibility 
harnessed free market optimism’s promise of corporate benevolence to assign 
responsibility for sweatshop harm to corporations.  
Stories reported that corporations had privileged profits over laws and morality. 
Eye on America’s Peter Jennings framed the program’s sweatshop investigation by 
saying that the shops’ prevalence could be explained when “you start tallying the dollars 
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and cents involved in an industry where increasingly it seems the right thing and the legal 
thing is [sic] often side swept by a drive for profits.”244 Nightline featured Kernaghan 
saying that the Gifford controversy was part of “this scheme of the multinationals 
jumping from country to country to country, in search of starvation wages.”245 The same 
episode interviewed investigative journalist Sydney Schanberg who reported that 
“companies are going to those nation states because labor is cheap, and the cheapest labor 
of all is child labor.” He added, “Children are not only cheapest, but they’re the least 
complaining, the most malleable of workers.” USA Today reported on “Secretary Robert 
Reich’s pledge to name names of manufacturers violating labor laws.”246  
These stories implied that corporations’ drive for profits over social welfare was 
an illegitimate action—a charge that made sense in a milieu that featured both 
manufacturing anxieties and free market optimism. This condemnation of profits was 
made legible by the familiar anxieties over manufacturing that Kernaghan explicitly 
voiced on Nightline when he said that retail corporations were “asking the U.S. 
manufacturer, the U.S. contractor, to meet the same prices that they pay offshore, which 
is impossible. You can’t do that legally.”247 This charge of illegitimacy only made sense 
as a moral breach because of neoliberal market optimism that encouraged people to see 
corporations as benevolent agents of peaceful prosperity and widespread self-realization. 
In other words, the free market had set up the expectation for corporate social 
responsibility by promising economic abundance for all in a free market system led by 
benevolent corporations. Thus, market optimism made it possible to assign responsibility 
for sweatshop harm to corporations. 
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Further drawing on a neoliberal celebration of corporate agency, reports 
publicized the DOL’s argument that corporations should be responsible for conditions 
because they were primary social actors. ABC News reported that government officials 
did not have enough resources to crack down on sweatshops, “So, the DOL has asked 
retailers to police themselves.”248 The Washington Post detailed how “The Labor 
Department says it can’t” go after the sweatshop problem “with only 800 federal 
inspectors and a few hundred at the state level for the entire industry.”249 Thus, “Reich 
wants American retailers to take responsibility because he says they are the real power 
brokers in the garment industry.”250  
Assigning such responsibility to corporations made sense in a neoliberal milieu 
that trusted private enterprise more than government regulation. The DOL’s statements 
harnessed these discourses to explicitly argue that corporations were responsible for 
ameliorating the harm that they had knowingly perpetrated. Eye on America showed 
Reich, a middle-aged white man in a suit, positioned in front of an American flag, giving 
the reporter a knowing smile saying, “Some of the big retailers have buyers who know 
very well what’s going on.”251 In these ways, reports constructed the government as a 
guilt-tripping actor who could prod corporations into doing “the right thing.”252 
Corporations, in turn, were constructed as powerful agents who were expected to take 
social responsibility for ensuring peaceful prosperity. 
Similar to Gifford’s mediated transformation, news media showed corporations 
first resisting responsibility for harming producers. ABC News reported, “Retailers say 
they should not be expected to do the government’s job of enforcing the law and defend 
themselves by saying they don’t knowingly buy goods from sweatshops.”253 As a reporter 
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narrated this response, viewers saw people shopping in retail stores and then sweatshop 
inspectors going through the familiar cramped, industrial hovels. These images, 
combined with the verbal reporting, suggested that retail corporations shirked 
responsibility for the sweatshops now in plain sight. Nightline’s reporter Dave Maresh 
stood in front of a Disney’s busy Times Square store reporting that, “Industry spokesman 
Robert Hall says it’s not the retailer’s responsibility…even though they’re the ones who 
contract out these product lines to the manufacturers.”254 The imagery suggested that 
corporations, like Disney, were neglecting the responsibility that came with capitalist 
success, a claim legitimated by the presence of an investigative reporter. The program’s 
anchor Ted Koppel opened the episode’s interview segment announcing “first of all, who 
won’t be joining us tonight. We invited, but they won't be coming, representatives from 
Nike, Reebok, and the Sporting Goods Manufacturers Association.”255 Such a 
pronouncement suggested that these corporations were neglecting their duty as primary 
social agents. 
Also similar to Gifford’s transformation, this initial denial of responsibility drew 
investigative attention to how commodities were produced and retail power consolidated 
in a neoliberalizing world. Nightline’s Maresh told audiences, “Reebok, contracts to 
several plants in China, while making soccer balls in Pakistan…Nike, makes shoes in 
Indonesia, and soccer balls in Pakistan.”256 On the screen, people saw a digitized map 
with outlines of these countries, stamped by the logos of the corporations that contracted 
labor in them. Maresh also detailed how “some U.S. suppliers…subcontract to 
sweatshops” while the camera showed a woman of color bent over a sewing machine, 
guiding fabric through a noisy machine in a cramped room stacked with clothing.257 The 
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New York Times reported how Gifford’s clothing ended up in Seo, the NYC sweatshop; 
the “Alabama company” with which Wal-Mart signed a contract “‘sub-contracted’ part of 
the order to New Jersey-based Universal Apparel, which in turn sub-sub-subcontracted to 
Seo – both typical transactions in the garment business.”258 The Washington Post argued 
that because “Retailing power has become increasingly concentrated…Retailers are the 
forces of pressure on manufacturers and … have helped to set consumer expectations 
about cost and availability.”259 These reports cultivated guilt around corporate self-
realization, as they characterized corporate maneuvers as power plays that allowed 
companies to profit from production practices that were causing widespread anxiety—
namely, overseas manufacturing and sweatshop labor. These stories also challenged the 
optimistic promise of peaceful prosperity by linking corporations’ prosperity with 
visceral depictions of inequality. 
Like Gifford’s narrative of transformation, news media showed retail corporations 
and their representatives eventually accepting responsibility and taking ameliorative 
action. On Nightline, Robert Hall, a spokesman for a retail organization, first acted 
defensively, saying that retailers could not be expected to do government’s work. In an 
interview session toward the end of the broadcast, Hall pivoted this position, saying 
“retailers are taking responsible action” in the form of “monitoring programs.”260 USA 
Today explained that “In the wake of the Kathie Lee Gifford sweatshop furor, the 
nation’s biggest retail chains are scrambling” to avoid using sweatshop labor.261 The 
Washington Post reported that these retailers met with guilt-tripping agents—including 
Reich and Gifford—at the White House to “broker an agreement that would have the 
companies taking special measures to ensure that their products were not made in 
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‘sweatshop’ conditions.”262 Again like Gifford’s actions, these admissions of guilt 
received praise from guilt-tripping agents. New York’s Daily News quoted Gifford’s 
“spokesman” as saying that “The system is beginning to prove that it can be effective in 
shutting down sweatshops,” lauding corporations for embracing their role as benevolent 
actors in the marketplace.263 
Corporations thus emerged from the controversy as agents that responded in 
laudable ways to their guilt. Although this construction of corporate benevolence 
bolstered free market optimism’s celebration of private enterprise, it elevated social 
responsibility—as directed by government officials and labor activists—over market 
freedom. This construction challenged the unfettered market’s capacity to usher in 
peaceful prosperity by depicting the government, activists, and the media as instrumental 
moral evaluators who could condemn actions and prescribe ameliorative action. 
Consumer Agency 
Drawing on neoliberal discourses of consumer agency, news reports assigned 
responsibility for harming producers to the consumers who demanded self-realization in 
the marketplace. As The Washington Post reported, “consumers want cheap fashion. 
They want the hot style this season, not next year,” and so “manufacturers are pressured 
for a fast turnaround on a hot item” and “turn to subcontractors for help in meeting 
deadlines.”264 ABC News assigned visual responsibility to consumers by showing images 
of shoppers combing through overflowing racks of clothing as the voice-over narrated 
retailers’ reluctance to “police themselves.”265 These images suggested that retailers were 
merely responding to consumer demand for clothing choices. Eye on America’s reporter 
lamented that “the outrage” over sweatshops “never seems to last for long” because “the 
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consumer” moves on and “buys her next outfit or his next pair of sneakers.” 266 As the 
reporter spoke, audiences could see groups of women of color stuffing shoes on a 
cramped assembly line and then a single woman hunched over a sewing machine 
surrounded by boxes.  
Stories also suggested that consumers were responsible for sweatshop harm 
because they relentlessly sought commodified self-realization at a bargain price. Eye on 
America asked, “what about the consumer?” 267 Answering this question, a voice-over 
claimed, “Many in the industry say shoppers will not pay more to end sweatshops,” while 
on the screen, several white women were shown looking through department store racks 
replete with clothing. Nightline introduced its sweatshop segment with images of young 
girls of color sewing in poorly lit, cramped rooms and a reporter’s voice-over saying, 
“Tonight, the real cost of a good deal.”268 On the same program, Ted Koppel told 
audiences that “those of us who buy the products… pay very little attention to where and 
how those products are manufactured, as long as we feel that we’re getting a bargain.” 
This bargain-hunting “is, of course, what encourages the manufacturers to search out the 
lowest-paid hourly workers, wherever in the world they may be.”269 The Los Angeles 
Times quite bluntly aimed responsibility at First World consumers when they named “the 
consumer, grown used to bargain shopping at national chains” as “The great beneficiary” 
of the “ruthless machinery” of the “sweatshop” in which “garments could be sewn ever-
more cheaply” in “filthy, fly-by-night rag shops that paid paltry—and sometimes sub-
minimum—wages.” Simply put, consumer “savings could be indirectly traced to 
exploited workers in America and abroad.”270  
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News media thus suggested that First World consumers shared in the sweatshop 
blame because they demanded abundant and inexpensive commodities such that their 
appetite for market self-realization at a bargain price drove corporations to harm 
producers. This characterization of consumer agency cultivated classed guilt because it 
impeded consumers’ bargain-shopping enjoyment by co-articulating consumerist 
pleasure with producer suffering. Media reports circulated the sense that First World 
shopping contained within it inadvertent violence directed toward innocent producers, 
imbuing the activity with an anxious responsibility for having caused this illegitimate 
harm. 
Stories depicted guilt-tripping agents directing this consumer guilt toward 
ameliorative action. On ABC News, DOL officials urged consumers to “become more 
educated about the extent of the problem,” and The Los Angeles Times upheld Gifford as 
an example, quoting her as saying “It has been a real education for me…I hope not just 
for me, but for every American who goes shopping.’”271 News media also publicized 
calls for consumers to “demand accountability from clothing makers and sellers” through 
inquiry and shopping habits.272 The Washington Post publicized the DOL’s “consumer-
oriented ‘No Sweat’ campaign” that prompted “consumers to ask retailers where clothes 
were made, whether the retailer independently monitors the contractors that make their 
goods and whether the retailer supports the ‘No Sweat’ campaign with a public 
commitment not to buy sweatshop goods.”273 An editorial for Florida’s St. Petersburg 
Times argued that in addition to asking questions, “consumers also have the power to stop 
these companies by not purchasing their products.”274 Media reports circulated these 
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ways of channeling consumer guilt into forms of action that were sanctioned by 
prominent sweatshop guilt-trippers like the DOL and Gifford herself.  
Although media reports did not depict consumers taking such ameliorative action 
during the Gifford controversy, stories later suggested that the controversy engendered 
consumer guilt that translated into anti-sweatshop purchasing and organizing behavior. 
Several months after Gifford appeared at the White House, The Philadelphia Inquirer 
reported that “The high-profile Gifford is the one who churned up all this attention” about 
“sweatshops” causing a “groundswell of similar movements.”275 The next fall, The 
Washington Post Style writer Amy Brecount explained, “With all the hoopla about 
Kathie Lee Gifford and Wal-Mart last year, the issue of sweatshops here and abroad 
surfaced in the consumer consciousness.” 276 Brecount went on to recount the many ways 
that “one lone consumer, really” could do to combat sweatshops, including joining a fair 
trade organization, asking where and how products were made, and only buying items not 
produced in sweatshops.  
These media reports publicized a simultaneously potent and limited form of 
agency for consumers in a neoliberalizing age. Consumers were understood as primary 
agents operating under free market optimism, and in this case, mediated classed guilt 
challenged consumers to learn how their self-realization in the marketplace implicated 
exploitative production practices. This guilt antagonized free market optimism’s promise 
to consumers that their apolitical purchases could fulfill them personally and spread 
peaceful prosperity globally. Instead, the guilt politicized purchasing, suggesting that 
consumers could again enjoy the marketplace if they learned about the systemic class 
structures that undergirded consumption and then chose products that privileged social 
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responsibility. This kind of antagonistic agency was potent because it took a primary 
agentic identity of the marketplace—the consumer—and pivoted it toward politics. As 
potent as it was in its milieu, this kind of agency was limited because it reified the 
neoliberal subjectivity of the individual consumer and the possibility of redemption in the 
marketplace. Still, in its limited way, this construction encouraged consumers to 
politicize their consumption by orienting it toward social responsibility and away from 
the unfettered market.  
Conclusion 
After decades of inattention, the 1996 Gifford controversy catapulted sweatshops 
back into mainstream U.S. consciousness. This controversy exposed the conditions of 
production that undergirded bourgeois life, like the exposés from the United States’ 
period of industrialization, including Jacob Riss’ How the Other Half Lives (1890) and 
newspaper coverage of the Triangle Shirtwaist Factory fire (1911). Similar to exposés at 
the turn of the previous century, the Gifford controversy interrupted bourgeois enjoyment 
by permeating it with discomfort. During the Gifford affair, the news media nearly tripled 
its coverage of production practices, and sweatshops sustained significant coverage for 
years afterward.277 Such public consciousness gave rise to various initiatives and 
movements, including a Presidential task force on employment standards and a swell of 
anti-sweatshop activity at the grassroots level.278 Furthermore, discourses negotiating the 
“sweatshop” dimension of the free market have proliferated widely since 1996.279 This 
debate would ultimately take three routes: one focused on persuading corporations and 
vendors to voluntarily ameliorate their practices, another pressured national and 
transnational regulatory agencies to enforce fairer labor standards, and a third pushed 
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individual consumers to shop ethically. Each track has had varying degrees of success, 
but the regulatory demands have been, for the most part, either stalled or ignored.280 
In this chapter, I argued that this controversy was potent because it interrupted the 
enjoyment of free market optimism, which is a discourse that fosters a hopeful 
attachment to liberal economics by promising that the market will bring peaceful 
prosperity to the world and self-realization to individuals. In the early-to-mid 1990s, this 
discourse encouraged societies to move toward neoliberal restructuring by promising 
social and personal fulfillment. These hopeful discourses fostered a tension between 
market freedom and social responsibility because they saddled liberal economics with the 
promise of fulfilling social desires.  
This chapter demonstrated that the Gifford controversy inhibited the pleasure of 
free market optimism by circulating shame and guilt—two related emotions that impede 
enjoyment. The mediated Gifford controversy circulated classed shame, then transformed 
it into classed guilt. Reports publicized Kernaghan’s charges, co-articulating Gifford’s 
character with the victimization of suffering producers. The news and tabloid media 
accelerated such coverage when Gifford responded to the allegations on air in a 
defensive, emotional outburst. Reports engaged an investigative ethos as they constructed 
a shameful controversy that drew attention to abusive production practices in the so-
called Third World. Eventually, news stories transformed the shame into guilt by 
harnessing neoliberal attachments to personal responsibility, corporate benevolence, and 
consumer agency. Audiences saw Gifford and corporations taking social responsibility 
for class harm and engaging in redemptive behavior. Stories also circulated classed guilt 
around consumers’ self-realization in the marketplace and encouraged them to also seek 
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redemption. The controversy interrupted the surging neoliberal articulation by privileging 
social responsibility over market freedom in ways that people could viscerally feel. It also 
crafted interconnected forms of agency that cast government officials, transnational 
activists, and redeemed offenders as moral evaluators. Ultimately, this episode 
challenged the unfettered market’s capacity to usher in peaceful prosperity. 
In this case, Gifford did not act as a scapegoat because she was not sacrificed to 
redeem the moral failings of global capitalism. Instead, activist texts and media reports 
articulated her as an embodiment of compassionate capitalism, and her redemption was 
held up as a model to prod other actors into redeeming the system. Gifford could act as 
synecdoche for compassionate capitalism because her market persona reified white 
bourgeois womanhood and its attendant social expectations: to act morally and to 
perform care for children and broader social welfare. Furthermore, publics could expect 
Gifford, as a woman, to be disciplined by male activists (Kernaghan and Reich) and to be 
moved into action by a suffering child (Diaz). Therefore, the Gifford episode suggests 
that capitalist womanhood can be quite susceptible to calls for antagonistic moral action 
because bourgeois women are often held to higher moral standards than masculine 
capitalists.  
Other scholars have rightfully pointed to the limits of the controversy’s foci and 
resolutions. Ethel C. Brooks argued that the episode’s privileging of First World agents 
focused “on branding and corporate citizenship, and in the end it left the garment workers 
to fend for themselves in an industry that had been changed very little despite the media 
frenzy surrounding the summer of the sweatshop.”281 Brooks demonstrated how 
government initiatives were not implemented successfully because they relied on 
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corporations to monitor their own operations, with no outside enforcement.282 Brooks 
argued that the controversy thus folded into the neoliberal narrative that privileges First 
World consumers, nation-states, and corporations as agents and celebrates individuals 
like Gifford instead of empowering workers to organize or governments to regulate.283 
Robert S.J. Ross similarly argued that government officials’ embrace of voluntary 
monitoring was an insufficient outcome because workers continue to have no power over 
their working conditions.284 Ross also maintained that consumer agency, particularly the 
agency to seek information about production practices, fell short by placing the onus on 
individual consumer choice.285  
These critiques are certainly accurate and my study, in part, supports these 
conclusions. However, this chapter also suggests that the Gifford controversy 
antagonized the neoliberal articulation in three main ways: it created discomfort around 
the free market’s hopeful promise, it pivoted neoliberal attachments and agents toward 
the political, and it amplified social responsibility over market freedom. These 
antagonisms were potent because they leveraged neoliberal attachments and 
identifications in ways that pointed to the limits of free market optimism, in effect 
showing that market freedom and social responsibility were uneasily attached in the most 
generous reading or, more radically, impossible to simultaneously pursue. The 
controversy suggested that one must often be jettisoned for the other to thrive. Therefore, 
rhetorically, this controversy constituted an antagonism that was legible as a 
denouncement of neoliberalism because it participated in dominant discourses and then 
pivoted them toward critique. 
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Beyond this judgment, the Gifford case study has four major implications. First, it 
demonstrates that shame and guilt can be wielded as antagonistic public emotions 
because both emotions inhibit the enjoyment that is inherent in ideological structures. 
People participate in systems, in part, because they are drawn to the enjoyment a system 
offers or promises to provide in the future.286 Shame and guilt both offer opportunities for 
impeding such enjoyment in ways that feel very personal because these emotions 
implicate individuals in social norms. Both have been called “moral emotions” because 
they evaluate a person/group or their actions while also negotiating social expectations.287 
Guilt prompts people and groups to assign responsibility for harmful actions, thus 
prompting them to evaluate social constructions of harm and agency. This case study also 
demonstrated that guilt offers the promise of future enjoyment and approval as rewards 
for correcting harmful behaviors and that agents who experience guilt can pass it on to 
others.  
Second, this case study demonstrates that the partition of the globe into “First” 
and “Third” worlds offers an opportunity to antagonize neoliberalism by foregrounding 
class in a globalized world. This case study showed how discourses implicitly 
constructed class by amplifying neocolonial discourses that blend race, gender, age, and 
occupation to construct classed worlds: the “First” as a world of exchange and agency 
and the “Third” as one of production and victimization. This move is clearly problematic, 
particularly when it comes to constructions of agency that translate into a felt 
responsibility for the First World to “save” the Third World through interventions. 
However, in the Gifford case, these worlds were co-articulated with shame and guilt, 
allowing a global understanding of class to challenge the neoliberal articulation. This 
	 188 
challenge was particularly potent when “Third World” conditions were exposed in the 
“First World,” thus interrupting the sense that under-development led to abuse; instead, 
the First World’s impetus to profit and consumption assumed some responsibility for 
class differentiation. This construction challenged the neoliberal articulation’s 
construction of profit, deregulation, and the free flow of global capital as heralds of 
human progress.288  
Third, the Gifford controversy shows the power and limitations of antagonistic 
agency in a neoliberal world.  Labor activists, government officials, and a redeemed 
celebrity emerged from this controversy as prominent judgmental others who assessed 
modes of bourgeois self- fulfillment and peaceful prosperity. To a lesser extent, Diaz, the 
15-year old Honduran sweatshop worker, also played the role of judgmental other, 
though she was often cast as an accompaniment to the more prominent First World 
agents.  In moments of shaming, the judgmental other denounces someone or something 
as fraudulent, while in moments of guilt-tripping, the judgmental other pronounces 
certain actions as illicit. The judgmental other and/or the moral code upon which their 
judgment is based must in some way participate in dominant discourses in order to be 
legible as a legitimate denouncement. In a neoliberal world, the judgmental others may 
summon guilt by amplifying neoliberal attachments and then pivoting them away from 
the market, as difficult a task as that may prove to be. For instance, in this case study, 
Gifford’s version of such agency co-articulated personal responsibility with government 
oversight, thus harnessing a neoliberal value to circulate guilt around a classed harm that 
was perpetuated on a structural level. Government officials and labor activists also 
engaged as judgmental others, wielding this simultaneously potent and limited form of 
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agency—that of a moral prodder of the powerful, not as a moral actor with significant 
power. However, given the restrictions on government and labor activism engendered by 
the neoliberal articulation, it is no surprise that these entitites could not emerge as power 
brokers.  
As limited as the judgmental other may be, in the Gifford case, these judicious 
others set the bounds of penance and acted as agents of forgiveness. Thus, in any 
situation involving guilt, it is imperative that judgmental others carefully consider their 
prescriptions for redemption. Consider, for example, what might have happened if 
Kernaghan and Reich called on Gifford to set structures that empowered garment workers 
to unionize. It is possible that this call would have fallen flat in a neoliberal world, but 
penance is usually also a negotiation between the judgmental other, the accused, and 
other social actors, and this call would have at least started closer to worker 
empowerment than the inspection proposal. 
In addition to the judgmental other, this case study shows that news and tabloid 
media can engage antagonistic agency by publicizing controversy. In the Gifford case, 
reports publicized the dispute over sweatshops and many reporters adopted either a 
confrontational or investigative posture, both of which prodded various actors to ruminate 
publicly on production practices. In this case, also, Gifford’s celebrity persona and 
entrepreneurship invited coverage from various sectors of news media including gossip 
columns, business section, front-page news, and investigative tabloids. The controversy, 
then, located discomfort around neoliberal production in spaces of inquiry and 
enjoyment. This form of agency was powerful because of its breadth and its ability to 
constitute sweatshop labor as an issue worthy of opinion and investigation, and the 
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“controversy” frame allowed reports to offer scathing indictments that antagonized the 
neoliberal articulation. News media agency was also limited, though, because, like the 
judgmental other, it lacked enforcement outside of the court of public opinion and 
because many news media were compelled to feature both sides of the sweatshop issue, 
thus also giving voice to sweatshop apologists and other neoliberal agents. Still, this case 
study shows that news media play a crucial role in circulating antagonistic disputes. 
Ultimately, this chapter points to the importance of re-organizing structures of 
emotion around the free market. This controversy did not stop at offering refutations or 
engaging in “unmasking” rhetorics that revealed the truth of exploitation. By constituting 
and circulating shame and guilt, the controversy actively altered the emotional 
attachments to market behavior such that product endorsement felt uneasy for celebrities, 
cheap production felt disagreeable to corporations, and shopping felt uncomfortable for 
consumers. Guilt’s promise of redemption created new structures of emotional 
attachment such that people could again enjoy market activities if they privileged social 
responsibility over market freedom. 
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The Battle in Seattle: 
Democracy and Violence as Antagonistic Disruptions 
 
In late 1999, the streets of Seattle exploded with rejections of neoliberal 
globalization. Thirty-thousand protesters swarmed the city to direct their “free-form 
anger” about globalized capital at the meeting of the World Trade Organization (WTO).1 
Just after dawn on the first day of meetings, protesters mobilized by the Direct Action 
Network (DAN) descended on the convention center and joined their arms with bicycle 
locks to prevent delegates from reaching their meetings, which the protesters condemned 
as secretive and anti-democratic. Several blocks away, the AFL-CIO set up its parade, 
which demonstrated organized labor’s resistance to free trade agreements that 
institutionalized low wages and an insecure workforce.2  
As the first day of protests progressed, both the Seattle Police Department (SPD) 
and the leaders of the WTO were overwhelmed with the displays of resistance. By ten 
o’clock in the morning, the SPD began firing rounds of tear gas to disperse the protesting 
bodies that took over the streets. To the police’s dismay, the tear gas did not disperse the 
protesters, who remained linked, coughing, but chanting, “Whose streets? Our streets!”3 
The AFL-CIO parade began shortly thereafter, and several-thousand labor marchers 
jettisoned their parade route to join the action around the convention center. In the days 
before the protests, the Black Bloc Anarchists had made a deal with DAN to not engage 
in any violence as long as the police also remained peaceful. Once the police fired the 
tear gas, Black Bloc Anarchists moved swiftly to destroy prominent symbols of the 
neoliberal world order. They descended on Starbucks, Nike, the Gap, and Old Navy and 
smashed their windows in protest. Dumpsters burned in the middle of Seattle streets. 
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Police fired tear gas, stun grenades, and rubber bullets in an effort to restore order in the 
streets. The WTO leadership cancelled its scheduled opening-day events. By nightfall, 
Seattle Mayor Paul Schell declared a state of emergency, instated a curfew, and called in 
the National Guard to discipline the largest protest against global free trade the United 
States had ever seen.4 
The events of that first day set the tone for the rest of the WTO meeting. For the 
next four days, protesters both inside and outside the meeting articulated a vision of the 
world economic order that rejected the global spread of neoliberal policy. Protesters 
outside the meeting held myriad sit-ins, demonstrations, parades, and street art shows, all 
aimed at “shutting down” not only this meeting, but also the spread of unfettered 
capitalism worldwide.5 For days, a “loose coalition of environmentalists, unionists,” 
students, and even “right-wing Reform Party presidential hopeful Pat Buchanan” enacted 
what “democracy looks like.”6  
Inside the meetings, delegates from poorer countries took their own stand against 
the wealthier, more powerful nations like the United States and Britain. Within one day, 
1,700 groups affiliated with poorer countries signed a petition that condemned the way 
the talks were structured. Delegates criticized the speed of negotiations and their 
countries’ exclusion from the agenda-setting conversations, during which social issues 
“were seen to be constantly suborned to pure economic interests.”7 One Filipino leader 
commented that if leaders were “worried about a few windows being smashed,” they 
“should come and see the violence being done to our communities in the name of 
liberalization of trade.”8 In sum, the myriad people who were “left behind” by a global 
free market agenda gathered to re-organize economic priorities both inside and outside 
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the WTO meetings. Ultimately, the talks collapsed, ending in a failure to set a WTO 
agenda.9  
This “Battle in Seattle” 10 forcefully challenged global proliferation of the 
neoliberal articulation at a time when powerful leaders and institutions promoted its 
expansion in the name of democracy and prosperity. With capitalist democracies declared 
victors of the Cold War, prominent discourses of the 1990s celebrated the dawn of a 
“new world” primed for free markets and democracy.11 Amidst accelerated openness and 
mobility across once-firm boundaries, governments of powerful nation-states and 
international monetary organizations offered to deliver peaceful prosperity to the world 
by promoting global free trade and advancing private enterprise.12 As the previous 
chapter demonstrated, optimistic discourses promised that free market capitalism would 
usher in peaceful prosperity, thus eliminating ideological animosity, ending violent 
warfare, engendering widespread prosperity, and extending democratic governance. 
In the 1990s, proponents of global economic liberalization emphasized democracy 
as an unstable legitimator for neoliberal policies. Prominent spokespeople and institutions 
largely re-articulated existing connections between democracy and free markets, even as 
they subtly allowed for the dis-articulation of the two by suggesting that free markets 
could reasonably precede democratization. Although such separation became possible, 
even spokespeople who suggested that economic liberalization could precede 
democratization often couched such assertions in some eventual promise of democracy. 
As a powerful empty signifier, democracy could legitimate neoliberal proliferation 
because it invoked a familiar ideal of peace that had gained resonance and global power 
with the collapse of the Soviet Union. As chapter three demonstrated, democracy’s 
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affective allure in the 1990s resided in its promise of what Katherine Fierlbeck called 
“the diffusion of power within a relatively ordered social environment.”13 Democracy, as 
imagined in these discourses, promised to “facilitate and protect individuals’ command 
over the way in which their life is to be lived” without the overt threat of force and 
violence.14 Connected with democracy’s promise of peaceful agency, many Western 
audiences could imagine economic liberalization as a peaceful alternative to violent 
warfare in a post-Cold War world.  
To facilitate a global economy premised on peace, the WTO replaced the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) in 1995, becoming the world’s premier 
multilateral trade body.15 The WTO formalized and modified GATT, which was a 
multilateral trading agreement and negotiation process that, according to the WTO’s 
telling of its history, “arose in 1947 out of the ashes of the Second World War.”16 The 
WTO institutionalized a process for negotiations between states that had been customary 
under GATT, extended membership to nations previously excluded, and widened the 
scope of trade to include “the cross-border movement not just of goods but of services, 
capital, ideas and even people.”17 The WTO sought to make trade as open as possible, 
which advocates maintained was the only peaceful and sensible arrangement in an 
inevitably interconnected world. According to the organization’s promotional materials, 
the WTO would function as “a forum for countries to thrash out their differences on trade 
issues…peacefully and constructively” in a world where interconnectedness meant “more 
opportunities for trade disputes to arise.”18 Advocates of the WTO, then, asserted that the 
institution would offer peaceful agency in a world where globalization was an inevitable 
reality. 
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In response to such discourses, protesters and media descended on Seattle in the 
last two months of the twentieth century to challenge the WTO’s neoliberal approach to 
international economic relations. These momentous protests have engendered robust 
analysis by communication scholars. Researchers have demonstrated the diversity of 
strategies that Seattle protesters employed when communicating with each other, with 
mainstream and alternative media, with the state, and even with archivists after the 
protests.19 Existing scholarship has also shown how both mainstream and alternative 
media coverage of the protests catapulted the protesters’ critiques of the WTO into very 
public view, and how the protests can be understood as part of a wider movement for 
global justice.20 Each of these studies has taken a very specific aspect of the protests, yet 
these studies have not explored how the protests interrupted hegemonic globalization.  
This chapter fills such a void by demonstrating how the protests—taken 
holistically—disrupted neoliberal globalization. This study treats the Seattle protests as 
an embodied and mediated rhetorical moment that antagonized the neoliberal articulation 
by dis-articulating democracy and free trade, while co-articulating free trade and 
violence. I argue that these protests took advantage of the unstable relationship between 
democracy and free trade to force a wedge between the two concepts. I also argue that the 
protests antagonized the neoliberal articulation by associating free trade with violence. 
Ultimately, this chapter shows how the protests articulated a stark choice for the 
globalizing world: neoliberal autocracy or economic democracy.  
To make this argument, I first argue that discourses advocating global economic 
liberalization simultaneously co-articulated and dis-articulated free markets and 
democracy, thus fostering a tension that the Seattle protests would engage. I then 
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demonstrate how the WTO fostered a more specified tension by simultaneously co- and 
dis- articulating democracy and free trade. Next, I analyze how embodied and mediated 
dimensions of the Seattle protests further dis-articulated democracy and free trade and co-
articulated the latter with violence. Finally, I explain how this case study demonstrates 
the antagonistic potential of two potent empty signifiers: democracy and violence.  
The Latter 1990s: Globalizing Free Trade and Democracy 
Drawing on connections fortified during the Cold War, many prominent 
discourses of the latter 1990s marked democracy as a primary legitimating term for the 
expansion of neoliberal policy. As an abstraction, democracy assembled a wide array of 
explicit and implicit commitments, practices, and connotations. In discourses advocating 
economic liberalization, democracy commonly referred to the dispersal of economic, 
political, and cultural power.21 For example, Senator Bill Bradley (D) offered such de-
centralization of power as evidence of a democratizing trends in China, remarking that 
“Beijing’s centralized control over the provinces has loosened.”22 Hector Garcia, the 
leader of a free trade advocacy group, argued that the North American Free Trade 
Agreement (NAFTA) could “help speed the process of democratizing the global 
economy” as “the first international agreement in which representatives of the developed 
and developing nations” were bestowed with “similar authority” in negotiations over 
trade.23 Garcia’s comments, like those of others, suggested that democracy meant 
dispersing authoritative power across loci, thus associating democracy with de-
centralized power.  
Democracy also tended to describe a form of participatory and lawful governance 
that stood in stark contrast with dictatorial rule. Commentators pointed to the 
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proliferation of elections in Latin America as evidence of “the region’s almost universal 
embrace of democracy.”24 President Bill Clinton and other prominent commentators 
celebrated elections as markers of the “dramatic swing of Latin American and Caribbean 
nations from dictatorship to democratic government.”25 Pro-liberalization rhetoric 
suggested that such popular participation was enabled by the transparent rule of law. For 
example, when describing China’s democratization, Bradley asserted that “The rigor of 
law is slowly replacing the whim of the Communist Party in many economic sectors,” 
which enabled local, non-governmental entrepreneurs to participate in crafting their 
country’s economy.26 Messages like Bradley’s suggested that democratic governance 
could traverse politics and economics. The democracy signifier, then, commonly 
connoted what M. Lane Bruner called “rights-based constitutional nation-state 
governments” that coordinated, but did not control, political and economic life.27 
Finally, democracy often implied improved social conditions, including the 
advancement of ambiguously-defined human rights. Clinton asserted that “democratic 
government” would provide Latin American nations “benefits that will actually change 
the lives of real people for the better.”28 A nation-state’s democratic status depended on 
the extent to which it advanced individual freedom and protected human rights, a concept 
that meant a variety of often contradictory commitments.29 Democratizing countries like 
China meant crafting “an effective human rights policy,” according to John Shattuck, 
Clinton’s Assistant Secretary of State for Democracy and Human Rights, whose title 
alone suggested democracy’s link to human rights.30 In discourses advocating the 
neoliberal articulation’s global expansion, then, democracy signified a transparent and 
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participatory structure of governance that dispersed power, improved social conditions, 
and protected human rights.  
As chapter one demonstrated, the neoliberal articulation sutures free markets and 
democracy, drawing on a discursive history that extends to the European Enlightenment, 
when a capitalist market and the private property of a growing bourgeoisie disrupted 
monarchical power.31 In the mid-to-late 1990s, discourses advocating global economic 
liberalization simultaneously amplified and de-emphasized this connection, thus fostering 
a tension that the Seattle protests would engage.  
Co-articulating Democracy and Free Markets  
Proponents of free trade and privatization re-articulated Cold War rhetorics that 
drew impenetrable boundaries between market democracy and communist 
authoritarianism.32 Discourses advocating globalized neoliberal policies fortified links 
between market economies and political democracy as they reinforced connections 
between state-controlled economies and political authoritarianism. Former U.S. Assistant 
Secretary of State Bernard Aronson explained that “the old, closed system of statist 
economic controls throughout Latin America was the bedrock of power of the corporatist, 
oligarchic elite that financed and supported authoritarian rule.”33 Aronson maintained that 
“Dismantling that structure has liberated not only market forces in the economy but also 
the forces of democratization in civil society.”34 In a speech to the World Bank’s Board 
of Governors, the organization’s president, James D. Wolfensohn, remarked on such a 
change, marveling at the extent to which “democracy has swept the world” as “Country 
after country has moved away from command and control to greater reliance on 
markets.”35 Some journalists reinforced this worldview by reporting on the economic and 
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political “transformation” sweeping the globe.36 For example, Charles Trueheart, writing 
for The Washington Post, described how “Before 1980, more than a dozen Latin 
American countries were ruled by military dictatorships and two were Marxist states; 
now, Cuba is the only country in the region that has not held democratic elections.”37 In 
the same paragraph, Trueheart asserted that this “political transformation has been 
accompanied by a massive shift toward economic liberalization.”38 As these observations 
demonstrate, commentators slipped between terms, treating economic and political 
systems as inherently bonded in ways that reinforced Cold War themes. 
Advocates of free trade and privatization also sutured free markets and democracy 
by asserting that these policies would create economic growth and that such prosperity 
would engender peaceful democratization. Operating on the assumption that democracy 
could not thrive in poverty, commentators and policy makers suggested that growing 
economies would create the conditions necessary for democratization.39 For example, 
some advocates of liberalized trade relations with China argued that “trade links will help 
create a thriving Chinese middle class, which in turn offers the best hope for China to 
eventually follow the path toward democratization.”40 Senator Bradley argued that 
economic growth would “create a fluid political and social environment and the 
emergence of a class of prosperous Chinese—all of which fuel democratization and 
improved human rights practices” because “prosperity breaks down old controls and 
generates demands for improved political and social conditions.”41 Regarding economic 
development in the Western Hemisphere, Aronson asserted that “economic liberalization 
is empowering a new class of entrepreneurs” who were “far less inclined to risk 
economic isolation by supporting a military coup d’etat.”42 Thus, he predicted that “trade 
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flowing freely across its borders” would allow “our hemisphere” to “emerge in the 21st 
century as a zone of democracy and peace where rising prosperity is widely shared.”43 
Speaking to the New York Times, foreign policy expert Michael Mandelbaum neatly 
summarized what he called the “driving conviction” of the growing post-Cold War 
hegemony: “that economic and trade relations will lead to democratization.”44  
Furthermore, international monetary organization discourses suggested that 
economic liberalization would create economic stability, which would allow democracy 
to take root and flourish where authoritarian regimes once ruled. In 1993, the Clinton 
Administration announced that they would lobby “international lending institutions to put 
money into development projects that promote democracy.”45 In 1998, president of the 
Philippines Fidel Ramos tied economic reform to democratization when he met with 
representatives of the U.S. government, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and the 
World Bank. Ramos reassured these organizations that his country was “a better 
functioning democracy than six years ago, because we have been able to fulfill most of 
the economic recovery programs” designed by international monetary institutions.46 
Indeed, monetary institutions warned countries that their grip on democracy grew more 
tenuous with each step away from economic liberalization. For example, the IMF’s 
Michel Camdessus warned Russian leaders that their economic policies could endanger 
democratization, criticizing the government for “letting inflation get out of control, 
saying the risk of hyperinflation threatened Russia’s fledgling democracy.”47 Camdessus 
insisted that “Hyperinflation must be stopped at all costs” because “Many democracies in 
the world have been killed by hyperinflation.”48 Discourses like these suggested that 
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liberal economics would offer a context of stability, which would enable democracy to 
take root. 
Some proponents of economic liberalization reversed this logic by arguing that 
democratization would enable the development and maintenance of free markets. During 
a speech at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, Alan Greenspan 
argued that “democracy is a necessary component for the efficient long-term functioning 
of a free market economy.”49 Greenspan constructed democracy as the transparent rule of 
law that protected the individual freedom to engage in a private market, concluding, “We 
depend on government in a free society to ensure those market ‘rights.’”50 Clinton’s 
national security advisor Anthony Lake asserted a similar relationship between 
democracy and free markets, writing in The New York Times that “Democracies create 
free markets that offer economic opportunity.”51 Although these remarks inversed the 
logic that constructed free markets as enabling democracy, both logics constructed 
positive relationships between democracy and free markets, thus reinforcing the two 
concepts’ inextricable linkages. 
These links were consistently repeated, even without an explicit logic, as 
commentators and policymakers addressed democracy and free markets in tandem. 
Leaders of both the United States and Britain advanced Third Way politics, which 
blended commitments to free markets and liberal-democratic values.52 British Prime 
Minister Tony Blair touted the “historic opportunity” that allowed Third Way 
policymakers to re-affirm “our long commitment to fairness, democracy and freedom” 
while “applying them to our new world of dynamic markets.”53 Stateside, Lake asserted 
that powerful nations like the United States should “reshape and create international 
	 212 
structures…to consolidate the victory of democracy and open markets.”54 Internationally, 
U.S.-led trade summits often addressed “democratization” alongside free trade 
agreements because, as Clinton asserted during one such gathering, “democracy and trade 
go hand in hand.”55 Such repetitions consolidated the terms’ co-articulation as a matter of 
common sense. 
Dis-articulating Democracy and Free Markets  
Although free markets and democracy emerged as a prudent pairing, discourses 
promoting and implementing global economic liberalization also suggested that free 
markets could reasonably precede democracy. Such a suggestion allowed people to 
conceptually understand free markets as able to be separated, if only temporarily, from 
democracy. For example, experts publicly warned the Clinton administration not to 
address “democratization” at trade summits because “Latin American leaders want to talk 
about one issue—creating a free trade zone.”56 One commentator warned that if Latin 
American leaders “hear too much about other issues” they could “form trade alliances 
with Europe and Asia” instead of with the United States.57 Before attending a three-day 
hemispheric trade summit, Treasury Secretary Lloyd Bentsen confirmed that trade was 
“at the top of the agenda” and “the most important question.”58 These kinds of discourses 
prioritized trade over democracy, thus suggesting that the concepts were not as 
inextricably linked as other dimensions of neoliberal discourse suggested. Even if the 
rationale for free trade was eventual democratization, privileging trade suggested that the 
two could be implemented separately.  
The international handling of the 1997 Asian financial crisis also fostered a 
conceptual separation of democracy and free markets. In the name of economic stability, 
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several international monetary organizations and the United States together pledged to 
loan Indonesia eighteen billion dollars to “give the country a lift and help contain a 
regionwide crisis,” even though the nation was ruled by “the authoritarian Suharto 
government.”59 The loans did not make financial assistance dependent upon democratic 
reforms, but lenders did mandate that Indonesia liberalize its economic structures. When  
Suharto wavered on adopting such liberalization, representatives of the IMF and the U.S. 
government pressured him to pursue “demonstrable and vigorous implementation of IMF 
reforms” as “the best prospect for restoring financial stability and economic growth in 
Indonesia.”60 Criticism of the handling of this crisis abounded, even among advocates of 
economic liberalization. One commentator noted that “When dealing with crises such as 
the one in Indonesia, the traditional U.S. preference is for stability, even if it results in 
repression and the denial of democracy and human rights.”61 These discourses subtly 
cleaved democracy from free markets by showing that economic liberalization aimed at 
creating free markets had been implemented before democratic reforms. 
This disarticulation became particularly prominent in the United States during 
debates over trade relations with China. These discourses tended to highlight the 
protection of human rights—particularly those of Chinese pro-democracy dissidents—as 
a primary dimension of democratization.62 Since 1980, China had been granted most 
favored nation (MFN) trade status, which meant that Chinese goods could enter the U.S. 
market at low tariff rates.63 With some debate, this status had been renewed annually, but 
in 1993, the newly inaugurated Clinton Administration decided to make this renewal 
contingent on China’s progress on human rights.64 One year later, the administration 
changed course by “de-linking” human rights and trade.65 When Clinton revoked the 
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linkage, he publicized a split between terms that his campaign and his first presidential 
term had once overtly linked. This widely publicized decision suggested that the 
implementation of unimpeded trade policies took priority over addressing human rights 
concerns in China.  
This disarticulation became more pronounced when Clinton’s 1997 renewal of 
China’s MFN status prompted heated debate in Congress.66 Among other rebukes, 
opponents complained that trade engagement had not democratized China; they declared 
that the country’s “human rights violations have increased” and that “China’s oppression 
of free expression continues” as its MFN status was renewed.67 Resisting such criticism, 
proponents of free trade argued that “the mandatory linkage between trade privileges and 
human rights” was so “obsolete” that it belonged in “the dust heap of history.”68 
Although many proponents of renewal insisted that trade could eventually bring 
democracy, this controversy subtly allowed for the dis-articulation of free markets and 
democracy by affirming the possibility of implementing free trade without evidence of 
progress toward democratization. In the next few years, the Clinton administration would 
“come under criticism for what its opponents describe as the elevation of trade over 
human rights,” thus suggesting that the separation had gained traction.69  
Contesting Globalized Free Trade and Democracy in the WTO 
When Clinton called on Congress to ratify the WTO’s establishment in 1994, 
voices resurfaced from the NAFTA debate.70 Although the measure passed with a “Big 
Bipartisan Vote,” various publics contested the WTO’s public meaning since its 
inception.71 Both advocates and critics characterized the WTO as a locus of agency in a 
globalizing world, even as they contested the nature and valence of such globalized 
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power.  As leaders, institutions, and critics negotiated the nature and value of the WTO’s 
agency, they simultaneously co-articulated and dis-articulated democracy and free trade. 
In these discourses, democracy generally signified a transparent and participatory 
structure of governance that dispersed power and improved social conditions. However, 
divergent usages emphasized different aspects of the democracy abstraction, thus 
marking democracy as an unstable term. 
Co-Articulating Democracy and Free Trade 
Characterizations of the WTO often attached to more general judgments about 
free trade because the organization was committed explicitly and solely to promoting 
global free trade.72 As such, advocates of the WTO co-articulated democracy and free 
trade in two ways; they suggested that the institution’s free trade agenda was pursuing 
democratic goals and that the organization abided by democratic procedure. The first 
democratic goal touted by WTO proponents was the widespread distribution of global 
power. The organization’s promotional materials argued that the WTO empowered 
nations struggling for global agency by “giving smaller countries more voice” and by 
providing opportunities “to form alliances and to pool resources.”73 Without the WTO, 
one pamphlet explained, “more powerful countries would be freer to impose their will 
unilaterally on their smaller trading partners” who “would be much less able to resist 
unwanted pressure” by negotiating without the WTO.74 Clyde V. Prestowitz Jr., president 
of the Economic Strategy Institute, told The Washington Post that the WTO was “another 
step in a gradual spread of economic power around the world.”75 In addition to adjusting 
global power imbalances, the WTO promised to help national governments resist 
“pressure from narrow interests groups” that threatened to hijack national economic 
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agendas.76 Stateside, commentators lambasted WTO opponents as “special interests that 
want to preserve the government’s ability to protect them by imposing unilateral trade 
sanctions.”77 In these ways, proponents of the WTO constructed the organization as 
committed to diluting concentrated hubs of power like large nations and lobbying groups.  
To ensure such dispersed power, the WTO aimed to institute “the rule of law” in 
global economics because “A system based on rules rather than power makes life easier 
for all.”78 The WTO named its primary objective as establishing “the global rules of trade 
between nations,” calling its agreements “the legal ground-rules for international 
commerce” and “contracts” that guaranteed “member countries important trade rights.”79 
WTO materials touted the system as “fair” because “everyone has to follow the same 
rules” in their “non-discriminatory trading system.”80 This system included a dispute 
resolution forum to which countries could appeal “if they think their rights under the 
agreements are being infringed.”81 One pamphlet explained that the WTO’s procedure 
was “The most harmonious way to settle” disputes because it constituted a “neutral 
procedure based on an agreed legal foundation.”82 In his address to the leaders of the 
WTO, President Clinton, himself the leader of a capitalist-democracy, applauded the 
organization for “its insistence on rules that are fair and open” and its “powerful role” in 
moving the world “toward open and accountable government.”83 Like Clinton, advocates 
of the WTO touted the organization’s insistence on the transparent rule of law, implicitly 
joining free trade with democracy. 
The final WTO goal aligned with democracy was “to improve the welfare of the 
peoples of the member countries” by replacing warfare with negotiation.84 WTO 
publications placed the organization within a post-WWII trajectory of peace, wherein 
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enforceable trade rules played a key role in maintaining harmony. One brochure 
explained, “After the war, the world’s community of trading nations negotiated trade 
rules which are now entrusted to the WTO.”85 In the post-war world, “international trade 
tension is reduced because countries can turn to organizations, in particular the WTO, to 
settle their trade disputes,” an option that “was not available…Before World War 2.”86 
WTO pamphlets also included historical counter-examples of “trade disputes turning into 
war.”87 One document asserted that “the trade war of the 1930s…worsened the Great 
Depression and eventually played a part in the outbreak of World War 2” because 
“countries competed to raise trade barriers in order to protect domestic producers and 
retaliate again each others’ barriers.”88 This narrative suggested that protectionist 
economic policies actively caused violent eruptions and that warfare could be avoided 
with better managed, freer trade. More generally, the WTO maintained that free trade 
agreements were well positioned to provide such peace because, “Crudely put, sales 
people are usually reluctant to fight their customers.”89 In the vision proffered by the 
WTO, free trade agreements could improve social conditions by preventing violent 
warfare. 
Advocates of the WTO also constructed the free trade organization as a 
representative democracy that sought to eliminate undue coercion. Proponents insisted 
that the WTO was a “member-driven” organization premised on self-governance, not 
autocratic authority.90 Institutional publications plainly stated, “the WTO does not dictate 
to governments to adopt or drop certain policies…In fact, it’s the governments who 
dictate to the WTO” because “The WTO is run by its member governments” and “All 
major decisions are made by the membership as a whole.”91 Even the WTO’s coercion to 
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comply with agreements and rulings could be understood as legitimate self-governance 
because, according to the WTO’s promotional material, they enforced “agreements that 
the infringing government had itself accepted,” rather than taking authoritarian action.92  
WTO proponents also touted the democratic nature of the organization’s 
procedures for decision-making by highlighting the procedures’ privileging of 
representation, negotiation, and consensus. Promotional materials asserted that 
“Individuals” were represented in the organization “through their governments” in WTO 
negotiations, during which “The private sector, non-governmental organizations and 
other lobbying groups do not participate” directly because “The WTO is an organization 
of governments.”93 This construction suggested that the organization privileged citizens 
over private enterprise because the WTO was comprised of representative governments 
that voiced their citizens’ concerns. The documents also insisted that representation was 
endemic to the WTO agreements because procedures mandated that “nations took 
agreements back to their parliaments for ratification.”94  
In addition to touting the WTO’s representational character, the organization 
promoted its commitment to negotiation as an essential institutional characteristic. One 
pamphlet read, “one of the WTO’s most important functions is to serve as a forum for 
trade negotiations,” which offered agency to member nations to peacefully engage to 
their mutual benefit.95 Promotional materials maintained that “liberalization under the 
WTO is the result of negotiations.”96 Pamphlets suggested that trade agreements resulted 
from “considerable debate and controversy,” and were not settled until every party 
entered into them voluntarily and with their interests served.97 This kind of negotiation 
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could be understood as democratic because it dispersed power and offered participatory 
agency to member nations, thus constituting a non-authoritarian form of governance. 
WTO advocates further publicized the institution’s commitment to non-
authoritarianism by highlighting its fair and consensual decision-making process. Months 
before Congress ratified the WTO’s establishment, trade analyst Claude Barfield re-
assured readers of The Washington Post that the organization instituted both “the 
principle of one nation/one vote” and “initial decision-making by consensus.”98 WTO 
promotional materials also maintained that decisions were “typically taken by consensus 
among all member countries,” meaning that “every country accepts the decisions. There 
are no dissenters.”99 Such a process, pamphlets asserted, was “even more democratic than 
majority rule because everyone has to agree,” thus ensuring that each member country’s 
“interests are properly considered” and that “every country has a voice.”100 WTO 
proponents explained that “When consensus is not possible,” decisions were still 
undertaken fairly through a voting process. One pamphlet explained that a vote on a new 
rule could be “won with a majority of the votes cast and on the basis of ‘one country, one 
vote.’”101  
For proponents of the organization, the institution’s process was legitimate 
because “decisions taken in the WTO are negotiated, accountable and democratic.”102  By 
casting the WTO and its goals as democratically oriented, advocates of the institution co-
articulated free trade and democracy. In these discourses, democracy signified a 
procedure by which government representatives voluntarily negotiated transparent and 
enforceable agreements. These voluntarily adopted rules promised to improve social 
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conditions globally by offering participatory economic agency and by replacing violent 
warfare with peaceful negotiation. 
Dis-Articulating Democracy and Free Trade 
Discourses making sense of the WTO also dis-articulated democracy and free 
trade in two ways. First, the WTO and its opponents alike maintained that the institution 
foreclosed democratic engagement on the free trade question. Although WTO advocates 
touted the organization’s democratic process, promotional materials acknowledged that 
free trade itself was not up for negotiation because the system was designed to enable 
“countries to lower their trade barriers and to allow trade to flow more freely.”103 
Therefore, although member nations could negotiate on “how low those barriers should 
go,” they could not negotiate about free trade as such because the WTO’s founding 
documents created a strict line between trade and politics, claiming the former as the 
institution’s domain.104 As a free trade organization, the WTO could mark issues like 
“Labour standards” as officially “not on the agenda” because such considerations had a 
“political angle” that could “simply be an excuse for protectionism,” which would 
impinge upon trade liberalization.105  
Seizing on the WTO’s trade focus, critics accused the organization of 
autocratically advancing free trade. In a series of op-eds, writers from Public Citizen 
explained that although “Trade agreements now affect a broad range of issues, from the 
safety of our food to how local tax dollars are spent, from the size and safety of trucks to 
the methods used to protect endangered species,” the WTO’s “rules put maximizing trade 
liberalization ahead of other values such as safety, the environment or living 
standards.”106 Whose Trade Organization? argued that when national laws became 
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“subject to a WTO panel’s review,” they were “judged exclusively by narrow, specific 
WTO-set economic standards,” barring all other policy questions from deliberation.107 
Commenting on the WTO’s first dispute resolution decision in 1996, economic analysts 
Alan Tonelson and Lori Wallach wrote that “at the WTO, trade effects trump all other 
considerations.”108 In sum, both critics and advocates dis-articulated free trade and 
democracy by placing the questions of free trade and social policy outside the purview of 
the WTO’s negotiation process. 
Second, critics of the WTO charged the organization with wielding autocratic 
power and overriding domestic policies, a charge that WTO documents, to some extent, 
confirmed. Critics characterized the WTO as a secretive locus of concentrated global 
power. Public Citizen’s Ralph Nader and Laura Grund separately commented on “The 
widening shift in power” taking place “from local democratic bodies to unaccountable 
global trade bureaucracies.”109 Their commentary appropriated the term “bureaucracy,” a 
derogatory term for governmental administration that had gained currency in the 
neoliberal milieu, to criticize the WTO as a complex structure that refused citizen 
participation. Similarly, Whose Trade Organization? argued that “WTO business is 
conducted by committees and panels that meet behind closed doors in Geneva, 
Switzerland.”110 This construction dis-articulated democracy and free markets because it 
characterized the institution responsible with liberalizing trade as a faceless and distant 
system, cordoned off from citizen concerns.  
Such unaccountable power played a particularly prominent role in the WTO’s 
dispute resolution process, in which countries could confidentially bring trade disputes if 
one party perceived that another was breaking negotiated agreements.111 As described in 
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the WTO’s promotional material, the organization granted its Dispute Settlement Body 
“the sole authority to establish ‘panels’ of experts to consider the case.”112 Panels of three 
or five trade “experts from different countries” would “examine the evidence and decide 
who is right and who is wrong,” and then report to the Dispute Settlement Body, “which 
can only reject the report by consensus.”113 Consensus meant that these rulings were 
“automatically adopted unless there is a consensus to reject a ruling,” so “any country 
wanting to block a ruling has to persuade all other WTO members (including its 
adversary in the case) to share its view.”114 The WTO’s Director-General Renato 
Ruggerio celebrated this dispute resolution system as “stronger” and “more automatic” 
than previous systems.115  
To critics, the strength, confidentiality, and speed of the resolution process was 
reason for concern about diminishing democratic norms. Whose Trade Organization? 
accused the panels of being “Secretive and Without Due Process” because the hearings 
were kept confidential and the rulings were adopted immediately, making the WTO 
“unique among all other international agreements in that consensus is required to stop 
action.”116 Even Clinton, an ardent supporter of the WTO, criticized the secretive 
resolution process, urging the organization’s leadership to “take every feasible step to 
bring openness and accountability to its operations. Today,” he said, “when one nation 
challenges the trade practices of another, the proceeding takes place behind closed doors” 
and “there is no mechanism for private citizens to provide input in these trade 
disputes.”117 Discourses critical of the WTO, even sympathetic ones, characterized its 
dispute resolution process as either unintentionally lacking perspicuity, at best, or 
actively obfuscating decisions, at worst. These critiques dis-articulated free trade and 
	 223 
democracy by characterizing the WTO as skirting democratic norms of transparency, 
participation, and collective deliberation. 
The final charge of autocracy leveled against the WTO was that the organization 
wielded the power to override domestic policies that had been decided by democratic 
process. Whose Trade Organization? argued that the WTO was staging a “coup d’etat 
over democratic governance worldwide” by instituting “new and unprecedented controls 
over democratic governance.”118 The book concluded, “After an in-depth analysis of the 
decisions reached by WTO dispute resolutions panels,” that the WTO had consistently 
ruled against all “democratically achieved environmental, health, food safety or 
environmental law” on the basis that they constituted “barriers to trade.”119 Grund offered 
an example to readers of The Washington Post, writing that “a panel of three WTO trade 
bureaucrats in Geneva” was currently considering a case against “part of our Endangered 
Species Act that protects rare sea turtles from methods of shrimp harvesting.” 120 If the 
panel ruled against the act, “the United States will have to change the law or face 
sanctions.”121 This example suggested that the WTO was anti-democratic because its 
panels of only three “trade bureaucrats” could overturn a law that was established by the 
U.S. government, which understood itself as a democracy. To some extent, WTO 
promotional materials supported such a charge, confirming that the “WTO body can have 
a direct impact on a government’s policies” because “the losing ‘defendant’” must “bring 
its policy into line with the ruling.”122 Otherwise, the Dispute Settlement Body had “the 
power to authorize retaliation” against a noncompliant nation.123 These discourses, 
critical and descriptive alike, contributed to the dis-articulation of free trade and 
democracy by constructing the WTO as a system that could discipline the United States’ 
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domestic policies, which many U.S. audiences could imagine as having been passed 
democratically.  
Discourses critical of the WTO deemed the institution illegitimate because it 
pursued “autocracy over democracy” and instituted a regime of “trade uber alles” that 
limited “citizens’ ability to self-govern.”124 By casting the WTO and its pursuit of free 
trade as autocratic, opponents of the institution dis-articulated free trade and democracy. 
In these discourses, democracy signified national sovereignty, transparency in process, 
and the ability of citizens to collectively participate in deliberations over myriad 
concerns, including trade. Advocates of the WTO did not ascent to the charge of 
autocracy, particularly because their definition of democracy emphasized representative 
negotiation and rule of law over national sovereignty and citizen participation. 
Nonetheless, some advocates’ discourse contributed to dis-articulating democracy and 
free trade by confirming WTO procedures and, at times, calling for reform. Opponents 
and advocates thus negotiated both interpretations of democracy and the meaning of the 
new free trade organization. These discourses of democracy enabled the Seattle protests 
by articulating a terrain of contestation over democracy.  
Furthermore, drawing on separations articulated during the NAFTA debate, 
discourses critical of the WTO enabled the emergence of a complex political 
identification that opposed the WTO. Ernesto Laclau argued that in populist discourse, 
“the people” are constituted as an unstable totality by linking separate unfulfilled 
demands under an empty signifier that renders differentiated claims equivalent.125 Prior to 
the protests, critics of the WTO linked different unfulfilled demands—safeguard the jobs 
of American workers, secure environmental protections, shield domestic policy from 
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foreign influence—under a critique of the WTO as “undemocratic,” thus constituting 
“democracy” as an empty signifier that rendered the different demands equivalent, if 
unique. Furthermore, Laclau argued that “the people” are constituted by expelling an 
other from their ranks and that such an exclusion also bestows equivalence to 
differentiated demands; discourses critical of the WTO named the institution and its allies 
as the other that granted such equivalence, thus enabling the emergence of a “people” 
united by democracy and their opposition to the WTO. 
Dis-Articulating Democracy and Free Trade in Seattle 
Neoliberal globalization discourses had marked economics as an appropriate site 
of democratic participation. Taking advantage of this opening, thousands of protest 
groups descended on Seattle to enact political agency over economic globalization. 
Chantal Mouffe argued that “the political” describes an adversarial relationship in which 
discourses draw frontiers between us and them.126 For Mouffe, democratic political 
engagement requires the active construction of a demos—a political “we” that is 
constituted through the articulation of some provisional and limited commonality that 
differentiates us from them.127 The demos and its adversary are mutually constituted as an 
oppositional pairing, with each leaving traces in the other.128 Ultimately, drawing these 
contaminated frontiers enables people to reconfigure power relations.129  
The Seattle protests disarticulated democracy from free trade by drawing such 
political frontiers between a democratic us and an autocratic them. The protests crafted 
this division by naming the WTO as an enemy of the people and by amplifying existing 
critiques. This separation allowed the protests to expel free trade from our democracy and 
to articulate a populist-democratic alternative to the WTO’s “trade uber alles” regime.130  
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Naming the Oppositional Pairing  
The act of organizing protests against the WTO ministerial meeting drew on 
existing discourses to overtly construct a demos and its adversary. The repetition over 
centuries of marches and rallies in many modern nation-states has marked such 
engagement as a prominent tactic of democratic participation and citizen opposition.131 
Therefore, when groups began planning demonstrations against the WTO, a certain 
demos/adversary relationship could begin to form without much strain on popular 
imagination. Furthermore, throughout the 1990s, groups had organized protests that 
named free trade deals, corporations, and globalizing capitalism as adversaries; NAFTA 
opponents staged several actions, the WTO’s first meetings precipitated global protest, 
and recurring “Reclaim the Streets” protests took aim at globalizing capitalism.132 The 
repetition of these protests created an existing system of signification that distinguished 
protesters as an us in opposition to a them comprised of elite financial organizations.  
Public organizing texts also promoted an oppositional pairing, specifically naming 
the WTO as an adversary of democracy. A flier announcing the protests called 
“Citizens,” “People,” and “activists” to “March on the WTO” because “Democracy is too 
important to be surrendered to corporate interests!”133 The flier suggested that the WTO 
was a worthy target because “The WTO Hurts Workers, the Environment, and 
Democracy.” 134 This flier drew a frontier between us—active citizen-defenders of a 
democracy that valued workers and the environment—and them, an organization that had 
begun an offensive on our democracy. DAN’s organizing materials also drew such 
frontiers, casting us as a “broad alliance of national, regional and local groups” that 
formed specifically “to plan and create an infrastructure to support a nonviolent mass 
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action and mobilization against the World Trade Organization.”135 These materials 
claimed phrases easily associated with democratic participation at the end of the 
twentieth century—“alliance,” “nonviolent mass action,” and “mobilization”—as 
dimensions of an us mobilizing against an adversary. Such organizing discourses created 
the possibility for an embodied democratic us to coalesce in Seattle by clearly articulating 
an adversary against whom various interests could provisionally unite.  
On the ground, protesters re-iterated this oppositional pairing. For example, the 
public statements of the “Seattle International People’s Assembly” signed off with a 
declaration of “Unity” that characterized us as “participants...coming from the First and 
Third Worlds” to “Say NO to WTO!” 136 The statement also described us as a group 
“firmly united in the task of exposing and opposing the WTO and advancing the people’s 
resistance to imperialist globalization.”137 This text co-articulated protesters with 
democracy by naming them as a “people,” and it cleaved democracy from the WTO by 
co-articulating the organization with imperialism, a concept that often connotes autocratic 
imposition. Similarly articulating a demos, a bright red protest poster featured the black 
outline of an octopus with the letters “WTO” written above its furrowed brows.138 Each 
of the creature’s tentacles wrapped around a different victim: the word “democracy,” a 
person in a straw hat, a sick cow, a frightened turtle, and a car emitting fumes. This 
image constructed a multi-faceted and democratic us by co-articulating democracy with 
human, animal, and object as separate entities made equivalent by their experience of 
victimization by a powerful them.  
Like these materials, news media accounts of the demonstrations named the WTO 
as the protesters’ constitutive outside. Steven Greenhouse of The New York Times 
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described the protests as “A Carnival of Derision” that would “Greet the Princes of 
Global Trade,” and he covered the thousands of people in Seattle’s streets “denouncing 
the target of their ire: the World Trade Organization.”139 ABC’s Deborah Wang reported, 
“for these protesters, this single organization, the WTO, has come to symbolize about all 
that is wrong in the modern world,” as the camera showed Chinese pro-democracy 
demonstrators marching in the street behind her.140 The nightly news programs on NBC, 
ABC, and CBS showed crowds and individual protesters chanting, “Hey hey, ho ho, the 
WTO has got to go” and “Hell no, WTO” as well as protesters holding signs with the 
letters WTO crossed out in red.141 News media and protesters simultaneously constructed 
an us and them by overtly naming the WTO as the adversary of a whole host of 
constituencies. These groups were constituted as a demos by their mutual opposition, by 
their overt articulation with democracy, and by their engagement in recognizable 
democratic norms of street protest.  
Amplifying Existing Critiques 
The protests also drew political frontiers by amplifying existing discourses that 
denounced the WTO as a secretive and concentrated locus of elite power. Protesters 
verbally amplified the charge that the WTO served the interests of private corporations, 
thus distinguishing between a privileged them and a marginalized us. Demonstrators 
characterized the organization as “the instrument of multinational corporations” and 
recounted the many ways that the WTO advanced “global trade and commerce rules that 
benefit only multinational corporations.”142 The New York Times reported that Seattle’s 
protesters accused “the trade organization” of being “a handmaiden of corporate interests 
whose rulings undermine health, labor and environmental protections around the 
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world.”143 ABC’s Wang rode a bus toward Seattle with “A group of radical activists” 
who traveled to the protests because “the WTO has failed to stop the exploitation of 
workers in the third world.”144 One of the protesters, a mocha-skinned man wearing 
circular glasses, explained to audiences, “They want profit.”145 Drawing on existing 
discourses that offered protesters and media coverage a system of signification, the 
protests amplified the construction of them as an organization that privileged 
multinational corporations, as opposed to us, who privileged “people, individuals” 
alongside “communities, workers and the environment.”146  
Protest coverage brought the charge of elitism to life by depicting the WTO’s 
delegates and supporters as elite actors. For example, CBS Evening News interviewed 
Secretary of Commerce William Daley, a white adult man in a suit situated in front of a 
bookshelf. Daley, a WTO supporter, told audiences that the WTO would bring net 
benefits, even if there were individual losses; he said, “there will be dislocations; there 
will be job loss, there will be job gain. What this is all about is trying to make sure that 
there’s more positives than negatives.”147 The same report showed streams of people 
dressed in casual clothing or hand-made costumes marching through the streets. 148 News 
programs consistently drew similar visual distinctions, depicting WTO delegates carrying 
briefcases and donning professional attire, while protesters clamored in the streets 
wearing casual clothing, handcrafted costumes, or plastic rain ponchos.149  
This juxtaposition marked the WTO’s elite supporters off from literal people in 
the streets, who could be understood as ordinary democratic citizens for two primary 
reasons beyond the protest tradition in modern states. First, existing frames already 
decried the WTO as an elite organization run by “bureaucrats,” so images of casual 
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dissenters and professional supporters could be folded into those existing narratives with 
relative ease.150 Second, most of the protesters depicted in these news stories were white. 
As Thomas K. Nakayama and Robert L. Krizek argued, whiteness emanates power 
through its invisibility and its capacity to be used as a quiet, yet universal standard from 
which others are distinguished.151 Indeed, whiteness operated undercover in the news 
media, never verbally mentioned, but implicitly marking the protesters as ordinary by 
participating in assumptions that construct white people as the standard bearers of 
humanity.152 Protesters’ predominant whiteness problematically marked them as 
ordinary; yet, depicting protesters as white folk made them intelligible as a “people” 
because of entrenched discursive frames that offer white people as inconspicuous 
embodiments of neutral humanity. The interspersed people of color in the crowds, in turn, 
implicitly legitimated the predominant whiteness by articulating some semblance of 
inclusion in this visual articulation of the demos.  
Marking protesters as ordinary citizens and free trade proponents as elites drew on 
populist frames to co-articulate protesters with popular democracy and to expel free trade 
from the democratic fold. Michael Kazin posited that American populism described a 
discourse in which an “ordinary people…view their elite opponents as self-serving and 
undemocratic, and seek to mobilize the former against the latter.”153 The Seattle protests 
drew such lines between ordinary people defending democracy against an elite aligned 
with free trade. Thus, free trade was co-articulated with an anti-democratic elite. 
Advancing a separation between the demos and its elite opponent, the Seattle 
protests amplified the existing discourse that accused the WTO of holding secretive 
negotiations. Protesters found themselves literally “on the street,” at various points of 
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proximity to the convention center where the meetings were taking place, but never 
inside.154 Protester Jeffrey St. Claire described one demonstration as confined in “a 
protest pen next to a construction site near the convention center.”155 The first labor rally 
occurred “at Memorial Stadium,” located “around the Space Needle, some fifteen to 
twenty blocks from the convention center.”156 Direct action protesters formed a “human 
chain at the intersection of 7th and Pine,” a block away from the meetings.157 The protests 
made literal and physical the claim that the WTO restricted citizen access to its meetings 
through embodiment, which, as I have explained elsewhere, “merges traditional 
distinctions made between the ‘thing’ and the ‘symbol’ that is supposed to represent the 
object.”158 Such a “synthesis gives a recognizably material presence to the symbolic, one 
that can be experienced, felt, and understood as a multifaceted reality.”159 Protesters’ 
physical confinement to the outside of the meetings incarnated the charge of secrecy as a 
multifaceted reality that placed them inside and us outside. 
News coverage consistently dichotomized the spaces of WTO meetings, 
circulating clear boundaries between a them on the inside and an us on the outside. The 
New York Times reported that delegates had planned “intense, closed-door talks,” while 
protesters in the streets aimed “to make their protests as visible as possible.”160 CNN’s 
Rusty Dornin told audiences, “Protesters may not become the core discussion inside the 
conference halls, but they plan to lead the discussion outside.”161 This newscast showed 
environmental and labor groups marching in the streets outside the meeting as reporter 
Dornin narrated, “both are angry to be left out of negotiations.” Greenhouse interviewed 
protester Bill Simpich “who started his day in the rainy, pre-dawn darkness by gathering 
with other protesters in a park near the Pike Place Market and then marching toward the 
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convention hall.” 162 This characterization marked the protesters as on the literal outside 
of the convention center, and Simpich drew similar lines verbally, telling The New York 
Times, “We will keep marching until the process is open and until they let the people in 
the door when the decisions are made.”163 News media thus distinguished between the 
inside and outside of the WTO meeting, drawing literal and metaphorical boundaries that 
separated a democratic us from an elite them.  
Finally, the protests amplified the domestic autonomy critique, charging that, in 
the unequivocal words of one flier, “The WTO undermines national sovereignty.”164 
News media circulated images of the hundreds of environmentalist protesters who wore 
sea turtle costumes, thereby giving physical presence to the creatures that U.S. 
environmental laws protected before the WTO overruled this safeguard.165 The New York 
Times reported on demonstrations during which “Speaker after speaker voiced anger” 
about how the WTO “overturned national laws that protected the environment, 
endangered species and consumers.” 166 From these news accounts, the demos emerged as 
a combination of human, animal, and system, all located within the confines of the 
nation-state and each made equivalent by their opposition to the WTO’s undermining of 
popular sovereignty. As one protester explained to ABC, “it’s the basic issue of 
sovereignty, of democracy that gets all these disparate constituencies riled up about the 
WTO.”167 
The popular sovereignty critique was viscerally amplified when the state clashed 
with protesters to ensure that the WTO could meet. Officers of the SPD arrived at the 
protests in black uniforms and protective helmets with face guards, carrying batons.168 As 
direct action protesters refused to break their physical blockades, the police issued a 
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warning. “We will forcibly remove you from this intersection,” one officer explained as 
he paced back and forth between a line of protesters on the ground and a line of standing 
police officers.169  “I would like to not hurt anyone,” he declared. “However, we will 
clear this intersection. We will clear it with chemical and pain compliance. If you do not 
move, you will be the subject of pain.” 170 Protesters covered their faces with bandanas 
dipped in vinegar, which would dampen the effects of airborne chemicals. Officers 
affixed their gas masks before taking formation and moving on protesters with batons, 
guns shooting rubber bullets, pepper spray, tear gas, and armored vehicles.171 
On the ground, this display of force amplified the charge of undermining local 
sovereignty because officers of the SPD privileged the meeting’s delegates over the 
protesters in the city’s streets. The police issued a sartorial warning to protesters even 
before they told them to disperse; the police’s gear suggested the possibility of an armed 
confrontation should protesters disrupt the WTO’s planned meetings. When the police 
enacted their warning with physical assault, protesters felt their marginalization at a 
physical level. Mac Lojowsky described the feeling of tear gas: “My eyes and face were 
on fire…Inside my body, my lungs began to seize with burning pain. My stomach began 
to contract uncontrollably, and I began throwing up heavy globs of mucus.”172 Since 
many protesters understood themselves as protecting their version of democracy, such 
visceral experiences created a multi-modal enactment of the claim that democratic 
sovereignty was under attack by the WTO and its supporters.  
This charge was further amplified when Seattle’s mayor “ordered 25 square 
blocks of downtown cordoned off,” making “the heart of the city” a “no protest zone” 
patrolled by police who removed “any visible signs of protest against the WTO,” 
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including “signs, leaflets, buttons and even t-shirts.”173 Although the order did not 
explicitly name the restricted area a “no protest zone,” it blocked anyone with anti-WTO 
messaging from entering the area.174 St. Clair watched as “a gang of cops body-slammed 
a protester who was standing on 6th Avenue handing out leaflets,” and as “Dozens of 
protesters were arrested immediately” upon entering the zone.175 Again, for protesters on 
the ground, enforcement of such an order made the claim of lack of sovereignty real by 
incorporating multiple senses into a system of signification in which protesters 
constituted an us defending democracy against an autocratic them who would undermine 
domestic civil liberties to push their agenda. 
The news media amplified the sovereignty critique and the us/them opposition by 
circulating images and narratives that portrayed state forces repressing protesters and 
supporting WTO delegates. For example, CBS aired footage of officers in masks carrying 
protesters away, as anchor Dan Rather explained, “Backed by the national guard, police 
finally cleared protesters from the streets of Seattle today.”176 The broadcast later showed 
an elderly white woman sitting on the ground next to two younger white adults; all three 
had their hands secured behind their backs in plastic wrist cuffs. The elder woman 
explained to the camera, “We got arrested for trespassing on the public streets,” the tinge 
of sarcasm in her voice implicitly indicting the police for infringing upon protesters’ right 
to assemble. As the camera panned to a white adult woman in a bright National Lawyers’ 
Guild cap, reporter John Roberts explained, “Attorney Amy Kratz was pushed away as 
she tried to act as a legal observer in one mass arrest.” Looking into the camera, Kratz 
explained, “I’m not really familiar with cities being able to suspend the Constitution.” In 
contrast to protester treatment, the same report showed adults in suits—mostly white 
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men—freely moving past police through a glass door as Roberts narrated, “With 
protesters swept away, the WTO was back in business. Delegates, whose movements had 
been frustrated Tuesday, walked the streets freely.” Other news media coverage offered 
similar juxtapositions of how protesters and delegates were treated by the state.177  
This news coverage amplified the existing charge that domestic sovereignty 
would be overturned to advance the WTO agenda by circulating a literal and physical 
manifestation of this claim. Such imagery could comfortably fold into an existing system 
of signification that hailed the WTO’s opponents as defenders of domestic democracy 
and denounced the organization’s supporters as global autocrats. As one letter to editor of 
The New York Times said, “By unleashing the National Guard on a group of citizens 
exercising its constitutional rights to free speech and assembly–in the country that claims 
to provide more freedoms than any other–it seems that the government has gone a long 
way toward proving the demonstrators’ point.”178 These discourses strengthened the 
oppositional pairing between us and them by constructing the demos as a set of 
nationally-anchored activists with diverse demands who were made equivalent by 
suffering physical and metaphorical marginalization at the hands of an adversary aligned 
with free trade. 
Amplifying and embodying the existing critiques constructed the protesters as a 
democratic us and the WTO as an autocratic them. Existing critiques allowed specific 
manifestations of resistance to the WTO—like flier language, physical marches, or state 
violence—to attach to an existing system of signification that drew equivalences between 
opponents of the WTO and cast the organization’s supporters out as others. The amplified 
critiques constituted the demos as a collection of human actors—activists, laborers, 
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environmentalists, public organizations—and elements traditionally associated with the 
natural world—like sea turtles—all unified as a political force through their opposition to 
the WTO. This configuration expelled free trade from democracy because the WTO was 
understood as an organization that advanced a free trade agenda, a position that the 
demos on the streets overtly rejected as elite and undemocratic. Seattle’s demos was also 
constituted through its defense of our democracy, which emphasized national 
sovereignty, popular participation, and social protections. The protests thus offered multi-
modal amplifications of existing critiques that cast the WTO as autocratic and its 
challengers as democratic.  
Articulating Economic Democracy 
Having expelled the WTO and its supporters from our midst, protesters offered 
their performance of economic democracy as the only legitimate form, casting the 
WTO’s free trade regime outside of democracy’s boundaries. Protesters and news media 
coverage crafted visions of an economic democracy that privileged mass participation, 
plurality, and solidarity. As tens of thousands of protesters gathered in Seattle, news 
media circulated accounts of this wide-scale participation; television networks and 
newspapers foregrounded depictions of the demonstrations as “massive in scale,” 
characterizing the event as “one of the biggest protest efforts in years,” which had drawn 
“thousands” of participants “from more than 500 organizations.”179 Newscasts featured 
footage of Seattle’s streets crowded with masses marching in endless streams past 
cameras and reporters.180 These depictions allowed audiences to visualize popular 
sovereignty by drawing on the familiar logic of numbers in protests, wherein significant 
participation offers a spectacle of legitimacy to dissent, particularly when it is covered by 
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media.181 The emphasis on masses offered such a spectacle of popular participation as a 
marker of our economic democracy, as juxtaposed with the selective delegates of their 
economic autocracy. In our democracy, the masses implied, many people participated in 
deliberations on economic policy.  
Both protesters and news media explicitly noted the multiplicity that comprised 
these masses, treating differences as an attribute of, rather than an impediment to, 
democracy. Protester Stephanie Guilloud celebrated the “broad spectrum of people” who 
gathered to oppose the WTO in their “different voices.”182 Ace Saturay, a participant in 
the Seattle International People’s Assembly, remarked that the gathering drew “various 
organizations, citizens’ movements and NGOs from twelve countries in Asia, Central 
America, Africa, the Middle East, Canada and USA.”183 Greenhouse documented such 
plurality for The New York Times, writing, “protest groups range from the well-known, 
like Friends of the Earth and the Humane Society, to the obscure, like the Ruckus Society 
and Raging Grannies.”184 ABC depicted white middle-aged men holding signs rejecting 
the WTO; the camera then panned to images of Asian people practicing yoga on a grassy 
area.185 Narrating these visuals, Wang reported on the “conservative Republicans” as well 
as members of “the Chinese spiritual movement” participating in demonstrations.186 
These accounts preserved the differences inherent to the demos’ linkages, thus 
constituting, in the words of one flyer, “a diverse, international civil society movement 
opposed to corporate globalization.”187 Protesters and news media offered a vision of 
globalized economic democracy that privileged difference. 
The protests further articulated their democratic alternative to the WTO by 
emphasizing pluralistic action and identification. The horizontal structure of the massive 
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protests empowered interest groups to act autonomously. With so many groups 
organizing actions, complete coordination could not take hold, particularly because 
groups did not agree on ideologies and tactics. For example, the AFL-CIO eschewed 
direct action in favor of a march, while DAN planned a series of coordinated actions that 
put protesters’ bodies in direct confrontation with WTO delegates and police. DAN, in 
turn, rejected tactics such as property destruction and physical assault, which groups like 
the Black Bloc embraced as useful modes of disruption.188 Even within specific networks, 
subgroups acted with relative autonomy. For example, protesters participating with DAN 
formed “self-reliant groups of 5-20 people” called “affinity groups,” which were 
composed of “people who are friends, coworkers, from the same neighborhood, city, 
workplace or school, or people who have a common identity or interest.”189 Members of 
these groups planned their own actions, used tactics suitable to them, and made in-the-
moment group decisions on Seattle’s streets.190  
These organizing patterns offered protesters the experience of radical democratic 
pluralism. Mouffe argued that pluralism names a condition in which social agents 
recognize the “particularity” and “limitation” of their claims, such that difference 
decenters universality.191 On the ground in Seattle, different tactics and ideologies existed 
simultaneously and eschewed totalizing unity, apart from rejecting the WTO. Even such 
rejection was pluralistic because protest groups acutely disagreed about whether to 
reform or abolish the organization and reached no consensus on the matter.192 For 
Mouffe, radical democratic politics place limits on pluralism because some forms of 
difference mean unacceptable subordination; therefore, radical democratic politics 
consistently advance contestation over which differences are appropriate and which must 
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be rejected.193 The Seattle protesters rejected the WTO’s autocracy as an unacceptable 
difference, which set the horizon for expulsion. Positions short of this horizon were 
largely treated as having at least some claim to legitimacy.194 These organizing patterns 
offered protesters the experience of participatory political engagement on economic 
policy, in which interest groups enacted the kind of agency that members crafted 
together. In their planning and execution, protest groups largely de-emphasized totalizing 
consensus between groups, beyond opposition to the WTO. This sense of democratic 
engagement on economics differed significantly from the WTO’s expelled model, 
wherein individual delegates represented entire nations as a unified whole and aimed at 
widespread consensus. 
While maintaining a space for acceptable difference, the Seattle protests featured 
enactments of solidarity that solidified equivalences between individuals and groups. 
Solidarity is an act of political intersubjectivity whereby, in Max Pensky’s words, 
individuals and groups “assume obligations to one another” and foster a sense of 
“belonging” in a community.195 In Seattle, acts of solidarity sutured protesters and groups 
to each other. Lojowsky recounted the “human tidal wave, crossing cultural, political, 
sexual, economic, and geographical boundaries joined in solidarity to overtake the streets 
of Seattle that Tuesday afternoon.”196 He described how “Environmentalists joined the 
march with topless, radical feminists, linked arm-in-arm with graying steel workers,” 
while “A large delegation of Chinese activists marched with American students” and 
“Longshoremen, carpenters and bikers chanted along with organic farmers, French 
farmers and young revolutionaries.”197 St. Clair celebrated with other protesters when a 
contingent of unionists broke from their planned march to join direct actions near the 
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convention center.198 He also recalled the cheers erupting in Seattle’s streets when 
protesters learned that “Inside the WTO, the African nations had shown the same 
solidarity as the protesters in the streets” when “They refused to buckle to US demands,” 
and “hung together” until “the WTO talks collapsed.”199  
Such moments of intersubjectivity solidified equivalences by creating 
multidimensional bonds between participants. The African delegates’ simultaneous acts 
of solidarity and rejection allowed them to transform from them to us, thus crossing over 
the inside/outside dichotomy. On the streets, individual protesters drew on their trainings 
and each other’s words to incorporate their affective experiences into systems of meaning 
that named their felt intensities as solidarity.200 Lojowsky described the “total energy of 
solidarity” that ran along the streets as people linked arms and refused to move.201 
Guilloud recalled how police’s tear gas and pepper spray co-mingled with the sense of 
intersubjectivity on the street, leaving protesters “feeling the heat of solidarity move 
through our veins to throat, tongue, and mouth.”202 Anarchist organizer Chris Crass 
described “Being tear gassed in the streets with thousands of amazing activists” as an 
experience that “brought so many emotions to the forefront – anger and profound 
sadness.”203 He named this mixture of emotions as the “undeniable sense of solidarity 
with everyone who is struggling in the streets to resist corporate tyranny.”204 Seattle 
protesters feeling such solidarity incarnated an alternative mode of economic agency. As 
Pensky noted, “belonging to a group in solidarity is not derivative from a calculation of 
the benefits that membership grants to the individual person”; rather, solidarity embraces 
the costs as well as the benefits of belonging, even if costs outweigh benefits.205 
Protesters on the ground, then, expelled the WTO’s model of economic deliberation, 
	 241 
which privileged negotiations based on delegates’ calculations of benefit. Instead, 
economic solidarity emerged from Seattle as the possibility of creating bonded 
communities that pursued their economic values, even at individual risk. 
News media also rendered protesters’ differences equivalent by highlighting the 
solidarity between unionists and environmentalists taking shape at the protests. Such a 
combination was striking because prominent discourses since at least the 1970s had 
consistently constructed the two groups as adversaries by pitting environmental health 
against employment opportunities.206 Before the protests, some voices articulated the 
possibility of such an alliance in various academic journals and opinion pieces in 
newspapers.207 NAFTA protests had also brought labor and environmentalists to the same 
table to strategize against the agreement, but without much amplification.208 Seattle 
coverage brought the unusual alliance to the forefront, with television news showing 
images and recounting narratives of unionists joining environmentalists to oppose the 
WTO.209 The New York Times reported on the “20,000 union members and their allies” 
who “packed Memorial Stadium” to cheer speakers like “James P. Hoffa, the Teamsters 
union president” and “Carl Pope, the executive director of the Sierra Club.”210 Writing 
for The Los Angeles Times, Marc Cooper characterized the “scenes from Seattle,” where, 
in the words of one protest sign, “Teamsters and Turtles” came “Together at Last,” as 
once “totally unimaginable.”211 These stories covered the coalition as a moment in which 
former adversaries assumed mutual obligation to each other to oppose a shared adversary. 
Such solidarity reconstituted the boundaries of exclusion to form a community bonded by 
shared opposition and mutual support.  
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In sum, protesters and media coverage drew on existing discourses to constitute 
the WTO as an autocratic adversary of the demos. Drawing frontiers between us and 
them enabled political engagement over economic governance because, as Mouffe 
argued, contestation is the marker of politics. Having constituted the demos’ autocratic 
outside, protesters and media coverage expelled free trade from protesters’ democracy, 
offering a vision of economic engagement that privileged mass participation, plurality, 
and solidarity. 
Co-Articulating Free Trade and Violence in Seattle 
The protests further cleaved democracy from free trade by associating the latter 
with violence. Although democratic practice has long had violence embedded within it, 
prominent discourses of the Post-World War II era marked democracy as an alternative to 
political violence, and neoliberal articulations re-iterated these discourses.212 Neoliberal 
discourses of the 1990s re-articulated this association when they suggested that the 
proliferation of capitalist democracy would bring peace to the world. The WTO protests 
antagonized this promise as violence erupted in the streets of Seattle.  
Violence is an empty signifier, but it often refers to a forceful disruption in which 
some entity negates or acts upon another.213 Slavoj Žižek distinguished between 
“subjective” violence, which is “performed by a clearly identifiable agent,” and objective 
violence, which is accepted as “inherent” to the “‘normal’ state of things” and is not 
necessarily attributable to responsible agents.214 Many people are more capable of 
perceiving the subjective variety of violence because we often understand violence as a 
rupture, a disruption in the “normal” functioning of life.215 Objective violence is difficult 
to perceive as violence because it refers to the harm that is accepted as a normal part of a 
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functioning system. Therefore, it is easier to perceive, for example, one person shooting 
another as violence than it is to characterize the physical and emotional harm caused by 
unemployment as violent. Indeed, Žižek argued that subjective and objective violence 
“cannot be perceived form the same standpoint” because objective violence is so 
normalized that it becomes part of the nonviolent scene that subjective violence 
disrupts.216 
Like any system, neoliberal globalization in the 1990s perpetrated systemic 
violence, which was often difficult for people to perceive as violent. Systemic violence is 
a form of objective violence that refers to, in Žižek’s words, “the often catastrophic 
consequences of the smooth functioning of our economic and political systems.”217 For 
Žižek, the fundamental difficulty with neoliberal systemic violence is that “it is no longer 
attributable to concrete individuals and their ‘evil’ intentions, but is purely ‘objective,’ 
systemic, anonymous.”218 Drawing on Žižek and Michel Foucault, Johanna Oksala 
argued that neoliberalism strips systemic violence of politics and morality, understanding 
destruction in purely economic terms.219 The systemic violence of neoliberal 
globalization was difficult to perceive because such obfuscation is a characteristic of all 
objective violence and because structural violence was primarily understood in economic 
terms, as destruction that was necessary for economic prosperity. 
Despite these difficulties, the Seattle protests rendered the systemic violence of 
neoliberalism perceptible and political through enactments of subjective violence. As 
Michael Kevin DeLuca and Jennifer Peeples demonstrated, images and narratives of 
violence “functioned as the dramatic leads for substantive discussions of the issues 
provoking the protests.”220 Because “the protesters’ criticisms of the WTO received an 
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impressively extensive and sympathetic airing,” the violence ultimately “sparked a 
conversation about the violence of global corporations in their daily practices.”221 
Moreover, the protests marked neoliberal free trade as violent when police and protesters 
engaged in recognizable forms of violence. In a milieu where, in Deluca and Peeples’ 
words, “news is attracted to disturbers of order and deviation from the routine,” news 
media rushed to cover these eruptions of perceptible violence.222 Mediated clashes 
between police and protesters thus created visions of threatening chaos and turmoil that 
co-articulated neoliberal free trade with violence. In what follows, I first explain why 
police actions and protester engagement could be considered violence; then, I 
demonstrate how these dual modes of subjective aggression co-articulated neoliberal free 
trade and violence. 
Police Violence 
The presence of armed, protected, and prepared police marked the trade talks as a 
space where violence could erupt. On the ground, demonstrators were met with what one 
protester called “paramilitary riot squads.”223 Police arrived at the convention center in 
armored vehicles and emerged from these so-called “peacekeeper” vans clad head to toe 
in bullet-proof armor and carrying batons, guns loaded with rubber bullets, and canisters 
of tear gas and pepper spray.224 Media reports depicted armed and protected police 
marching in formation and riding on horseback down the streets of Seattle.225 NBC’s 
Nightly News covered “how jittery the authorities are as these meetings get under way,” 
reporting that “Law enforcement forces” were “prepared for all sorts of potential threats, 
including acts of terrorism.”226 One day before the meetings were scheduled to begin, 
news media showed police shutting down the convention center because of a “security 
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concern.”227 CNN Worldview reported that police had “declared a lockdown, kept every-
body outside for four hours while the SWAT team surveyed the situation inside,” 
deciding “after about four hours…that it was safe for the other folks to go in.”228 
This police presence permeated the free trade talks with the threat of violence. 
Threat is a powerful emotion that self-substantiates, creating what Brian Massumi 
described as “a felt certainty about the world, even in the absence of other grounding for 
it in the observable world.”229 The threat of violence widely circulated in the 1990s as 
part of what Chin-Kuei Tsui called President Clinton’s “new terrorism” discourse.230 
“New terrorism” rhetoric circulated the fearful anticipation that attacks like the 1995 
Oklahoma City bombing or 1996 Centennial Olympic Park bombing would continue to 
disrupt the peaceful functioning of the United States in a globalizing world.231 As a site 
dedicated to the globalization of free trade, the WTO meetings were deemed a likely 
target for such violent disruption. Police preparation and armored presence thus 
harnessed threatening discourses of terrorism to attach a diffuse sense of violent threat to 
the free trade meetings. 
This threat was realized when police officers physically assaulted protesters. 
When protesters refused orders to disperse, police aimed pepper spray directly at 
protesters’ eyes, shoved and beat them, and launched canisters of tear gas, rubber bullets, 
and concussion grenades into groups of demonstrators.232 Protesters understood these 
assaults as violence because they experienced bodily harm inflicted upon them by 
specific agents. St. Clair later narrated his experience: “my eyes began to boil in my head, 
my lips burned and it seemed impossible to draw a breath.”233 As he “staggered back up” 
	 246 
the street to get away from the tear gas, he “stumbled into a cop” who “turned and gave 
me a swift whack to my side with the tip of his riot club.”234  
Protesters experiencing such an assault could also understand police actions as 
violence because the demonstrators had constructed their direct action as nonviolent. 
Direct action refers to what April Carter called collective and public “methods of 
noncooperation, obstruction or defiance” that seek to challenge a system by engaging in 
modes of dissent that are not constitutionally protected.235 The role of (non)violence is 
still debated, though direct action has largely been co-articulated with nonviolence since 
at least the mid-twentieth century.236 Nonviolent direct actions have functioned 
rhetorically as dramatic confrontations that make systemic violence visible by provoking 
or threatening subjective violence.237  
During a week-long preparation event in Seattle, DAN trained protesters to 
engage in “mass nonviolent direct action” to “creatively and nonviolently shut down the 
WTO.”238 There, affinity groups could practice modes of such direct action as blockades, 
in which groups “take on responsibility for blockading one section of the streets 
surrounding the WTO opening, so that it is completely inaccessible.”239 Groups 
associated with DAN consented to nonviolence guidelines, promising to refrain from 
bringing weapons, engaging in physical or verbal violence, and destroying property.240 
Even participants in the Anarchist Black Bloc, whose protest tactics include property 
destruction, agreed to refrain from such action if the police did not physically assault 
protesters.241 Having cloaked themselves in the rhetoric of nonviolence, direct action 
protesters could understand police assaults as violence—as a harmful disruption that 
disturbed the nonviolent order. In a display of such disruptive force, one protester 
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recounted how a police car charged at people in a blockade, while the protesters chanted, 
“nonviolence.”242 Demonstrators could understand themselves as victims, who stood their 
“nonviolent” ground in the face of physical assault.  
News media circulated stories of these physical assaults of protesters perpetrated 
by police officers. The New York Times reported that “police used tear gas, pepper spray 
and rubber pellets” against demonstrators.243 The story also described how “uniformed 
officers fired rubber-coated capsules at protesters. The pellets, which the police said 
contained chemical irritants, hit some of the protesters in the leg or the arm, causing 
visible welts.” For days, television news circulated footage of riot police spraying tear 
gas and pepper spray directly onto demonstrators who shielded their faces with bandanas 
and raincoats. The footage also showed riot police shooting into crowds of protesters 
from atop their armored vehicles and physically assaulting individual protesters.244 For 
example, CBS Evening News featured shaking footage of the dark Seattle street, in which 
several police officers shoved a single protester to the ground, hit him with batons, and 
aimed their guns at the casually clad demonstrator writhing on the street.245  
This imagery could be understood as violent by news media and viewers because 
it featured subjective physical assault, perpetrated by police officers against protester 
victims. Subjective physical assault is commonly understood as a kind of violence, and 
this construction was made clear by the asymmetrical engagement between police and 
protesters. Police wore armor and used weapons, while protesters wore casual clothing 
with which they protected themselves; The New York Times highlighted such asymmetry 
by recounting how police used “tear gas” on demonstrators engaged in “a largely 
peaceful protest.”246 Other reports also cast protesters as victims of police violence by 
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characterizing protesters as some combination of white, nonviolent, and physically 
hurt.247  
For example, CBS Evening News showed a violent exchange in which a masked 
police officer clad in riot gear reached for a white woman holding a brown folder. 
Roberts narrated, “She carried no banner, just business papers. The young woman said 
she wanted only to use the streets of her city.” The woman was shown swatting the 
officer’s hand away as she said, “Don’t touch me. I’m not bothering anybody here. I’m 
standing right here. Get out of my face.” Roberts explained, “In Seattle today, however, 
to challenge the police in any way was to risk arrest. With uncompromising force the 
police in Seattle today sought to end any kind of protest in the city center.” On screen, the 
officer shoved the woman, first with his hand and then his baton, while another officer 
grabbed her by the collar and slammed her against a concrete wall before dragging her 
away. The narration marked this woman as a fellow-protester because of her encounter 
with the police on Seattle’s streets. Although she verbally rebuked the police, her white 
womanhood comingled with officers’ physical assault to render her recognizable as a 
victim of police violence. As this example illustrates, police actions were understood as 
violence because they conformed to common discourses that frame physical assault of 
victims as moments of violence. 
Protester Violence 
Even as some protesters were marked as victims, other demonstrators engaged as 
agents of subjective violence. On the ground, some demonstrators “fought back” against 
police assaults, picking up tear gas canisters from Seattle’s streets and launching them at 
the police.248 Protesters assaulting police officers could see themselves as acting in self-
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defense against a police force that had attacked them first. Nonetheless, they confronted 
police with acts that could be considered violent because they refused to take a purely 
victimized position and retaliated with physical force and weaponry, if in an 
asymmetrical manner. Protesters also destroyed property, a tactic that began after José 
Bové, who St. Clair identified as “a sheep farmer from Millau …and a leader of… a 
French environmental group,” gave a rousing speech in front of a McDonald’s. 249 Bove 
and others broke the chain restaurant’s windows and invited “the customers and workers 
to join the marchers on the streets.”250 The next day, Anarchist Black Bloc participants 
broke the storefront windows that lined Seattle’s downtown shopping district and defaced 
buildings with spray paint.251  
Anarchists may not have considered their property destruction violent, but they 
engaged in such behavior with the knowledge that many—perhaps even most—observers 
could understand these acts as violence. Black Bloc participants understood their 
vandalism as a powerful symbolic “attack,” but not as violence because, according to the 
ACME Collective’s post-N30 Communiqué, they “targeted corporate property,” not 
people.252 This communiqué contended that, for its anarchist authors, “property 
destruction is not a violent activity.”253 Indeed, this communiqué questioned other 
protesters’ “nonviolence,” describing how “so-called ‘non-violent’ activists physically 
attacked individuals who targeted corporate property.”254 While Anarchists’ construction 
of violence did not include property destruction, as Bart Cammaerts explained, “legally 
and certainly in its mediated representation and public perception, this distinction is often 
not made” and, as such, “damage to property is uniformly represented and punished as 
violence.”255 This approach stems from a longstanding bourgeois attitude that 
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equivocates destruction of property with destruction of people.256 Property destruction 
and forceful self-defense against police participated in what Cammaerts described as “the 
long-standing Anarchist tradition of ‘propaganda by the deed,’” whereby activists enact 
fearlessness and physical force to destabilize the power of private property and law 
enforcement.257 
These moments of conspicuous subjective violence drew media attention as 
newsworthy moments.258 News media widely circulated stories and visual footage of 
subjective violence perpetrated by protesters in the form of physical assault and property 
destruction. Video footage showed protesters throwing smoke canisters and safety cones 
at police, and The New York Times reported that protesters “attacked” multiple 
authorities, including “police officers,” “A security officer,” and even “several bus 
drivers.”259 Most television coverage of the protests spent significant time depicting 
masked protesters clad in black running through Seattle’s downtown streets, using 
hammers, baseball bats, safety cones, street signs, and their bodies to break the large 
storefront windows of establishments like U.S. Bank and Starbucks Coffee.260 Footage 
also showed protesters spray-painting buildings, jumping on cars, and overturning trash 
cans and newspaper boxes, sometimes setting them on fire.261 Some reports showed the 
aftermath of property destruction—shattered glass, boarded up windows, and spray-
painted building walls, and a downtown inaccessible to owners and shoppers.262  
These deeds could be understood as violent because they took the form of 
physical assault and because the news media explicitly called the actions “violence.”263 
Individual police officers were visually accessible as subjects who protesters targeted for 
physical assault. Also, the long-standing bourgeois norm of treating property as 
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something worth protecting created the possibility for seeing protesters’ property 
destruction as a physical assault aimed at an object-cum-subject. Moreover, news media 
narratives characterized what viewers were seeing as violence. For example, Rather 
reported on CBS Evening News that the WTO meetings “were overshadowed by some 
carefully orchestrated violent protests in the streets.”264 Behind Rather, viewers could see 
images of a street filled with protesters and lined with armed riot police. Although these 
specific images did not feature physical assaults or property destruction, Rather’s words 
framed the reception of these and subsequent images as moments of violence. Later in the 
broadcast, Roberts repeated this characterization, explaining that “Protesters turned 
violent,” as images of protesters’ assaults and destructions flashed on screen. 265 Other 
media sources echoed such a characterization; CNN and NBC both named the protesters’ 
actions as “violence,” and The New York Times described the “surge of violence” that had 
overcome protests in Seattle.266 
In addition to overtly naming protesters’ modes of engagement as “violence,” 
news media bolstered this construction by using words associated aggression and 
disruption. Across news media, accounts described how protesters “attacked” and 
“smashed” storefront windows, engaging in a “rampage” that caused “mayhem,” 
“turmoil,” and “terror” in Seattle.267 These words framed the visual and verbal accounts 
of protester engagement in aggressive terms, so that visuals coalesced with these words to 
form a sense of violent eruption in Seattle’s streets. Characterizing these actions as 
disruptions, The New York Times described how “minutes after the union and 
environmental groups passed through downtown, the mood changed” when other 
protesters engaged in violent acts of disruption, causing “jarring sights in a city that 
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prides itself on its laid-back image.”268 Such characterizations described some protesters 
violating the dual norms of Seattle’s spirit and marchers’ emotional tenor, thus casting 
these moments as ruptures of the non-violent norm. 
Further characterizing such engagement as a violent disruption, news media 
verbally and visually distinguished between protesters employing such aggression and 
nonviolent demonstrators. CBS Evening News juxtaposed “destruction” and “rowdy, but 
non-violent, protest.”269 The New York Times described the “destruction” that “was 
carried out…by a relatively small gang of self-proclaimed anarchists” as they implicitly 
chastised police for ignoring this violence while “using tear gas nearby to contain what 
had been a largely peaceful protest near the convention hall.”270 Offering visual contrast, 
NBC juxtaposed an image of a white woman holding up her left hand in a peace sign 
with stunned crowds standing near a smashed Starbucks window.271 CNN cut from an 
image of a large and colorful day-time street march to footage of a smoke-filled street at 
night, where protesters hurled canisters of gas.272 These verbal and visual contrasts 
established that some protesters ruptured the assumed normalcy of nonviolent protest, 
thus marking some forms of engagement as violent. 
News stories bolstered this construction by showing nonviolent protesters 
denouncing and distancing themselves from acts of destruction. As images flashed of 
black-clad, masked protesters breaking windows, CBS gave voice to “the hundreds of 
organized protest groups” who “deny involvement” in any of these actions.273 The New 
York Times reported that “demonstrators shouted at the vandals to stop the violence” and 
that “groups that had planned to be arrested all along sent out a call for a ‘massive 
cleanup’ of the damage done by people they labeled as vandals.”274 This story 
	 253 
constructed protesters as internally divided into a nonviolent, decorous mass and a 
violent, disrespectful group. This story highlighted how “Dozens of the protesters” in the 
former group “took brooms to the fresh scars of the city’s retail core” to atone for the 
pain that the destruction had caused the city.275 Such vivid coverage of these embodied 
denouncements on the part of protesters worked proactively to simultaneously bestow 
virtue upon nonviolent protesters and to cast people engaged in destruction as others who 
had disturbed overlapping norms. 
News media constructed these others as menacing perpetrators of violence. 
Multiple news reports depicted protesters—many of whom could be read as white— 
“dressed in black,” with their faces covered with bandanas and “black masks.”276 Their 
monochrome darks and covered faces made distinguishing between protesters difficult 
and suggested that they had planned to obfuscate recognition. Moreover, focusing on the 
group’s black attire, news media’s visuals implicitly drew on common (neo)colonial 
light/dark dichotomies to suggest that these protesters constituted a sinister group that had 
specifically chosen to identify themselves with darkness, rather than light.277 Media 
referred to these black-clad protesters as “vandals” and “troublemakers,” and allowed 
them to voice their identification as “Anarchists.”278 Such words and images combined to 
differentiate this group of protesters as a menacing force that disregarded established 
laws and forms of decorum.  
Such characterizations negotiated common tensions of chaos/order to further 
construct these protesters as menacing perpetrators. ABC’s World News Tonight 
characterized Anarchists and their fellow disrupters as “Troublemakers with no political 
agenda”; the camera showed a masked protester standing in front of several young men 
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of color with exposed faces, as one unmasked young man told the reporter, “There ain’t 
no point; it’s just fun.”279 NBC Nightly News showed footage of masked protesters, who 
could just barely be read as white by the skin that peaked out through their black garb, 
alongside several young men of color without masks cheering as a window broke.280 The 
scene then cut to a vision of several shadowy figures quickly taking items from store 
shelves, while the newscaster characterized the activity as “a rampage of destruction and 
looting.”281 When asked how he felt “about all the vandalism and destruction left 
behind,” one demonstrator averted their masked face from the camera and responded, “I 
feel great about it.”282 These narratives of chaos drew on neocolonial discourses that 
construct dark spaces filled with (dark) “others” as a wilderness that calls for taming and 
containment by white, bourgeois people and institutions.283 The images combined visions 
of a dark street, men of color, and white people draped in black clothing and masks to 
constitute the streets of Seattle as a wild place, where rules of civilization had collapsed.  
Simultaneously, news media constructed the protesters as highly motivated and 
organized political actors who posed a threat to the status quo because of their strategic 
prowess and discipline. NBC Nightly News characterized the protesters as “highly 
organized,” and showed Chief Norm Stamper of the Seattle Police Department telling 
reporters, “The anarchists are very well trained in the tactics they’re using.”284 World 
News Tonight’s Judy Muller explained that while “‘Organized anarchy’ might seem like 
an oxymoron…Dozens of young people have been planning for months about ways to 
incite the crowds at this event.” 285 Muller told audiences, “in fact, many of them had 
been drilled, gathering this summer in Eugene, Oregon, where they nurtured an ideology 
based on the destruction of capitalist societies.”286 The camera then showed a young 
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white man with a bandana around his neck but with his face uncovered, telling Muller, 
“A lot of people equate anarchy with chaos. That’s not at all what anarchy is. Anarchy is 
actually organized.”287 Mike Dolan, identified as the Deputy Director of Public Citizen 
on the screen, told ABC that he had “seen them on the periphery of some of these 
peaceful demonstrations, and they seem almost drilled to a sort of military precision.”288 
These accounts characterized Anarchists as, in the words of NBC Nightly News reporter 
Kelly O’Donelly, “mostly young, middle class whites, described as angry and anxious 
about the future, determined to antagonize the establishment.”289 Drawing on discourses 
that mark white men of means as embodiments of human ability, these newscasters 
constructed Anarchists as smart political actors who had blended strict training, 
ideological fervor, and chaos to attack the free trade regime specifically and capitalism 
more generally. These narratives suggested that young, white, men were breaking norms 
of political decorum and instead embracing a “strategy” that emphasized the “open 
advocation [sic] of violence.”290  In sum, the mainstream news media constructed some 
protesters as menacing perpetrators engaged in recognizable forms of subjective violence. 
Neoliberal Free Trade and Violence 
Embodied and mediated clashes between police and protesters marked free trade 
as a site of violence. For protesters on the ground, clashes incarnated a physical battle 
between neoliberal free trade and its activist opponents. A critique of systemic neoliberal 
violence had brought many activists to Seattle; as one call to organize explained, “various 
grassroots groups prepare to take action” against the WTO because “the CAPITALIST 
SYSTEM, based on the exploitation of people, societies and the environment for the 
profit of a few, is the PRIME CAUSE of present SOCIAL AND ECOLOGICAL 
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TROUBLES.”291 On the city’s streets, both police and protester violence incarnated the 
charge that neoliberal free trade meant violence—not only that perpetrated by protectors 
of the order, but also by those acting in opposition to a worldwide system that stripped 
them of other forms of potent agency. Police assaults made physical the existing claim 
that neoliberal free trade harmed people. Moreover, as some protesters hurled objects at 
the police and destroyed the windows of corporate stores, they transformed themselves 
into what St. Clair called “street warriors” whose embodied “bravery” had culminated in 
a “tremendous triumph: they held the streets long enough to force the WTO to cancel 
their opening day.”292 
When opposing something as diffuse and abstract as “free trade” or “capitalism,” 
incarnating it as an embodied fight can send surges of motivating sensation through both 
individual and collective bodies, allowing intellectual oppositional claims to manifest at a 
physical level. As I explained elsewhere, “Affective experiences are powerful because 
they register as what Catherine Chaput calls a ‘gut feeling’ that seems more personal and 
primordial than the discursive and social.”293 When these feelings attach to a political 
discourse, they become political emotions that feel, as I explained, “more real and 
personal” than experiences “that do not proffer that kind of sensational attachment.” 294 
For the “street warriors,” such embodied engagement constituted free trade—and by 
extension, capitalism—as a practice literally worth fighting against. 
News media also marked free trade negotiations as a space of violence in three 
ways. First, they reported the clashes as part of their WTO meeting coverage. Reports of 
police violence contextualized these assaults as taking place because of free trade 
negotiations. The New York Times reported on how “the police were using tear gas… 
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near the convention hall where the world trade group delegates were to meet.”295 CBS 
Evening News similarly co-articulated the talks and police violence: “Using tear gas and 
pepper spray,” the reporter explained, the police “dispersed a group of demonstrators who 
had blocked the routes to the WTO conference and canceled its ceremonial opening.”296 
The visual coverage implicitly drew on tropes of police-protester contention to co-
articulate free trade and violence. DeLuca and Peeples gave voice to these hidden 
connections when they argued that news coverage of police assaults in Seattle “exposed 
the violence of the state and transnational capital as the allegedly progressive haven of 
Seattle cracked down with a show of force worthy of 1960s Birmingham or Los 
Angeles.”297 Such implicit collective memories of police violence associated free trade 
with struggles for black civil rights, over which police had historically assaulted 
protesters. Thus, media coverage of state-sanctioned assault co-articulated free trade and 
state violence. 
Second, news media characterized demonstrators’ descent into chaos as an 
orchestrated response to free trade and the kinds of economic prosperity that it 
engendered. For instance, Rather explained on CBS Evening News, “World Leaders are in 
Seattle tonight hoping to set the economic agenda for the 21st century, but today, at least, 
they were overshadowed by some carefully orchestrated violent protests in the streets.”298 
An image behind Rather further connected chaos and the WTO; a smoke-filled street 
teemed with police and protesters, several of whom held two large signs that read, 
“Resist!” and “Greed + Ignorance = WTO.” This story also marked the targets of 
protester violence as multinational corporations, which stood as symbols of the economic 
success that free trade advocates promised was possible. Rather explained that a “group 
	 258 
of troublemakers” had “attacked a symbol of Seattle’s economic success, smashing the 
windows of a Starbucks restaurant.”299 Similarly, The New York Times interviewed some 
Anarchists who “said they might have smashed a window or two, but carefully noted that 
any destruction they might have committed was against stores representing what they 
said were ‘multinational corporations’ like Starbucks, Nike or the Gap.”300 These 
accounts connected protester violence to the economic successes associated with free 
trade, marking such policies as spaces that invited civic aggression. 
Finally, news coverage marked free trade as a space of violence by constructing 
police and protester aggression as an aberrant “violent frontline battle over free trade.”301 
On CBS’s Early Show, anchor Bryant Gumbel explained that “Violent street 
confrontations Tuesday between protesters and police have thrown the meetings of the 
World Trade Organization into chaos.”302 News media visually signified such chaos with 
hazy and shaky images of protesters and police bodies moving swiftly in multiple 
directions through streets filled with thick, white smoke.303 Reports cast such chaotic 
scenes as aberrant in the United States, yet common occurrence around free trade talks.304 
For example, NBC Evening News interviewed John Goodman, a white, middle-aged, 
male steelworker in a cowboy hat wearing a shirt with an American flag on it. 305 
Goodman told audiences, “I’ve witnessed things in the last four days that I – I didn’t 
think could happen in America.” Other reports showed similarly chaotic scenes 
simultaneously erupting in London over free trade, thus suggesting that while this chaos 
was perhaps unusual in Goodman’s America, it followed free trade around the world.306  
Discourses of such aberrant chaos stoked fear about free trade. As Žižek argued 
about scenes on television of Hurricane Katrina’s aftermath in New Orleans, mediated 
	 259 
images of chaos in American streets “recall a whole series of real-life media and cultural 
phenomena” depicting a “disintegration of the social order” in Third World countries far 
from the West.307 Žižek explained that this anxiety over images of domestic chaos is 
anchored in a realization that “what we were used to seeing happening THERE was now 
taking place HERE.”308 These images and narratives suggested that free trade could 
summon such a disintegration in spaces unaccustomed to outbursts of such subjective 
violence. This anxiety traversed news stories as a fear that there would be no sanctuary 
from the violence associated with free trade.309 For example, NBC Nightly News 
explained that “For Seattle’s workers and shoppers,” the chaos was “a nightmare.”310 A 
white woman trembled as she spoke the reporter from her car window. She cried, “I just 
wanna be out of the middle of it, I’m scared to death, I just wanna get to work, I want my 
kids out of the car and I don’t wanna be in the middle of this.” 311 Thus, the co-
articulation of free trade and violence circulated fear and anxiety about neoliberal 
globalization from which no one was safe. 
Conclusion 
Combining threats of disruptive violence and visions of popular democracy, the 
protests in Seattle articulated a forceful and widely-circulated choice for the globalizing 
world: neoliberal autocracy or economic democracy. In the neoliberal autocracy 
articulated by the protests, bureaucrats representing wealthy interests met behind closed 
doors, while protesters and police physically battled in chaotic streets, where no one was 
safe. In the protests’ economic democracy, “the people” – composed of 
environmentalists, workers, human rights activists, and the natural world—acted in 
pluralistic solidarity to enact agency over economic globalization. As a December 2 New 
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York Times editorial asserted, “The chaos” in Seattle’s streets had “conveyed a warning” 
about secretive economic deliberations, demonstrating that “vital issues affecting the 
health and prosperity of the planet deserve a visibly fair hearing.”312  
This choice continued to travel globally, as Seattle catapulted the “global justice 
movement” into very public view.313 The lives of many protesters were forever changed, 
as the experience sutured them to the task of challenging neoliberal globalization.314 For 
example, Columbia University economist Suresh Naidu told the Huffington Post that his 
experience protesting in Seattle “was exciting and exhilarating” because “it felt like we 
were winning” and “changing the terms of the debate on free trade.”315 Maidu said that 
his experience in Seattle prompted him to both study the dynamics of international 
economics and participate in movements for global economic justice. More generally, 
these protests had reframed direct action tactics as successful, inspiring subsequent 
challenges to neoliberal globalization in streets around the world.316 Moreover, the 
Seattle protests engendered the rapid proliferation of what Todd Wolfson called the 
“cyber left.”317 The reach of alternative media networks like Indymedia grew 
significantly after Seattle, thus circulating alternative visions of economic democracy 
throughout the world.318 Seattle also encouraged the proliferation of transnational 
organizations and coalitions that challenged neoliberal autocracy and developed modes of 
economic democracy.319 Under such public pressure, the WTO and other international 
economic organizations began to open their deliberations in the years after Seattle, until 
another violent disruption closed elite organizations again in 2001.320  
Just two years after Seattle, the global justice movement’s accelerating power in 
the United States was stunted when the World Trade Center was attacked. This attack 
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prompted many U.S. global justice activists to re-consider tactics, goals, and foci.321 
Moreover, the U.S. response to the attacks re-energized a global security regime and a 
new war effort. Emboldened by laws and resources that authorized surveillance and pre-
emptive action in the name of security, law enforcement officials developed what Patrick 
F. Gillham called “strategic incapacitation” to infiltrate and shut down social movement 
groups like those advocating for global economic justice.322 Finally, after September 11, 
many of the U.S. groups left standing focused on specifically opposing the 2003 U.S. 
invasion of Iraq and, because of increased security measures, moved away from engaging 
in direct actions.323 Despite these difficulties, in recent years, the Seattle-style critique of 
neoliberal globalization has re-emerged from its public dormancy in the United States, 
perhaps most notably in the Occupy Wall Street (OWS) actions of 2011-2012.324  
In this chapter, I argued that these critiques and modes of engagement were potent 
in Seattle because they dis-articulated free trade and democracy, thus puncturing a 
prominent legitimating co-articulation. In the 1990s, discourses advocating global 
economic liberalization simultaneously co-articulated free markets and democracy, 
marking this empty signifier as a primary legitimating term for expanding neoliberal 
policy. Such discourses co-articulated democracy and free markets by re-articulating 
bipolar Cold War rhetoric, by asserting positive relationships between democracy and 
free markets, and by consistently addressing the concepts in tandem. However, the 
implementation of neoliberal policies also enabled the disarticulation of democracy and 
free markets by suggesting that economic liberalization could reasonably precede 
democratization. These discourses thus fostered a tension between free markets and 
democracy that also framed the creation and reception of the WTO. 
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In WTO discourses, leaders and institutions simultaneously co-articulated and dis-
articulated democracy and a specific aspect of free markets—open trade. Advocates of 
the WTO co-articulated democracy and free trade by suggesting that the institution’s free 
trade agenda was pursuing democratic goals and that the organization abided by 
democratic procedure. However, contentious discourses making sense of the WTO also 
dis-articulated democracy and free trade in two ways. First, the WTO and its opponents 
alike maintained that the institution foreclosed democratic engagement on the free trade 
question. Second, critics of the WTO charged the organization with wielding autocratic 
power and overriding domestic policies, a charge that WTO documents, to some extent, 
confirmed.  
I argued that the Seattle protests took advantage of the tension between free trade 
and democracy to drive a wedge between the two concepts. The protests constructed the 
WTO and its free trade agenda as an opponent of the demos, drawing a political frontier 
between a democratic us and an autocratic them. The protests did so in both embodied 
and mediated ways, overtly naming this oppositional pairing and amplifying existing 
critiques of the WTO’s free trade agenda. Drawing such frontiers allowed the protests to 
articulate a democratic alternative to the WTO’s free trade regime. This alternative 
emphasized participation, pluralism, and solidarity.  
Moreover, I argued that the protests associated free trade with violence. The 
Seattle demonstrations marked neoliberal free trade as a site of violence when police and 
protesters engaged in recognizable forms of aggression. For protesters on the ground, 
clashes incarnated a physical battle between neoliberal free trade and its activist 
opponents. News media also marked free trade negotiations as a space of violence by 
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reporting the clashes as part of their WTO meeting coverage and by characterizing 
demonstrators’ descent into chaos as a response to free trade. News coverage thus 
circulated police and protester aggression as a battle over free trade. Ultimately, 
democracy and violence emerged from Seattle as empty signifiers that powerfully 
challenged the neoliberal articulation. 
Beyond Seattle, this case study has three main implications. First, this analysis 
demonstrates that the constitution of a political “people” is a complex rhetorical process 
that is necessary for political engagement. My study confirms Michael Calvin McGee’s 
argument that the constitution of a “people” is a rhetorical process, and this chapter 
suggests that the news media play a significant role in such a construction.325 Also, 
following Mouffe and Laclau, this chapter suggests that the construction of a “people” 
necessitates both a constitutive outside in the form of an adversary and linkages between 
political demands.326 Finally, this case study suggests that an existing antagonistic system 
of signification can accelerate the formation of an embodied and mediated “people.” A 
recognizable people and enemy could form in Seattle, in part, because the protests 
amplified both existing critiques of free trade and existing constructions of a multifaceted 
people for economic democracy. Thus, protesters and news media could turn to existing 
frames for understanding the disruptions in Seattle’s streets as a coherent and 
decipherable challenge to neoliberal globalization.  
Second, this analysis suggests that “democracy” is a potent empty signifier for 
challenging the neoliberal articulation. As Jodi Dean demonstrated, democracy certainly 
is a troubled term because it is used by a variety of communities to authorize neoliberal 
intervention.327 Democracy has been closely aligned with free market capitalism since 
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before the Cold War, and such an association intensified during and after these 
tensions.328 Although the two terms have been sutured, their intersections exist a node of 
tension in the neoliberal era because phenomena deemed democratic can be disregarded 
or punished in favor of market liberalization.329 Although democracy certainly is a 
troubled term, it is also a potent one precisely because it is an empty signifier that has 
both animated the neoliberal articulation and offered a way out of it. As communities re-
articulate democracy and its intersections with economic relations, the term can de-
legitimize the neoliberal practices that it has authorized for decades. 
Finally, this case study suggests that collective, public acts of subjective violence 
can be a potent avenue for disrupting the neoliberal articulation, which is legitimated by 
the promise of peace. As this study showed, violence is itself an empty signifier that 
attaches to various acts and threats of harm. As Žižek argued, subjective violence is a 
powerful form of disruption that is often more visible than objective violence, which 
refers to the harm that is considered necessary and normal for the smooth running of a 
social system.330 The Seattle protests disrupted the neoliberal promise of peace when 
police and protesters engaged in recognizable forms of subjective violence, which were 
contrasted with nonviolence. These acts of recognizable violence muddied the neoliberal 
promise of peace with embodied and mediated visions of aggression that protesters and 
news media sutured with free trade. Žižek argued that subjective and objective violence 
cannot be seen from the standpoint, but my case study suggests otherwise, particularly 
when my arguments are paired with those of DeLuca and Peeples, who found that 
protesters’ symbolic violence attracted news attention to systemic critiques of neoliberal 
globalization. My study suggests that narratives can connect public explosions of 
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subjective violence to the objective violence of the neoliberal articulation. Ultimately, 
this case study demonstrates that both violence and democracy are powerful empty 
signifiers that can pose significant challenges to neoliberal hegemony.  
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Antagonistic Disruptions of Neoliberal Capitalism 
Commentators suggested that the 2016 election directly challenged neoliberal 
hegemony. Jon Talton, a columnist for The Seattle Times, named “neoliberalism” as “one 
of the foremost targets” of both Bernie Sanders and Donald Trump, arguing that “the 
economic policies that have held sway for more than 35 years are under unprecedented 
attack.”1 Talton warned readers, “If the system doesn’t reform itself, people will seek 
alternatives. And the hunt might not be pretty.” The day after Trump declared victory, 
Naomi Klein argued in The Guardian that “Democrats’ embrace of neoliberalism…won 
it for Trump.”2 Klein told readers that “Under neoliberal policies of deregulation, 
privatisation, austerity and corporate trade,” people’s “living standards have declined 
precipitously.” She explained, “For the people who saw security and status as their 
birthright – and that means white men most of all – these losses are unbearable.” Klein 
suggested that Trump’s campaign resonated because it spoke “directly to that pain” by 
summoning a “nostalgic nationalism and anger at remote economic bureaucracies” and 
by “bashing immigrants and people of colour, vilifying Muslims, and degrading women.” 
Her article concluded by praising Bernie Sanders’ “amazing campaign” for 
demonstrating “that the appetite for democratic socialism” as an alternative to 
neoliberalism “is out there.” As these commentators suggested, electoral discourses of 
2016 challenged neoliberal hegemony by pointing to its limits and by positing 
alternatives. Using the parlance of this dissertation, the commentators could argue that 
these electoral discourses antagonized the neoliberal articulation.  
In this project, I asked two primary research questions. First, how did the 
neoliberal articulation create opportunities for people to resist it? Second, how did people 
 278 
take advantage of these opportunities to challenge neoliberal hegemony? To answer these 
questions, I took an approach grounded in theories of articulation. In chapter one, I 
explained that taking this approach means mapping the various relationships established 
rhetorically between both material and symbolic elements. These relationships develop 
over time, and repeated connections solidify to create dominant systems of meaning that 
make sense of the world in ways that privilege some subjectivities over others. Although 
they are powerful, hegemonic articulations are an unstable cobbling together of ideas and 
practices, and so are always subject to destabilization. Antagonisms pull apart the 
dominant articulation by showing that it is not natural, essential, nor complete. Moreover, 
hegemonic articulations tend to create some room for antagonistic agency because people 
identify with multiple and often conflicting subject positions. Thus, an articulation 
approach assumes that the capacity to challenge often arises from negotiating competing, 
overlapping, and often contradictory subject positions available under a particular 
configuration of power. 
Taking such an approach, I defined neoliberalism as a hegemonic articulation that 
strings together four governing principles: freedom as primary, economics as natural, the 
individual as rational actor, and the free market as pure. I demonstrated how the 
articulation of these principles emerged as a system of thought when members of the 
Mont Pelerin Society sought to privilege unfettered capitalism after the Second World 
War. I argued that the neoliberal articulation gathered strength in the United States and 
Britain as a response to the economic crises of the 1970s and that it was legible because 
of its historical antecedents. Through amplification, repetition, and implementation, the 
neoliberal articulation combined governing principles and structural adjustments such 
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that a common sense about how to govern emerged: a common sense that privileged the 
free market as natural, pristine space. 
Having established neoliberalism as a hegemonic articulation, I approached each 
case study as an antagonism that pointed to its limits. In chapter two, I analyzed the U.S. 
Catholic Bishops’ 1986 treatise, Economic Justice for All: Pastoral Letter on Catholic 
Social Teaching and the U.S. Economy (EJA), arguing that this letter introduced Catholic 
Social Teaching as a counterweight to the burgeoning neoliberal articulation. This 
chapter situated the letter in several contexts that enabled the bishops to issue such a 
challenge. I demonstrated that the Ronald Reagan Administration fostered a tension 
between understanding economics as a technocratic science and as a moral philosophy, 
and I argued that the bishops’ letter amplified this tension in ways that privileged 
morality over technocracy. Specifically, I suggested that EJA leveraged the renewed 
emphasis on politicized Christianity and the pastoral letter genre to pivot from a 
generalized Christian conception of economics to a specifically Catholic one. This case 
study demonstrated the relevance of economic philosophies, showed the antagonistic 
power of alternative traditions and institutions, and suggested that Latin American 
traditions and “developing” status could poignantly antagonize neoliberal promises of 
freedom. 
Chapter three examined the 1996 controversy over allegations that Kathie Lee 
Gifford used underage sweatshop labor to produce her Wal-Mart clothing line. This 
chapter also situated the controversy in several contexts that enabled activists to target 
Gifford and news and tabloid media to circulate her emotional responses to the charges. I 
advanced the concept of “free market optimism” – a discourse that uneasily combined 
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market freedom and social responsibility as it promised that free markets would engender 
peaceful prosperity and self-realization. I argued that activist Charles Kernaghan, Gifford 
herself, and the news and tabloid press circulated class shame around bourgeois 
fulfillment, which inhibited free market optimism. I then demonstrated how the 
controversy transformed this shame into class guilt by appropriating neoliberal 
attachments in ways that privileged social responsibility over free market expansion. This 
case study suggested that shame and guilt can be powerful antagonistic emotions, 
particularly when circulated by mainstream media as a controversy. It also showed that 
dividing the globe into “First” and “Third” worlds can foreground class and that 
anchoring antagonistic agency in neoliberal identities is at once potent and limiting.  
In chapter four, I considered Seattle’s 1999 World Trade Organization (WTO) 
protests within the overlapping contexts of neoliberal globalization and democratization. 
This chapter demonstrated how proponents of economic liberalization—including the 
WTO—discursively combined free markets and democracy, while simultaneously 
separating the concepts. I argued that the protests amplified this tension in ways that 
constituted the WTO and its free trade agenda as enemies of a democratic people. I also 
demonstrated how amplifying this tension allowed the protests to articulate a democratic 
economic alternative to free trade. Finally, I argued that the protests co-articulated free 
trade and violence when police and protesters engaged in recognizably violent acts, 
which mainstream news media covered extensively. Ultimately, the chapter showed how 
the protests articulated a choice for the globalizing world: neoliberal autocracy or 
economic democracy. Beyond Seattle, this case study also suggested that the rhetorical 
construction of a political “people” is a complex and necessary process and that 
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democracy and violence both circulate as potent empty signifiers that can antagonize the 
neoliberal order. 
Taken together, these case studies offer scholars and activists lessons about the 
neoliberal articulation and rhetorics that antagonize it, and each of these implications can 
inform the study and practice of rhetorical antagonisms more generally. In this 
concluding chapter, I explicate what these studies teach us about hegemonic articulations, 
antagonistic agency, and multimodal accumulation. As I expound on these implications, I 
propose “antagonistic disruption” as a term that describes antagonisms that interrupt 
hegemonic discourses and evoke the possibility of their demise.  
Hegemonic Articulations  
The project suggests that hegemonic articulations adjust to antagonisms leveled 
against them. Although each case significantly antagonized the neoliberal articulation, 
none of them—even together—dissolved this powerful system. Chapter two concluded 
that EJA’s critique of Reaganism became muted, in part, because the Catholic Church 
pivoted away from its antagonistic economic vision and became embroiled in sex 
scandals that themselves antagonized the Catholic Church’s claim to moralism. Chapter 
three showed how spokespeople and institutions channeled antagonistic guilt into 
subjectivities that upheld the neoliberal articulation in the long term. Chapter four’s 
conclusion demonstrated how the attacks on the World Trade Center, the subsequent rise 
of the militarized police state, and the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq allowed for the 
neoliberal articulation to patch over the cracks caused by the Seattle protests. Indeed, the 
neoliberal articulation is hegemonic because it is sustained by consistent financial, 
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institutional, and rhetorical support that secures its adaptability. It is consistently 
circulated, funded, implemented, and naturalized by powerful people and institutions.  
Such adaptability is why this dissertation opts to approach antagonisms as 
disruptions of neoliberalism. Sociologists Frances Fox Piven and Richard Cloward 
defined “disruption” as the collective withholding of cooperation from a system that 
relies on participation; such disruptions force a change because they impair the system’s 
functioning.3 These case studies suggest that antagonistic disruption has a similar 
meaning because it describes antagonisms that halt the smooth circulation of a hegemonic 
articulation. This term, then, draws our attention to the various interruptions that impede 
the functioning of a system of signification.4 Antagonistic disruptions also suggest the 
possibility of shattering the hegemonic articulation because to disrupt also means, in the 
words of The Oxford English Dictionary, “To break or burst asunder; to break in pieces, 
shatter; to separate forcibly.”5 Thus, antagonistic disruptions interrupt and suggest the 
possibility of shattering hegemonic articulations.  
This project suggests that antagonistic disruptions are made possible, in part, by 
the tensions that animate hegemonic articulations. Specifically, this dissertation suggests 
that discourses promoting neoliberalism in the 1980s and 1990s uneasily attached free 
markets to social goods. As chapter two demonstrated, technocrats took control of an 
economy in crisis and implemented economic liberalization on the promise that these 
practices would usher in moralistic freedom. Chapter three showed how optimistic 
discourses of the 1990s pursued market freedom by suggesting that markets would 
engender prosperity and social responsibility. Chapter four demonstrated how efforts to 
globalize free market exchange rested upon the unstable promise of democracy. In each 
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case, the neoliberal articulation uneasily combined free markets with social goods. The 
neoliberal articulation needed both market freedom and social goods to gain and maintain 
its hegemony because its power came, in part, from these attachments. However, as the 
preceding chapters demonstrated, these attachments often came into conflict when people 
implemented neoliberal policies and when critics of economic liberalization drew 
attention to decisions that privileged market freedoms over social goods.  
Since the late 1990s, the neoliberal articulation has adjusted to antagonisms as it 
has gathered strength, but similar tensions have continued to animate this powerful 
discourse. Nearly one year after the World Trade Center Attacks, the George W. Bush 
Administration outlined its National Security Strategy in starkly neoliberal terms, treating 
economics as a technocratic science and a moralistic philosophy. Echoing the 
technocratic arguments of Chairman of the Federal Reserve Alan Greenspan, the 
document stated as a fact that “Economic growth supported by free trade and free 
markets creates new jobs and higher incomes.”6 The document also struck a moralistic 
tone, asserting that “The concept of ‘free trade’ arose as a moral principle even before it 
became a pillar of economics.” The strategy document explained that a market was moral 
because it “is real freedom, the freedom for a person—or a nation—to make a living.” 
Thus, the Bush Administration simultaneously approached economics as a technocratic 
science and a moralistic philosophy, and Bush would continue to celebrate the scientific 
accuracy and philosophical primacy of neoliberal economics even as the economy 
crashed in 2007.7  
A decade later, President Barack Obama’s discourse also exhibited a tension 
identified in this dissertation: the tension between free markets and democracy. On the 
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one hand, the Obama Administration’s approach to diplomacy and free trade suggested 
that democracy and free markets did not always work in tandem. For example, in a 2016 
speech to the United Nations, Obama dis-articulated free markets and democracy, 
asserting that “some countries, which now recognize the power of free markets, still 
reject the model of free societies.”8 Obama said that although various governments 
adopted market approaches, the adoption of “liberal democracy” was slow or non-
existent; he shared with his audience a sense of frustration at learning “that liberal 
democracy will not just wash across the globe in a single wave.” Yet, in his 2017 
Farewell Address, Obama warned against “autocrats in foreign capitals who see free 
markets, open democracies, and civil society itself as a threat to their power.”9 Thus, 
seventeen years into the new millennium, Obama co-articulated free markets and 
democracy in ways reminiscent of 1990s discourses of neoliberal globalization.  
Most recently, the Trump Administration and Congressional Republicans have 
activated the final tension examined in this dissertation: the uneasy combination of 
market freedom and social responsibility. Although Trump antagonized neoliberalism on 
the national border front, his cabinet appointments and policy suggestions have largely 
towed the neoliberal line. Take, for example, the recent healthcare debate. Throughout 
2017, advocates of market approaches to healthcare, including Trump, sought to repeal 
the Affordable Care Act’s regulations, mandates, and subsidies for health insurance, thus 
moving healthcare further toward a free market system. Speaker of the House Paul Ryan 
explained that transforming healthcare into a “free market” would offer U.S. individuals 
the freedom to “pick the plan they want” and “to pick the doctor they want.”10 Writing 
for The Hill, President of the Taxpayers Protection Alliance David Williams asserted that 
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“If we want more affordable healthcare in this country,” we must turn to “Free market 
reforms” to “increase competition and innovation in the healthcare system.”11 People 
proposing free market reforms thus saddled free markets with the social responsibility of 
providing desirable and affordable healthcare.  
This project prompts scholars and activists to pay close attention to these and 
other tensions. As the neoliberal articulation continues to legitimize the free market by 
attaching it to social goods, scholars can identify other tensions that animate this 
powerful discourse. Moreover, activists seeking to antagonize the neoliberal articulation 
can continue to exploit the above tensions, which remain ripe for exploitation because 
they have already been publicly amplified.  
Antagonistic Agency 
This dissertation showed how particular antagonisms interrupted the neoliberal 
articulation by amplifying the aforementioned tensions. Each antagonism also implied the 
possibility of neoliberalism’s disintegration by pivoting the legitimating value away from 
the free market. EJA constructed economics as a moral philosophy aimed toward 
community, the Gifford controversy turned salient subjectivities toward social 
responsibility, and the Seattle protests articulated a form of democracy that excluded free 
trade. By pivoting salient discourses away from the market, these antagonisms implied 
the viability of a world beyond neoliberalism. More generally, this dissertation suggests 
that antagonistic agency amplifies animating tensions and tends to privilege one of the 
tension’s elements while muting the other.  
The preceding chapters also teach scholars that existing discourses and previous 
antagonisms enabled activists and news media to enact antagonistic agency. Chapter two 
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argued that the Catholic bishops’ economic agency was made possible by the Christian 
milieu and by Catholic traditions and institutions. These existing discourses rendered the 
bishops publicly legible as economic activists, thus prompting the news media to cover 
their letter as a newsworthy intervention into public policy. Chapter three showed how 
Kernaghan’s sweatshop claims fit neatly into an existing system of signification that 
wielded “sweatshop” as a term of critique. Activists and the news media had laid the 
rhetorical groundwork for the Gifford controversy by circulating other sweatshop 
exposés, and existing discourses of celebrity and neoliberal identifications facilitated the 
mediated transformation from shame to guilt. Finally, chapter four demonstrated that the 
Seattle protests activated existing discourses of democracy and previous antagonisms 
aimed at global capitalism. Previous activism had created modes of engagement and 
frames of legibility for activists and for news media outlets, which were thus primed to 
cover “The Battle in Seattle” as a critique of globalization.  
Once each antagonistic disruption had been enacted, it embodied the possibility of 
shattering hegemonic articulations by demonstrating that people had already challenged 
neoliberalism, and thus could do it again. As such, each antagonism explored in this 
project itself became a discourse that authorized future antagonistic agency. In the last 
few years, EJA has re-emerged as a rhetorical resource for Catholic antagonisms of 
neoliberal capitalism. Al Jazeera America contextualized Pope Francis’ “critique of 
trickle-down theories of economics” by tethering it to EJA, which the report identified as 
a cornerstone text of “the Catholic left” in the United States.12 Villanova University 
professor emeritus Joseph Betz tied Sanders’ campaign to EJA in an editorial. Betz told 
readers of The Philadelphia Enquirer that thirty years before Sanders’ bid for the 
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presidency, EJA had proposed an “experiment in securing economic rights…for every 
person,” and that “Bernie Sanders now offers to lead us in designing this experiment.”13 
Writing for the Catholic daily La Croix International, Charles Wilber argued that 
Trump’s “economic program…conflicts with Catholic social thought as embedded in a 
number of social encyclicals and the U.S. bishops’ 1986 letter on the economy, 
‘Economic Justice for All.’”14 Wilber contrasted Trump’s priorities with EJA and 
concluded that “Catholics attentive to our tradition of social and political thought should 
be wary of Trump policies.” As these examples demonstrate, despite having been muted 
by Catholics in the 1990s and 2000s, EJA now circulates as an existing discourse that 
authorizes other Catholic antagonisms of the neoliberal articulation.  
The Gifford controversy also enabled future enactments of antagonistic agency. 
For example, it significantly increased the news coverage of Nike’s use of sweatshop 
labor, and the company’s chief executive officer Phil Knight partially followed Gifford’s 
lead, assuming some responsibility for Nike’s labor practices.15 In their analysis of five 
years’ worth of Nike sweatshop coverage, Josh Greenberg and Graham Knight found that 
stories largely privileged activist perspectives, but that the coverage “tended to 
concentrate on solutions rather than causes, and the source of the problem tended to be 
rooted in the agency of consumers rather than producers.”16 Their study suggests that the 
antagonistic agency of consumers articulated by the Gifford controversy, with all of its 
limitations, stuck to subsequent sweatshop controversies. Spurred by these dual 
controversies, students established chapters of United Students Against Sweatshop 
(USAS) at campuses around the country and pressured their universities to denounce and 
divest from corporations that used sweatshop labor.17 This activist network even 
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established an independent monitoring organization called the Worker Rights Consortium 
(WRC), which, as of September 2017, claimed one hundred and ninety-one universities 
and colleges as affiliates.18 Gifford’s controversy, then, created forms of antagonistic 
agency that begot future antagonisms. 
The Seattle protests also enabled similar antagonisms to neoliberalism. In recent 
years, the Seattle-style critique of neoliberal globalization has re-emerged from its public 
dormancy in the United States, perhaps most notably in the Occupy Wall Street (OWS) 
actions of 2011-2012.19 OWS began on September 17, 2011, when hundreds of protesters 
marched on Wall Street to protest economic disparity and declared, in the words of 
Adbusters, “It’s time for DEMOCRACY NOT CORPORATOCRACY.”20 In the coming 
weeks, hundreds of people occupied Zuccotti Park in New York City, renamed it Liberty 
Square, and lived there, creating an embodied community of participation, plurality, and 
solidarity.21 Activists set up such encampments in cities across the United States in the 
fall of 2011 and into 2012. Combining embodied action and media coverage, OWS 
publicly dis-articulated free market capitalism and democracy, re-articulated economic 
democracy, and showcased police and protester violence.22 Collective memory of the 
1999 Seattle protests offered a system of signification for understanding OWS as a 
movement with significant historical precedent, as media reports and activists connected 
2011 with 1999.23  
In addition to this lesson, the mediated dimensions of these case studies teach 
scholars that antagonistic agency must not necessarily be tethered to purpose. The 
activists certainly sought to undermine neoliberal priorities in each case, but the news 
media did not necessarily engage in intentional antagonism aimed at disrupting the 
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neoliberal articulation. Following dictates of newsworthiness and controversy, news 
media antagonized the neoliberal articulation by covering the intentional antagonisms of 
activists and by circulating their own narratives that framed the activism as significant 
and disruptive. News media, then, can enact a form of antagonistic agency that is not 
necessarily tethered to antagonistic purpose. However, activists certainly should not rely 
heavily on news media amplification, since news media are themselves subject to a 
neoliberal system that privileges shareholders over other constituencies.24   
Ultimately, this project suggests that antagonistic agency is disruptive when it is 
enacted through existing systems of meaning. Existing meanings render antagonistic 
disruptions intelligible, and thus capable of interruption. Existing antagonisms also evoke 
the possibility of neoliberalism’s demise by showing that both challenges and alternatives 
are possible. Therefore, these cases suggest that activists should attach their actions to 
existing discourses and re-articulate previous antagonisms, which can offer both 
inspiration and the rhetorical heft of history. Moreover, this dissertation suggests that 
activists should attract news media attention to their public actions in situations where the 
possibility of a sympathetic frame of controversy exists.25 In other words, if the existing 
system of signification is such that it might offer a sympathetic take on activist actions, 
the news media can amplify antagonisms to the level of disruption. However, this 
opportunity is likely not uniformly accessible to all activists and all causes; thus, activists 





Multimodal Accumulation  
This project affirms Darrel Enck-Wanzer’s contention that engaging in multiple 
rhetorical modalities creates potent forms of agency.26 As Chapter One demonstrated, 
theories of articulation propose that discourses gain force as they accumulate, and my 
case studies suggest that engaging multiple rhetorical modalities allows antagonism’s 
disruptive force to accumulate by infiltrating multiple sense-making spaces.  
EJA primarily took the form of an institutional letter, a modality that allowed the 
bishops to curate theology, history, and economics into an antagonism whose institutional 
affiliation granted it the weight of the Catholic Church. As an institutional document, 
EJA could register as an official moral treatise. This modality also attached to several 
other modes of engagement, each of which brought EJA into additional spaces. As the 
bishops held committee hearings with economic experts and poor people’s advocates, 
EJA attached to economics and advocacy. As newspapers covered EJA, its articulation of 
economic justice attached to national news about policy and economics more broadly. In 
the years immediately following the letter’s release, the bishops began to create Church 
programs, sermons, and pamphlets that sought to bring EJA into practice. Had the Church 
not pivoted away from economic justice, these programs could have engaged members of 
specific parishes, thus attaching this antagonism to everyday practices of U.S. 
Catholicism. 
The Gifford controversy also engaged multiple rhetorical forms, which allowed 
for the sweatshop critique to accumulate as it attached to ever-expanding spaces. 
Kernaghan first articulated the charges in a letter sent to Gifford and Wal-Mart, and the 
limitations of this modality became clear when the allegations were largely ignored. 
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Kernaghan escalated the publicity of his antagonism by speaking with members of 
Congress and by holding a press conference. These modalities made the antagonistic 
shame a matter of public policy and marked it as newsworthy. As Gifford reacted with 
shame and guilt on television, the antagonism penetrated the living rooms of people all 
over the country, attaching antagonistic emotion to spaces of leisure and comfort. As 
news and tabloid media became antagonists, the sweatshop charge stuck to labor laws, to 
the global production chain, and to consumer preferences and behaviors. This antagonism 
also manifested in hearings held at the highest levels of national government, as Gifford 
testified in Congress and at a meeting and press conference held at the White House. The 
sweatshop critique, then, accumulated by attaching to more spaces and issues, until social 
responsibility became a common component of capitalist consumption in the United 
States. 
The Seattle protests likewise activated multiple modalities. Activists planned the 
protests for months, coordinating in-person trainings and crafting materials in preparation 
for their embodied action on the city’s streets. These planning efforts blended communal 
co-presence with ideological principles to steel protesters for a confrontation between 
democracy and free trade. On the streets, protesters blended various embodied 
modalities—some marched, others blockaded, yet others engaged in violence. Marchers 
assumed the posture of acceptable protest, while direct action protesters elevated the risk 
and power involved with the antagonism, using their bodies as barriers and suffering 
violence at the hands of police. Protesters who engaged in violence infused the 
antagonism with threat, giving free trade an ominous emotional tenor. The police 
attached another dimension to the antagonism when they enacted violence against 
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protesters in ways that attached the democratic critique of free trade to literal people in 
the streets. The news media also facilitated the accumulation of the antagonism by 
covering the demonstrations for days and as part of its reporting on issues of national 
significance. The verbal dimensions of the coverage offered a narrative that separated 
free trade from democracy, and the visual dimensions confirmed the narrative accounts 
by featuring violence, mass demonstration, and an overzealous police force protecting an 
elite group of bureaucrats. The multimodality of the Seattle protests disrupted the 
neoliberal articulation by antagonizing free trade in multiple spaces and in ways that 
activated multiple senses.  
This dissertation also suggests that antagonisms are disruptive to the extent that 
they are consistently engaged, and thus allowed to accumulate. When compared to the 
other case studies, EJA was the least disruptive, in part, because it was the least 
consistent. With the weight of Catholic institutions behind it, the letter had the potential 
to significantly disrupt the burgeoning neoliberal articulation, particularly if the Church 
had implemented its plans to put EJA into regular Catholic practice. In recent years, this 
antagonism has resurfaced with the institutional lead of Pope Francis, and the Catholic 
Church is again poised to stand as a significant antagonist of the neoliberal articulation. It 
will remain up to Catholic institutions, leaders, and congregants to amplify this moral 
critique of neoliberal economics in multimodal ways that activate diverse senses and 
spaces. 
The Gifford controversy offered a significant disruption because its impetus to 
social responsibility was consistently repeated in multimodal ways. Various communities 
and institutions—from the White House to Nike to student groups—adopted this 
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antagonism, allowing its critique of market freedom to accumulate. Of course, the danger 
of Gifford-style accumulation is that it was ripe for appropriation because it revolved 
around market identities like the consumer and the corporation. For example, Forbes 
Magazine reported that the Gifford controversy and its Nike corollary “cemented an 
expanded expectation of business to accept responsibility for the oversight of the social 
and environmental impacts of its supply chain.”27 Forbes explained that as corporations 
“became concerned about tarnished reputations, potential regulations, and shareholder 
actions,” they created the growing field known as Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR). 
Many consumers, also, have taken on responsibility for “ethical consumption” when 
purchasing a plethora of consumer goods, including clothing, food, and housing.28 In 
many ways, such self-regulation and consumerism strengthened the power and morality 
of the free market by showing that social responsibility could be enacted in the 
marketplace.29 
Nonetheless, through accumulation, the social responsibility critique of market 
freedom has attached the threat of shame and guilt to the production-consumption-profit 
chain in ways that manifest every day. Moreover, this accumulation has heightened the 
tension between market freedom and social responsibility because corporations and 
consumers have embraced responsibility as a marker of neoliberal identity. Thus, 
antagonists can again amplify this tension in multimodal ways that dis-articulate the free 
market and social responsibility, while emphasizing the latter. As they pursue such a task, 
antagonists should heed a key rhetorical finding of chapter three—that the remedies 
prescribed by guilt-tripping agents can shape the possibilities for remediation. These 
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remedies, then, should focus on excising the market from social responsibility to the 
extent that existing discourses enable such a separation. 
People involved with movements for “Fair Trade” have combined the social 
responsibility impetus with the democratic antagonism made prominent in Seattle. 
Movements for Fair Trade, according to Michael K. Goodman, seek to “re-connect 
producers and consumers economically, politically, and psychologically through the 
creation of a transnational moral economy.”30 Many fair trade advocates use the language 
of populist democracy to privilege fair over free; for example, the Fair World Project 
promoted their vision of an “empowering and activist model of trade that supports small 
farmers, democratic organizations, and engaged consumers.”31 Fairtrade America 
asserted that their organization enabled “democracy in action” because it offered 
“producer organizations the opportunity to elect how they invest in their communities,” 
thus promoting “self-determination.”32 In the last decade, some development scholars 
have suggested that fair trade, not free trade, may aid global democratization, thus 
lending scholarly authority to this co-articulation of fair trade and democracy.33  
Movements for fair trade are but one example of people re-engaging the 
democratic antagonism of free trade. Indeed, the Seattle protests’ populist-democratic 
challenge to free trade—itself a re-articulation of previous antagonisms—has 
accumulated to the point of significant disruption. When President Obama pushed to 
ratify the Trans-Pacific-Partnership (TPP) in the last years of his presidency, familiar 
critiques resurfaced. Writing for The Nation, Lori Wallach—the same person who had 
written op-eds against the WTO in 1999—argued that the TPP was “a massive assault on 
democracy” because it “would grant enormous new powers to corporations.”34 The 
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critique also re-emerged when political candidates in 2016 made the TPP a focal point of 
the election. Sanders called it “a disastrous trade agreement designed to protect the 
interests of the largest multi-national corporations at the expense of workers, consumers, 
the environment and the foundations of American democracy.”35 Trump also called the 
TPP a “disaster” and went as far as to compare it to sexual assault, saying that the deal 
was “done and pushed by special interests who want to rape our country.”36 Trump’s 
unseemly metaphor highlighted populism, violent imagery, and the lack of consent to 
challenge the free trade deal. Although Hillary Clinton originally supported the TPP, she 
also denounced the deal on the campaign trail as one that did not adequately control 
“currency manipulation,” which had cost “American jobs” in the past.37 Clinton largely 
avoided the democracy critique, but she nonetheless re-engaged the national sovereignty 
and worker-centric elements of the Seattle protests by pledging allegiance to “American 
jobs.” In the end, the United States did not adopt the TPP. 
Ultimately, my case studies show that the more multimodal and frequent the 
antagonistic engagement, the more forceful the disruption. With each enactment, the 
antagonistic disruption gains force as it attaches to more senses and spaces, thus 
simultaneously interrupting the hegemonic articulation and implying the possibility of its 
collapse. This project, then, recommends that activists focus on consistency and 
multimodality when enacting antagonisms. Moreover, this dissertation suggests that 
rhetorical scholars of social change should examine how people come to re-articulate 
multimodal antagonisms. Scholars might inquire how existing discourses enable such re-
articulation and how particular antagonisms become, to borrow Sara Ahmed’s word, 
“sticky” enough to disrupt.38 
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Antagonistic Disruptions of the Neoliberal Free Market 
When Trump won the presidency in 2016, Cornel West proclaimed that “The 
neoliberal era in the United States ended with a neofascist bang.”39 West characterized 
the election as one in which “White working- and middle-class fellow citizens—out of 
anger and anguish—rejected the economic neglect of neoliberal policies” and “supported 
a candidate who appeared to blame their social misery on minorities.”40 This dissertation 
suggests that Dr. West sounded neoliberalism’s death knell too soon. Indeed, the Trump 
Administration’s embrace of free market principles demonstrates the ability of the 
neoliberal articulation to adjust to antagonisms leveled against it. Instead of watching for 
the definitive end of neoliberal hegemony, this project suggests that we approach recent 
electoral discourses as antagonistic disruptions—that is, discursive interruptions that 
evoke the possibility of shattering neoliberalism’s hegemony.  
Taking this approach, we can analyze how existing discourses enabled electoral 
antagonisms, which tensions the campaigns amplified, and how they enacted antagonistic 
agency. For instance, we can see how existing xenophobic-nationalist discourses around 
free trade enabled the Trump campaign.41 Taking advantage of such discourses, the 
campaign amplified a neoliberal tension between globalism and nationalism: an uneasy 
attachment of globalized free trade to a nationalistic social good—namely, the promise of 
economic opportunity in the United States.42 Trump vowed not to “surrender this country, 
or its people, to the false song of globalism,” unlike the leaders who he said had been 
“moving our jobs, our wealth and our factories to Mexico and overseas.”43 Discourses 
surrounding Trump’s campaign also marked Hillary Clinton as the “globalist” who had to 
be defeated in order to restore national sovereignty over economics and identity.44 The 
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Trump campaign pivoted national wealth away from a global free market in multimodal 
ways – through speeches, rallies, news media coverage, and eventually, through an 
Electoral College win.  
We can also examine how the Sanders Campaign amplified a tension that 
animated the progressive end of the neoliberal continuum. Nancy Fraser recently coined 
the term “progressive neoliberalism,” which describes a form of the free market impetus 
that blends the emancipatory claims of “new social movements” with deregulatory and 
individualistic commitments.45 In Fraser’s configuration, we again see the free market 
attaching to a social good—this time to the practice and promise of emancipation. 
Although Clinton adopted policies that reigned in the unfettered market, prominent 
discourses in 2016—including those of Sanders’ supporters—had cast her as an 
embodiment of progressive neoliberalism.46 Enabled by such existing discourses as 
Occupy Wall Street and criticisms of the TPP, the Sanders campaign pivoted social 
movement emancipation away from the free market. For example, in Sanders’ speech 
celebrating his New Hampshire primary win, he vowed to “pursue the fight for women’s 
rights, for gay rights, for disability rights” in the same breath as he told his supporters, 
“we must tell the billionaire class and the 1% that they cannot have it all at a time of 
massive wealth and income inequality.”47 The Sanders antagonism also engaged multiple 
modalities including speeches, rallies, policies, grassroots organizing, news media 
attention, and high-profile endorsements. 
Despite these disruptions, the neoliberal articulation is currently adjusting to 
2016’s disruptions, thus supporting this dissertation’s assertion that no single antagonism 
will tear apart the neoliberal articulation. The Trump Administration and Congressional 
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Republicans have embraced the free market as a beacon for their domestic policies, and 
Democrats are in the throes of deciding whether to heartily embrace progressive 
neoliberalism or to embark on a more socialist-populist platform.48 This dissertation also 
suggests, though, that antagonistic disruptions can accumulate if they are consistently 
engaged in multimodal ways. One year after the electoral upset, antagonists have been 
mobilizing against the neoliberal articulation on multiple fronts. The Sanders campaign 
has morphed into Our Revolution, a national group that organizes for progressive 
candidates and policies; the Democratic Socialists of America recently broke their record 
in memberships, tripling in size; sixteen Democratic Senators co-sponsored Sanders’ 
2017 Medicare for All bill.49 The antagonisms appear to be accumulating, and my 
dissertation suggests that consistent, multimodal disruptions have the potential to tear 
neoliberalism apart. 
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